

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER
AD512785
CLASSIFICATION CHANGES
TO:                    unclassified
FROM:                confidential
LIMITATION CHANGES
TO: Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
FROM: Controlling DoD Organization: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.
AUTHORITY
General Declassification Schedule per DoD 5200.1-r; Adjutant General's Office [Army] ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED  
AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE  
UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND  
NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON  
ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A**

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;  
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

# **GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE**

**IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
DOD 5200.1-P & EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652**

---

# **SECURITY**

---

# **MARKING**

**The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked.**

**Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.**

---

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.



**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL**  
**WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (18 Nov 70) FOR OT UT 702185

25 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st  
Logistical Command, Period Ending 30 April 1970 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Information of actions initiated as a result of subject report should be forwarded to ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

1 Incl  
as

**DISTRIBUTION:**

**Commanding Generals**

US Continental Army Command  
US Army Combat Developments Command  
US Army Materiel Command

**Commandants**

US Army War College  
US Army Command and General Staff College  
US Army Adjutant General School  
US Army Armor School  
US Army Aviation School  
US Army Engineer School  
US Army Field Artillery School  
US Army Infantry School  
US Army Ordnance School  
US Army Quartermaster School

Regraded unclassified when separated  
from classified inclosure.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

AD 512785

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND  
APO San Francisco 96384

AVCA CO-MH

15 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
30 April 1970 (RCS CSFOR-65)(R-2) (U)

THRU: Commanding General  
United States Army, Vietnam  
ATTN: AVHGC-DST  
APO 96375

Commander in Chief  
United States Army, Pacific  
ATTN: GPOP-DT  
APO 96558


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D.C. 20315

The Operational Report-Lessons Learned of this Headquarters for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 is forwarded in accordance with Army Regulation 525-15.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4862

1 Incl  
as

  
C. T. SELBY  
LTC AGC  
Adjutant General

Regraded unclassified when separated  
from classified inclosure.

INCL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

## CONFIDENTIAL

### DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)

- US Army Signal School
- US Army Southeastern Signal School
- US Army Transportation School

### Copies furnished:

- Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
- Deputy Chiefs of Staff
- Chief of Research and Development
- Assistant Chiefs of Staff
- Chief of Engineers
- The Surgeon General
- The Provost Marshal General
- OSD(SA) Assistant for Southeast Asia Forces
- Office, Director of Defense Research & Engineering
- Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Commanding Generals
  - US Army Electronics Command
  - US Army Weapons Command
  - Deseret Test Center
  - US Army Computer Systems Command
- Commandant of the Marine Corps
- Defense Documentation Center
- USAF Project RAND
- Commanding Officers
  - US Army Construction Engineering Research Laboratory
  - US Army Limited War Laboratory
  - US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
  - US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center

CONFIDENTIAL

## SECTION I, OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIONS

ANNEXES	PAGE
A. COMMAND GROUP	1
B. ACofS, COMPTROLLER	2
C. ACofS, SECURITY, PLANS, AND OPERATIONS	7
D. ACofS, SUPPLY	38
E. ACofS, MAINTENANCE	47
F. ACofS, TRANSPORTATION	55
G. ACofS, AMMUNITION	69
H. ACofS, SERVICES	72
I. ACofS, PERSONNEL	75
J. ACofS, PROCUREMENT	82
K. ADJUTANT GENERAL	84
L. INSPECTOR GENERAL	85
M. STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE	88
N. PROVOST MARSHAL	92
O. STAFF CHAPLIN	95
P. INFORMATION OFFICE	95
Q. SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR DATA SYSTEMS	98
R. SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR COMBAT SECURITY	99

## SECTION II, LESSONS LEARNED: OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS

A. PERSONNEL	100
B. INTELLIGENCE	101
C. OPERATIONS	104
D. ORGANIZATION	118
E. TRAINING	118

INCL



ANNEXES	PAGE
F. LOGISTICS	118
G. COMMUNICATIONS	121
H. MATERIAL	121
I. OTHER	121

#### INCLOSURES

1. Visitors to the Command
2. Reenlistment Statistics
3. R&R Allocations
4. Promotion Allocation and Appointments
5. Quarterly Strength Report
6. Quarterly Report of Gains and Losses
7. Awards
8. Report of Casualties

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**SECTION 1**

**OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIONS**

FOR OT UT  
702185  
Inclosure

iv

**DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

ANNEX A (U) Command Group

1. (U) Distinguished visitors to Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command are indicated at inclosure 1. During the reporting period the position of Special Assistant to the Commanding General for Data Systems was abolished and the Logistical Data Service Center was established: GO #338 effective 13 April 1970.

2 (U) Principal changes of key personnel during the quarter: COL Jerome M. McCabe replaced COL Michael Chessnoe as ACofS, Maintenance; COL John T. Burke replaced COL Herbert S. Lewis as ACofS, SP&O; COL R. E. Stone replaced COL Robert A. Reade as ACofS, Supply and MAJ William D. MacQuattie replaced COL Stone as Director of Food; LTC Foster F. Fountain replaced COL Ralph Leinhaas as Director of POL; LTC Carl G. Meador replaced COL Otto P. Scharth as Special Assistant to the Commanding General for Special Projects Planning; COL Charles D. Agee replaced COL Frank A. LaBoon as ACofS, Services; MAJ William H. Reynolds replaced LTC Alvah B. Davis, Jr., as Secretary General Staff; CPT Miguel A. Cuadros replaced CPT Anthony A. Yancoskie as Assistant Secretary General Staff; CSM James A. Scott replaced CSM Franklin M. Wickham as Command Sergeant Major.

ANNEX B (U) ACofS, COMPTROLLER

1. (U) Management Engineering Branch

a. Location Accuracy: The accuracy of the locator file in 1st Logistical Command Depots has been a matter of continuing concern to the Commanding General. The locator file, which records where each item in the Depot is stored, is an essential management record, since it is impossible to issue what cannot be found. Moreover, without accurate locator records an accurate inventory is impossible. In the past, estimates of locator accuracy reported by the Depots to HQ, 1st Logistical Command, had been taken using inappropriate sampling techniques, or methodologies which resulted in biased results. Generally, results reported by the Depots were biased upward. The Comptroller's office applied simple random sampling techniques to generate a better estimate of location accuracy. An initial set of samples was taken in December, one at each Depot, and the results reported at the December Commander's Conference. These results helped to spotlight the command's problems with location accuracy. A second set of samples was taken for the Commander's Conference in February, and a third set for the April Commander's Conference. By April, Long Binh and Da Nang Depots had achieved a file to floor location accuracy of better than 87%. Qui Nhon had begun to recover from a period of very poor accuracy. Cam Ranh Bay showed no improvement. Methods of random sampling developed by the Comptroller's office were adopted as a command standard, and a computer program was disseminated to generate the samples.

b. Keystone Bluejay: The Director of Retrograde requested the Comptroller to review operations in the Keystone Bluejay Control Center and prepare a desk SOP, which was completed on 1 April 1970. Before the preparation of this SOP there had been no single reference document to assist personnel who managed the system in determining appropriate disposition and flow of all documents.

c. Disposition of Property Disposal Yard Smelters: A management team visited the major property disposal yards to determine disposition of five aluminum smelters acquired in late 1969. These smelters had been acquired as a result of a Department of the Army recommendation in 1967 that the command purchase four nonferrous metal smelters. The aluminum smelters were found to be too specialized for use in Vietnam, and scrap contractors were in a position to provide adequate aluminum scrap removals. The team determined that operation of these smelters would be uneconomical and recommended that the smelters not be installed, but retrograded or sold.

d. PERIL Truck Demurrage: The Deputy Commanding General requested the Comptroller to analyze demurrage under the PERIL contract, which provides trucking services in the Saigon area. The purpose of the analysis was to determine where demurrage was occurring and why. It revealed that demurrage at the offload site was most important, followed by escort demurrage (i.e., waiting for MP escort through Saigon or other areas). Demurrage at the load site was least important. Moreover, demurrage was concentrated in just a few locations: Long Binh Depot, Newport, Phu Tho, and PX's in the Long Binh area.

e. Organization and Functions Manual: On 28 February 1970, change 1 to LC Regulation 10-1, Organization and Functions Manual, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, was published and distributed to all concerned. Basis for publishing this

change was to update the manual prior to the arrival of the DA IG Inspection Team. Update reflected certain internal organizational realignments and/or the transfer of specific functional responsibilities within the various staff elements.

f. Consolidation of Headquarters: In February 1970 the responsibility for monitoring and coordinating the approved consolidation of this headquarters and Headquarters, USARV, was transferred per Commanding General's direction from ACofS, Comptroller, to ACofS, SP&O. In March 1970, Mr. Watase, Management Analyst, ACofS, Comptroller was assigned on a loan basis to assist the action officer of ACofS, SP&O, with the responsibility cited above.

## 2. (U) Review and Analysis Branch

a. During the past quarter, coordination has been effected between Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command and Headquarters, USARV, concerning the status of the Review and Analysis and the Commanding General's Fact Book upon consolidation.

(1) The function of preparing the Review and Analysis publication will be assumed by the USARV ACofS, Comptroller, on 25 May 1970. USARV currently publishes a quarterly Command Progress Report. Current planning calls for the merger of these two publications resulting in a quarterly publication with a monthly logistical supplement.

(2) The function of preparing the CG's Fact Book will be assumed by the G-4, USARV on 1 July 1970.

b. Reports Control: The review of 1st Logistical Command recurring reports during the past quarter consisted primarily of determining which reporting requirements would be necessary after the consolidation of USARV and 1st Logistical Command Headquarters. On 1 Apr 70 the ACofS, Comptroller, discontinued justifying reports and issuing 1st Logistical Command Reports Control Symbols (RCS's). This function was taken over by the USARV Comptroller and USARV RCS's are presently being utilized as appropriate. The primary objective of the 1st Logistical Command Reports Control Officer beginning 15 Mar 70 was to ensure that all 83 1st Logistical Command reports were either rescinded or continued under a USARV RCS by 15 Jun 70. This entailed coordination between personnel of the two headquarters. As of 30 Apr 70 agreement between headquarters action officers had been reached on the future status of all but five reports. The 30 Apr 70 status of all reports is shown in the table below.

<u>ACTION</u>	<u>NUMBER OF REPORTS</u>
Rescinded	6
To be rescinded	13
Awarded USARV RCS	6
To be awarded USARV RCS	53
Undecided	<u>5</u>
TOTAL	83

INCL

The 53 reports that are pending USARV action have a 30 May 70 suspense for action to ensure that all reports have new symbols and that the subordinate commands are informed of the changes by 15 Jun 70.

3. (U) Financial Services: Because of the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division and Phase 3 redeployment, realignment of non-divisional finance support was required. USARV letter, AVHGD-F, subject "Realignment of Responsibility for Non-Divisional Units," dated 7 February 1970, and HQ, 1st Logistical Command Msg, subject: "Movement Orders" DTG 041024Z Mar 70, directed the movement of the 22nd Finance Section from Nha Trang to Di An, RVN. The responsibility for operation of Class B Finance Offices at Phu Loc (formerly 1st Infantry Division), Bien Hoa (Central Finance and Accounting Office (CFAO)) and Bearcat (CFAO) was to be transferred to the 22nd Finance Section NLT 10 March 1970.

The Headquarters element of the 22nd Finance Section arrived in Di An on 5 March 1970. The element included the Commanding Officer, Sergeant Major, Chief of Pay Division, Supply Sergeant and two clerks.

On 9 March 1970, the 1st Infantry Division's Class B Office at Phu Loi was taken over and the 22nd Finance Section began disbursing operations on 10 March. Due to the lack of office and billet space, this office could not be moved to Di An at that time.

Also, the two Class B Offices (Bien Hoa and Bearcat) could not be transferred from the CFAO as directed above because of services provided by CFAO and a shortage of officer personnel in the 22nd Finance Section. However, on 9 April, the Class B Office at Bien Hoa was finally transferred to 22nd Finance Section. The Phu Loi office also moved on this date to Di An. On 11 April 1970, the personnel, equipment and pay records of CFAO were transferred from Bearcat to the Class B Office, Bien Hoa, 22nd Finance Section.

#### 4. (U) Budget

a. Continued analysis of requirements by the Resource and Contract Performance Review Boards and Program Budget Advisory Committee reprogramming actions have reduced FY70 In-Country OMA fund requirements to \$100.8 million as of 31 March 1970. All known requirements have been financed. The obligation rate as of 31 March 70 is 82.4% of committed funds which is an acceptable rate.

b. The Bulk Certification of Funds (BCF) Letter, 70-2, dated 6 Mar 69, issued by the Centralized Financial Management Agency, Hawaii, has been increased during the 3rd Quarter of FY70 by \$4 million. The latest increase was for operational requirements and the BCF Letter with all amendments now totals \$46 million.

c. 1st Logistical Command Out-of-Country OMA fund requirements for FY70 are substantially lower than for FY69. Through the first nine months of FY70, net fund reservations represent 49.5% of the total fund reservations recorded for FY69. Obligations for the same period of FY70 represent 45.6% of the total recorded for FY69. Of the \$30 million programmed as earned reimbursements in FY70, \$22.5 million has been earned through 31 March 70. A 1st Logistical Command Operating Budget for FY71 OMA Out-of-Country funds was submitted to USARV during February 70. Including programmed reimbursements of \$45 million, the budget

totaled \$459 million. Included are the new mission requirements for the US Army in I Corps Tactical Zone.

5. (U) Cost Reduction: During February-April of FY70 an additional 47 actions were submitted to the US Army Audit Agency for validation. Audit work on these and earlier submissions increased total validated savings to \$30.5 million. The largest single action was a "Reduction in the Use of Sandbags" for over \$22 million.

6. (U) Internal Review.

a. Auditors of the Finance and Internal Review Division continued their audits of the Foreign Excess Sales Office and Imprest Funds.

b. An audit of the accountability of assets turned in under Keystone Bluejay began near the end of this reporting period. The Internal Review program as a whole was restricted by an additional loss of personnel.

c. No USARV internal reviews were performed during this period.

d. Three final reports of audit were received from the USAAA: Asset Accounting, Subsistence Management, and Inventory Balances.

e. Audit work continued on the 10-ton tractor. Two command assist audits, "Redball" and "Duplicate Documents in the NCR 500 System", were initiated.

f. General Accounting Office attention focused on Operation Keystone Bluejay. Nearly 30 Auditors were assigned to this audit throughout Vietnam. Field work is expected to continue throughout the remainder of the year.

g. Non-Appropriated Funds studies proceeded according to the published schedule with visits to all four Support Commands. No problem areas were encountered.

## CONFIDENTIAL

### ANNEX C (C) ACofS, Security, Plans and Operations, Security and Intelligence Division

1. (C) During the reporting period, several highpoints of enemy initiated activity were noted, the most significant being the night of 31 March - 1 April when the enemy apparently initiated his Spring Campaign. Several 1st Logistical Command installations, facilities and activities were subjects of attacks by fire during this night. In March and April the enemy initiated extensive offensive activity in the Dak Seang area of II CTZ. These offensive actions were an attempt to accomplish three primary objectives: (1) shatter the Vietnamization program, (2) force the U.S. to completely withdraw its troops from South Vietnam and (3) establish a coalition government. Documents captured in April 1970, stated that following these three objectives "complete" victory would be obtained by communist seizure of key positions from village to provincial level. The document stated that while the first two objectives were possible, the third was improbable. Admitting the failures of the general offensives during this period, COSVN has directed a "return to the early stages of the war." This "return" is a probable reference to a strengthening of political structures, Local Force units and emphasis on small unit operations. In II Corps enemy divisional elements moved generally to the west and southwest in the Corps during the quarter, possibly in response to Cambodian pressures and in an attempt to maintain his existing supply corridors. Continuing infiltration was noted in IV Corps with an accompanying moderate level of activity directed primarily at Regional Forces and Popular Forces in Chau Doc Province.


2. (C) This quarter once again witnessed a general decrease in the total number of incidents directed against 1st Logistical Command. There were almost 16% fewer incidents this quarter than last quarter. The only categories of "enemy initiated" incidents that did not decrease were shipping and harassing incidents. This is in keeping with the enemy's intent to return to the early stages of the war in which small unit/hit and run strategy plays the dominant role. Even though sapper activity decreased, it appears that this tactic will be of primary significance in the future because it is well suited for the guerrilla war/protracted conflict.

3. (C) The following chart depicts the total number of incidents, stratified by type, directed at 1st Logistical Command installations and activities from May 1969 through April 1970. Significant enemy initiated incidents involving 1st Logistical Command during the period 1 February 1970 through 30 April 1970 were of six types; attacks on shipping, attacks on convoys, interdiction of pipelines, ground/sapper attacks, harassments, and attacks by fire. As the chart indicates, there has been a significant trend of decreasing frequency of incidents over the past nine months.



# CONFIDENTIAL

ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS INVOLVING 1ST LOG 1 May 1969 - 30 Apr 1970




## CONFIDENTIAL

4. (C) The following is a breakout of enemy initiated incidents, by type, with comments and examples:

a. Attacks on Shipping

(1) This type of activity has increased 114% since the last quarter with a total of 15 incidents this quarter compared with only seven incidents last quarter. There was only one incident that occurred in the Long Tau shipping channel, further indicating that the "Special Interest" procedures in this area have been effective. Six of the 15 incidents occurred in the Dong Nai River between Cat Lai and a point approximately 16 kilometers north up the river. Most of the incidents in this area were harassing in nature and did not result in any significant damages or casualties. The most significant shipping incidents were two mining incidents against ships that were docked at port as indicated in items (3) a. and b. below.

(2) The following chart shows enemy initiated incidents directed against shipping for a 12 month period, to include the three months covered by this report.



## CONFIDENTIAL

(3) Some examples of attacks on shipping were:

(a) On 26 February, 1970, at Cat Lai, barge #6624 was hit by a mine while in the process of off loading 175mm ammunition from the ship "PETRACA". The barge was approximately 20% loaded when the explosion occurred. The mine was attached to a nearby buoy and had been allowed to float downstream and hit the barge. The barge sustained minor damages and the ship sustained damages to the wheelhouse, electronic gear and the wiring system. None of the ammunition was damaged. Six Vietnamese civilians and two U.S. personnel received slight wounds.

(b) On 5 March, at Qui Nhon, the ship "AMERICLOUD" while back-loading retrograde at De Long Pier, was damaged by an unknown type explosive charge believed to have been a satchel charge placed in a fender bumper between the ship and the pier. Damage to the ship consisted of one hole on the port bow approximately six feet high and 18 feet long and a hole on the starboard side approximately one foot by one foot. There were negative casualties.

(c) On 20 March, 1970, 5 kilometers northeast of Cat Lai, the POL barge "BASSIC" was fired on by an unknown number of B-40 rockets. One round hit the barge resulting in minor damage to the barge and wounding one local national.


### b. Attacks on Convoys

(1) To illustrate the type and severity of enemy initiated incidents against 1st Logistical Command convoys, these incidents have been divided into ambushes, sniper fire and mine incidents. Convoy incidents have decreased 15.2% this quarter as compared with last quarter. As noted on the chart below, convoy incidents have generally decreased during the entire 12 month period. It is interesting to note that although there was an overall decrease in convoy incidents, there was a 110% increase in mining incidents this quarter compared with the preceding quarter. This type of activity has progressively increased during the reporting quarter. This type of activity is very indicative of the overall characteristic of enemy initiated activity this quarter in that it is more in keeping with guerrilla type warfare, requiring fewer personnel to accomplish a mission of comparatively little risk to the perpetrator. During the reporting period 56% of the enemy activity directed at land vehicles occurred in II Corps with the predominance of activity on QL-19 between Qui Nhon and Pleiku and to a lesser degree on QL-21 between Ninh Hoa and Ban Me Thuot.

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

(C) The following chart depicts enemy initiated incidents directed against land vehicles for a 12 Month period to include the three months of this quarter:



## CONFIDENTIAL

### (3) Some examples of convoy ambushes were:

(a) On 1 April, 1970, 5 kilometers east of An Khe, A 54th Transportation battalion convoy traveling west on QL-19 enroute to Pleiku from Qui Nhon was ambushed by an unknown size enemy force. The enemy employed small arms, automatic weapons and B-40 rocket fire from 10-200 meters on both sides of the road. The convoy was organized into one march unit and consisted of 26 vehicles. Fire was returned with organic .50 caliber, M-16, M-79 and M-60s. Gunships provided support. Results: Friendly - 4 WIA (all from the 54th Transportation Battalion with minor wounds), three five ton cargo trucks and one guntruck moderately damaged; Enemy - one KIA.

(b) On 7 April, 1970, eight kilometers east of An Khe, a 27th Transportation Battalion convoy traveling east on Highway QL-19 from Pleiku to Qui Nhon was ambushed by an estimated enemy company employing an unknown amount of small arms/automatic weapons fire and grenades from 10 to 24 meters on both sides of the road. The convoy was organized into one march unit and consisted of 30 vehicles. Fire was returned with organic weapons. Results: Friendly - There were no casualties, but four flatbeds and two reefers received minor damages; Enemy - Unknown.

(c) On 25 April, 1970, six kilometers west of Qui Nhon, a 54th Transportation Battalion convoy traveling south on Highway QL-1 was ambushed by an unknown size enemy force employing small arms, M-79 and B-40 rocket fire from both sides of the road. Fire was returned with organic weapons. Results: Friendly - Two U.S. killed, four U.S. wounded, two five ton cargo trucks, one guntruck and one jeep destroyed. Enemy - Unknown. Comment: This is the first convoy incident since 24 November 1969, in which any 1st Logistical Command personnel have been killed.

### (4) Some examples of mine incidents were:

(a) On 11 March, 1970, 23 kilometers east of Ha Tien, a 38 vehicle convoy from the 120th Transportation Company, 91st Combat Support Battalion, traveling west on Highway LTL-8A enroute to Ha Tien from Binh Thuy, hit two command detonated mines. The convoy was being escorted by elements of the 7th Battalion, 1st Cavalry. Results: Friendly - four killed, five wounded (all from the 1st Cavalry) and moderate damage to two vehicles; Enemy - None.

(b) On 21 April, 1970, 25 kilometers south of Quan Loi, a truck from the 572nd Transportation Company, 48th Transportation Group, hit

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

and detonated an unknown type/size mine on Highway QL-13. Results: Friendly - One U.S. slightly wounded and one truck lightly damaged; Enemy - None.

(c) On 6 April, 1970, 16 kilometers east of Long Giao, a five ton tractor-trailer from the 47th Transportation Company hit and detonated a pressure-type mine on Highway QL-1. Results: Friendly - Two U.S. received minor wounds, the tractor was destroyed and the trailer sustained one broken axle; Enemy - None.

(5) Some examples of sniper incidents were:

(a) On 20 March, 1970, 16 kilometers east of Phu Loc, a convoy from the 363rd Transportation Company, 80th General Support Group, enroute to Da Nang from Phu Bai on Highway QL-1 received sniper fire from an unknown size enemy force. No fire was returned. Results: Friendly - One wounded; Enemy-None.

(b) On 31 March, 1970, 22 kilometers northwest of Ninh Hoa, a convoy from the 24th Transportation Battalion, enroute to Cam Ranh Bay from Ban Me Thuot on Highway QL-1, received an unknown amount of small arms and automatic weapons fire from the south side of the road while stopping to adjust the load on an S&P. Fire was returned with unknown results. There were no friendly casualties or damage.

(c) On 17 April, 1970, a convoy from the 124th Transportation Command Battalion, traveling west on Highway QL-19 from Qui Nhon to Pleiku, received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force located on the south side of the road. Fire was returned with unknown results. There were negative friendly casualties or damage.

(6) During the reporting quarter there were 49 enemy interdictions of rail lines throughout the Republic. This did not represent any appreciable increase from the past quarter. Of significance were two major rail restoration projects that were initiated as depicted below:

(a) During February 1970, work parties began restoration of the line between Thap Cham (4 kilometers northwest of Phan Rang) and Dalat; approximately 84 kilometers of track. As of 8 March 1970, the line was operational as far as Song Pha; half way to Dalat. The remainder of the line is expected to be operational on or about 15 May 1970.

(b) Repair work on the Ho Nai-Xuan Loc Line, 39 kilometers of track running west to east just north of Long Binh Post, was discontinued in January 1970 by the Vietnam Railroad Service due to inadequate security

## CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL


in the vicinity of Bau Ca (located half way between Ho Nai and Xuan Loc). Work again commenced on 17 February, but was again discontinued due to repeated enemy interdiction. No date has been established to renew restoration activities on this line.

### c. Pipeline Incidents:

(1) Enemy initiated incidents involving pipelines decreased by almost 16% as compared with the last quarter and as the chart indicates pipeline incidents have generally been decreasing since August of 1969. The damages to the pipeline incurred as a result of enemy activity has also been very low this quarter with approximately 25% of the incidents resulting in the replacement of three or more sections of pipeline. It is significant though to point out that there were thirteen major incidents (not reflected on the chart below) of Local Nationals tampering with the lines by loosening couplings, which resulted in considerable product loss. Most of this activity took place in the Phan Rang area of II Corps during the period 30 March to 1 April 1970; a relative high-point country-wide. Pumping operations have terminated between Qui Nhon and Pleiku due to continuing enemy activity and pilfering along this line.

(2) The following chart depicts enemy initiated incidents directed against pipelines for a 12 month period to include the three months of this quarter:

# CONFIDENTIAL



(3) Some examples of enemy initiated incidents against the pipeline were:

(a) On 9 March, 1970, four kilometers east of An Khe, seven sections of pipeline were replaced as a result of damage caused by a satchel charge on the night of 8-9 March 1970.

(b) On 10 March, 1970, 15 kilometers east of An Khe, 116 sections of pipeline were replaced as a result of damage caused by small arms fire on the night of 9-10 March 1970.




## CONFIDENTIAL

(c) On 1 April, 1970, five kilometers north of Vung Ro Bay, six sections of pipeline were replaced as a result of damage caused by a satchel charge on the night of 31 March 1970.

### d. Ground/Sapper Attacks

(1) There were few conventional ground attacks, even against tactical units, during the quarter, which apparently is an indication that the enemy has returned to guerrilla warfare tactics. It is likely that there will be few if any large scale ground attacks against major Allied installations in the near future. Recently, conventional attacks against fixed targets have been directed towards small Regional Force/Popular Force outposts and other small isolated tactical positions. Ground/sapper attacks against 1st Logistical Command this quarter have decreased by 50% over last quarter with only two sapper incidents occurring on the night of 31 March 1970.

(2) The following chart depicts ground/sapper attacks against 1st Logistical Command units during a 12 month period to include the three months of this quarter:



## CONFIDENTIAL

(3) There were only two sapper attacks against 1st Logistical Command installations during this quarter as depicted below:

(a) On 31 March, 1970, tank farm #2 at Cam Ranh Bay was attacked by sappers. Three 10,000 barrel tanks and one 3,000 barrel tank were destroyed. An additional two tanks were found with Soviet type C-4 charges affixed to the outside of the tanks, which EOD personnel removed. Five sets of footprints were found in the tank farm, but the sappers escaped. There were no friendly casualties, but a total of 530,307 gallons of diesel fuel and 19,372 gallons of MOGAS were lost.

(b) On 31 March, 1970, three sappers were engaged and killed by a dog patrol as they were attempting to penetrate the ammunition base depot at Qui Nhon. Three satchel charges and assorted grenades and fuzes were captured. There were no friendly casualties or damage.


### e. Harassment Incidents:

(1) Since the August/September 1969 surge of harassment incidents there has not been a significant number of these incidents recorded in any one month. As in the past, this type of activity continues to occur primarily in the Qui Nhon area of II Corps.

(2) The following chart depicts harassment incidents directed against 1st Logistical Command units during a 12 month period to include the three months of this quarter:

## CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL



(3) Some examples of harassment incidents were:

(a) On 11 February, 1970, tank farm #1 at Qui Nhon received 8-10 rounds of small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. Fire was not returned and there were no friendly casualties or damage.


(b) On 10 March, 1970, tank farm #1 at Qui Nhon received 15-20 rounds of small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. Fire was returned with small arms, M-79s and six mortar rounds with unknown results. There were no friendly casualties or damage.

(c) On 25 March, 1970, the property disposal yard located six kilometers southwest of Qui Nhon was fired on with 100 rounds of automatic weapons fire all of which impacted short of the perimeter. Fire was not returned because a friendly village was in the vicinity. There were negative casualties or damage.

## CONFIDENTIAL

### f. Attacks by fire

(1) As evidenced on the chart, the number of attacks by fire against 1st Logistical Command installations and facilities has been decreasing since May of 1969. There were 22.5% less attacks by fire this quarter than the preceding quarter. Not only have the attacks decreased in number, but they have also decreased in intensity. Less than 20% of all attacks by fire on 1st Logistical Command facilities consisted of more than 20 rounds of high explosive ordnance. This category of incidents is generally a good indicator of the overall level of enemy activity. 55.5% of the attacks by fire in April occurred during the period 1-3 April; a relative highpoint country wide.



CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

### (2) Some examples of attacks by fire were:

(a) On 2 March, 1970, seven 107mm rockets impacted on Long Binh Post. Two of the rockets impacted approximately 400 meters north of USARV Headquarters resulting in no casualties or damages; two impacted at the Transportation Motor Pool resulting in no casualties, but causing moderate damage to two busses; one impacted across the street from Sanford Airfield resulting in no casualties, but causing minor damage to one building and the last round hit the 16th Medical Dispensary, approximately 150 meters east of 1st Logistical Command Headquarters, resulting in no casualties, but causing moderate damage to the dispensary.

(b) On 31 March, 1970, elements of the 277th S&S Battalion came under an attack by fire from an unknown size enemy force. The enemy employed an unknown number of 82mm mortar rounds, 16 - 60mm mortar rounds, two 107mm rockets and an unknown amount of B-40 rocket and small arms fire. Artillery and gunships returned fire resulting in six enemy killed. Seven U.S. were wounded, to include two from the 1st Logistical Command. There were no significant damages.

(c) On 1 April, 1970, Cam Ranh Bay received 11-107mm rockets. Three of the rounds impacted in the vicinity of Pier #5 and Tank Farm #2 and #3 resulting in no casualties or damages. The remaining eight rounds impacted in the U.S. Army Depot resulting in no casualties, but causing moderate damage to two warehouses, two S&P trailers, two shop buildings, one refrigerator van and a PX storage yard.

5. (U) The following statistics reflect the number of personnel security actions completed during the period. The total number of personnel security actions processed decreased approximately 29.9% from the last reporting period.

a. Clearances Validated:	Feb	Mar	Apr	Total
(1) Top Secret	30	42	40	112
(2) Secret	54	68	45	167
b. Requests:				
(1) Background Investigations	2	7	1	10
(2) National Agency Checks	11	15	64	90
(3) USAIRR Checks	121	92	122	335

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

c. Clearances Granted:	Feb	Mar	Apr	Total
(1) Top Secret	2	2	1	5
(2) Secret	11	63	16	90
(3) Interim Top Secret	2	2	1	5
(4) Interim Secret	1	4	4	9
(5) Confidential	0	6	3	9

d. At the end of the period 67 personnel security actions were pending.

6. (C) The following information is furnished concerning the activities of the 524th Military Intelligence Detachment (CI) during the period 1 February 1970 through 30 April 1970.

a. Assignment of key personnel:

- (1) Captain Frederick C. Howing, Administrative Officer
- (2) Captain Kenneth R. Medd, Case Control Officer

b. Special studies conducted:

- (1) 141 checks for possible outlets for subversive and/or anti-American literature.
- (2) 23 checks on salvage facilities and document destruction facilities for complete and proper destruction of classified material.

c. Counterintelligence Services conducted:

- (1) There were no counterintelligence surveys conducted.
- (2) 53 announced counterintelligence inspections.
- (3) 48 unannounced counterintelligence inspections.
- (4) 92 after duty hours counterintelligence checks.

d. Personnel Security Investigations:

- (1) Number conducted: 21

## CONFIDENTIAL

(2) Number of Agent Reports submitted: 103

f. The Counterintelligence Personal and Impersonal Card File have a total of 11,475 personalities and 805 impersonal items on file at the end of the reporting period.

g. There were 210 contacts made with installation informants during the past 90 days which produced 77 IIRs for a 37% production ratio.

h. There were 154 contacts made with military informants during the past 90 days which produced 38 production reports for a 25% production ratio.

7. (U) WEATHER: The northeast monsoon which is still strong in February dissipates and becomes weak and variable by mid-March and ends in the transition season (mid-March through mid-May). During the northeast monsoon, most cloudiness and precipitation occurs on the eastern slopes of the Anam Range and along the east coast, resulting in generally poor weather in I and II Corps Tactical Zones and good weather with little precipitation in III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. During the transition season (mid-March to mid-May) the northeast monsoon weakens and precipitation becomes less frequent in I and II Corps while III and IV Corps have more frequent precipitation in the form of thunderstorms and rainshowers. There were many days with light rain or drizzle, low clouds and poor visibility during February and early March in I and II Corps Tactical Zones, but in III and IV Corps Tactical Zones the weather was good with only scattered thunderstorms being reported. During the transition season there was less precipitation throughout the Republic with only scattered thunderstorms being reported. The temperature increased each month in the lowlands from 90 degrees Fahrenheit in February to 95 degrees Fahrenheit in April, and remained fairly constant at 73 degrees Fahrenheit plus or minus two degrees in the highlands. There were no significant disruptions of 1st Logistical Command activities during this quarter due to poor weather. The Fifth Weather Squadron during February, March and April, has provided the 1st Logistical Command with very accurate weather information.

## CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

### Annex C (U) ACoFS, Security, Plans, and Operations, Training Division

1. (U) Operation BUDD<sup>v</sup>, a training program designed to improve the logistical capability of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), was significantly expanded during the period 1 Feb 70 through 30 Apr 70. A total of 2425 ARVN soldiers have been trained by 1st Logistical Command units during this reporting period.
2. (U) The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) Improvement and Modernization Program, designed to upgrade the military capabilities of RVNAF both in quality and quantity, was implemented within 1st Logistical Command as Project SWITCH. The turn over of equipment from the 551st Composite Service Company (Light Maintenance) and the 553d Composite Service Company (Heavy Maintenance) to ARVN units was completed in March 1970. The transfer of equipment to form an ARVN heavy boat company began in March 1970 and is scheduled for completion in June 1970.
3. (U) SKILLS I is a training program designed to improve the support capabilities of 1st Logistical Command by orientation and indoctrination of newly assigned personnel and by placing additional emphasis on formal and informal logistical training at all echelons. The number of persons trained during this reporting period is listed below:

	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ALPHA	1426	1462	1435	4323
BRAVO	5876	7292	5907	19075
CHARLIE	<u>1164</u>	<u>1103</u>	<u>988</u>	<u>3255</u>
TOTAL	8466	9857	8330	26653

CONFIDENTIAL



## CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX 1-1, ACOFS, Security, Plans and Operations, Logistics Review Division

1. The draft of the Logistics Review consisting of eight volumes (26 annexes) was reviewed and approved by both Headquarters, U.S. Army, Vietnam (USARV) and the Headquarters as of 15 April 1970. The last volume to be approved was Volume I which is the System Overview consisting of ten chapters summarizing each of the logistical sub-systems of the USARV Logistics Review. This volume also consisted of the introductory and summary chapters of the Review.

2. All of the volumes have been typed on final mats and submitted to the Adjutant General publication division for reproduction. A distribution list included in part of Volume I reflects the wide spread distribution to all service schools and other agencies involved in logistics. As of 30 April 1970, copies of each of the eight volumes were printed and the Logistics Review is considered completed.

3. (U) The Logistics Review Division has been disbanded as of 30 April 1970 and all personnel have been reassigned to various divisions within the ACOFS, Security, Plans and Operations, 1st Logistical Command.

## CONFIDENTIAL

### ANNEX C (C) ACoFS, Security, Plans and Operations, Plans Division

#### 1. (U) Headquarters Consolidation.

On 4 Feb 1970, the mission of planning the consolidation of Headquarters 1st Logistical Command and Headquarters USARV was given to USARV C3 and ACoFS, SP&O, 1st Logistical Command. To perform the cited mission, a planning group was formed consisting of representatives from the USARV staff elements and ACoFS, SP&O, Plans Division of this headquarters.

On 11 Feb, the mission and responsibilities of the group, called the Headquarters Consolidation Group, was established by the DCoFS, (P&A) USARV based upon the publication of a Letter of Instruction (LOI).

Additionally, staff action officers were appointed in each staff element of the two headquarters to assist and coordinate the plans of the Headquarters Consolidation Group.

On 10 March, planning guidance for all staff elements was published as a Letter of Instruction. On 1 April, the plans of all staff elements involved were submitted to the Consolidation Group. These plans, with minor modifications, were approved for implementation by CG, 1st Logistical Command and DCG, USARV.

Based upon the final approved plan, the administrative staff elements of both headquarters will consolidate during the period 10 April through 1 June. The logistical staff elements, will merge on 14 June. On 15 June, all logistical functions, remaining 1st Logistical Command personnel and subordinate units will be assigned to Headquarters USARV. Also, on 15 June, the 1st Logistical Command's TDA will be discontinued and on 16 June, the Consolidated Headquarters will begin operations.

#### 2. (C) Common Service Support in ICTZ.

On 26 March 1970, the 1st Logistical Command completed assumption of the Phase III Common Service Support mission in ICTZ. During Phase III, 1st Logistical Command assumed the wholesale POL mission, operation of the subport of Tan My/Col Co Island, operation of the Self Service Supply Center at Phu Bai and operation of the Unaccompanied Baggage Facility at Phu Bai. NAVSUPPACT transferred, on a nonreimbursable basis, facilities and non-TOE equipment required to accomplish the assumed mission. Army personnel phased in gradually, with on-the-job training provided by the Navy where required. The 1st Logistical Command relocated the following units to USASUPCOM-DNG during Phase III:

1098 Trans Co, one Plt (MDM BT)  
525 QM Co (Petrl Dep) (-)  
(HQ and one Plt)  
(One Plt)

FROM  
USASUPCOM QNH  
USASUPCOM CRB  
USASUPCOM QNH

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

ACofS, SP&O completed planning for Phase IV assumption of the complete Common Service Support mission in ICTZ. 1st Logistical Command OPLAN 107-70 (Common Service Support ICTZ) (U) was published on 20 February 1970. 1st Log Comd redesignated LCOPLAN 107-70 (U) as LCOPORD 107-70 (U) on 17 April 70. SUPCOM's will publish implementing OPORD NLT 30 April 70.

During Phase IV the 1st Log Comd will assume the common service support mission in ICTZ to include operation of the deep water piers, three shallow water ports, the wholesale depot, common user land transportation system, security for installations/facilities required to accomplish these additional missions and operate the ferry service from Camp Horn Da Nang proper. CG XXIV Corps will provide necessary security for operation of the ferry service.

Units and personnel required for the additional mission in ICTZ will be trained and relocated from other CTZ as required. Therefore, the takeover of common service support in ICTZ must be considered an integral part of the entire logistical support picture in RVN. Army personnel will phase in gradually with on-the-job orientation provided by the Navy where required. 1st Logistical Command units scheduled to relocate to USASUPCOM-DNG are:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PRESENT LOCATION</u>
5th Trans Comd (TMLA)	USASUPCOM QNH
329th Trans Co (HVY BT)	USASUPCOM SGN
1098th Trans Co (MDM BT) (-)	USASUPCOM QNH
544th Trans Co (MDM BT)	USASUPCOM SGN
264th Trans Co (TS)	USASUPCOM QNH
870th Trans Co (TS)	USASUPCOM CRB
396th Trans Det (POL Barge)	USASUPCOM QNH
632d Trans Det (Floating Crane)	USASUPCOM QNH
Det 1 USA Marine Maintenance Activity	USASUPCOM QNH

Additional financial and personnel (LNDH and DAC) resources required will be made available to 1st Logistical Command via an interdepartmental level transfer, or from Army resources. The Navy will transfer depot stocks to the 1st Logistical Command on a nonreimbursable basis. The 1st Logistical Command will accept Class I, II, IV and IX common stocks to support a 5.5 month requisitioning objective plus the theater permissive overstockage of 4.5 months for selected Army stockage item for which the 1st Logistical Command has a requirement. The Navy will be responsible for disposal of stocks not accepted by the 1st Logistical Command.

### 3. (U) Planning Actions.

a. 1st Log Comd OPLANs will be transferred to USARV G3/G4 by 15 Jun 70. USARV OPLAN 183-70 (Classified) has been revised and published and now incorporates the logistics functions formerly found in LC OPLAN 104-70 (Classified).

b. The publication and up-date of LC OPLANs has been minimized since the functions of these plans are being transferred to USARV and will be incorporated into USARV Plans.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

c. USARV ADMIN/LOG ORD 1-70A was staffed through 1st Log Comd and revised for final publication by G4 USARV.

d. OPORD 103-70 (Common Service Support, ICTZ) was published on 29 January 70.

e. OPLAN 107-70 (Common Service Support, ICTZ) has been published and changed to an OPORD.

f. USARV OPLAN 79-70 (Continuity of Logistical Operations) (U) is being revised to incorporate the provisions of LC OPLAN 79-69 (Continuity of Logistical Operations) and 85-69 (Alternate Aircraft Refueling Sites) (U).

## CONFIDENTIAL

### ANNEX C ACofS, Security, Plans, and Operations (Force Development Division)

1. (U) On 9 March 1970, Headquarters, USARV, forwarded the proposed Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) for the Property Disposal Agency, Vietnam, to Hq, USARPAC. On 16 April 1970, Hq, USARV published General Order 876, organizing the agency provisionally and assigning it to 1st Logistical Command effective 1 April 1970. The General Order authorizes 50 officers, 8 warrant officers, 596 enlisted, 21 DA civilians and 214 Local Nationals.

2. (C) In support of the I CTZ takeover, 5th Transportation Command is scheduled to move to Da Nang. The mission of port operations at Qui Nhon will be given to the Transportation Terminal Unit, Qui Nhon (Provisional). A proposed TDA for the unit was prepared on-site at Qui Nhon and submitted to Hq, USARV on 1 April 1970. The proposed TDA provides for contractor supervision, security, and equipment for the contract operation of the port. The unit has been formed provisionally by the Support Command and is scheduled to officially assume its mission on 1 July 1970.

3. (C) The added mission requirements brought on by the scheduled takeover of all logistical support for ICTZ necessitated an increase in the capability of the Da Nang Field Depot. The increase in capability was accomplished by forming an Army Depot at Da Nang. Preparation of the proposed Depot TDA began on-site in March 1970, and the proposed TDA was forwarded to Hq, USARV on 23 April 1970. 802 trade-off spaces were provided by two Modification of TDA (MTDA) actions, eight Modifications of TOE (MTOE), and ten unit inactivations.

4. (U) Action to provide ten Security Guard Companies for the command began in January 1970. MTOE 7-18G was developed to provide the organizational structure and personnel and equipment requirements. As the action originated, 1600 trade-off spaces were needed to finance the ten companies. Subsequently, Hq, USARV provided four Infantry companies to the command from the 18th MP Brigade. Final MTOE action was submitted to Hq, USARV on 26 April 1970. Trade-off spaces submitted were from four MTOE, three MTDA and six inactivations, for a total of 960 manpower spaces.

5. (U) The Department of the Army approved TDA for Augmentation, 128th Signal Company (Depot) was received on 3 February 1970. This document was submitted on 7 June 1969, and authorizes personnel and equipment for the operation of the Duffle Bag facility at Cam Ranh Bay. The augmentation was organized by USARPAC General Order 822, 11 Dec 69, effective 2 Feb 70.

6. (U) USARPAC approved the September 1969 manpower survey report for US Army Depot Long Binh and notification to submit the implementing MTDA was received on 6 February. The document was completed and forwarded to Hq, USARV on 31 March 1970. From past experience, it is expected that DA approval will be obtained around August 1970.

# CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX E (C) AChS, Security, Plans and Operations, Operations Division

1. (C) During the reporting period, the 1st Logistical Command continued its support to US and Free World Military Forces throughout Vietnam. Highlighting the reporting period were: Operation Keystone Bluejay, assumption of Class III responsibilities in I CTZ, phasedown of the US Arm Depot at Qui Nhon, closing of the An Khe - Qui Nhon pipeline, Delta resupply, closing of ASPs and relocation of units.

2. (C) Highlights of Logistical Support Activities: a. Operation Keystone Bluejay:

(1) Operation Keystone Bluejay implemented a further reduction of US Forces in the Republic of Vietnam. A total of 21 1st Logistical Command units were inactivated in-country or lost spaces as part of the operation. The overall impact on the 1st Logistical Command was the loss of 2,536 spaces. A summary of the space losses is shown below.

(a) UNIT INACTIVATIONS:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>INACTIVATION DATE</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
3d CS Co	Di An	10 Apr 70	180
11th TC HHD	Cat Lai	12 Feb 70	45
64th QM HHD	Long Binh	8 Apr 70	65
125th TC HHD	Saigon	14 Feb 70	138
205th OD Plt	Tay Ninh	12 Mar 70	90
*287th CS Det	Da Nang	16 Feb 70	10
*288th CS Det	Qui Nhon	17 Feb 70	10
*511th CS Det	Cam Ranh Bay	18 Feb 70	12
556th TC Co	Long Binh	8 Apr 70	<u>171</u>
*Units were at zero strength		TOTAL	721

(b) SPACE REDUCTIONS: USASUPCOM-SGN

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>SPACE REDUCTIONS</u>
4th TC TDA	Saigon	128
292d FI Sect Disb	Vung Tau	49
440th TC Co	Can Tho	156

# CONFIDENTIAL

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>SPACE REDUCTIONS</u>
HQ, 1st Log Comd	Long Binh	43
HQ, SGN SUPCOM	Long Binh	31
USA Depot, LBN	Long Binh	<u>815</u>
TOTAL		1,222

(c) SPACE REDUCTIONS: USASUPCOM-CrB

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>SPACE REDUCTIONS</u>
109th QM Co, Aerial Del	Cam ranh Bay	72
HQ, CrB, SUPCOM	Cam ranh Bay	<u>25</u>
TOTAL		97

(d) SPACE REDUCTIONS: USASUPCOM-QNH

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>SPACE REDUCTIONS</u>
126th FI Sect, Disb	Pleiku	40
243d CS Co, Fld Svc	Pleiku	186
HQ, QNH SUPCOM	Qui Nhon	25
USA Depot, QNH	Qui Nhon	<u>245</u>
TOTAL		496

(e) Total 1st Logistical Command authorized space losses resulting from reductions in authorized strength of designated units: 1815.

(2) The primary tactical units effected by the redeployment were the 1st Infantry Division and the 3d Bde, 4th Infantry Division. USASUPCOM-SGN was tasked with responsibility for supporting the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division. The 79th Maintenance Battalion (USASUPCOM-SGN) established processing locations both at Di An, location of the 1st Infantry Division DISCOM, and at Long Binh to expedite and facilitate processing operations. The 62d Maintenance Battalion (USASUPCOM-QNH) at Pleiku received the equipment turned in by the 3d Bde, 4th Infantry Division. USASUPCOM-QNH also established a processing point at Cha Mang. In addition to these primary processing points, facilities were also established at Dong Ha (USASUPCOM-DNG) and at Cam ranh Bay (USASUPCOM-CrB). A summary of processing sites established is as shown below.

## CONFIDENTIAL

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>CORPS TACTICAL ZONE</u>	<u>SUPPORT COMMAND</u>
Mi An	III	USASUPCOM-SGN
Long Binh	II	USASUPCOM-SGN
Leiku	II (North)	USASUPCOM-QNH
Chu Rang	II (North)	USASUPCOM-QNH
Chu Khanh Bay	II (South)	USASUPCOM-CNB
Long Ha	I	USASUPCOM-DNG

(3) The Keystone Bluejay Operation was accomplished in a smooth and efficient manner and showed improvement over past operations. Improvement can be directly attributed to the experience gained by the support commands, the subordinate units which received and processed the equipment and the staff of headquarters elements during the Phase I and Phase II redeployments.

### b. Closing of ASP's:

(1) The ARVN and the US forces both had operated separate ASPs at Ban Me Thuot. The realignment and drawdown of US forces in the Ban Me Thuot area resulted in withdrawal of US combat battalions from the area. Since the ARVN were performing a security mission at the US force's ASP as well as their own, a decision was made to close the US force's ASP to conserve security forces. Adequate stocks were placed in the ARVN ASP to enable US units in the Ban Me Thuot area to draw required ammunition on a regular basis. US liaison personnel continue to assist ARVN in the maintenance of stock records and furnishing of US logistical elements with data upon which to base stock replenishment.

(2) Since the residual US forces, after the redeployment of the 1st Inf Div under Operation Keystone Bluejay, and the ARVN forces at Lai Khe, could not provide for security for the Lai Khe ASP, the ASP was closed on 21 February 1970. The Class V stocks were reduced through attrition and backhaul to Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot (LBASD). The residual forces in the Lai Khe area are now supplied from LBASD to a central distribution point at Lai Khe operated by tactical forces.

### c. Reassignment of Units:

(1) Resupply of the IV CTZ (Delta) during the reporting period continued to be a problem. One of the contributing factors to the problem area was lack of surface transportation assets in IV CTZ to meet mission requirements. Generally the roads in IV CTZ could support only 2½ ton vehicles on a sustained basis and the available assets of this type in IV CTZ consisted of two platoons of the 120th TC Company. These assets have been augmented during the reporting period by:

## CONFIDENTIAL



## CONFIDENTIAL

(a) Transfer of the remaining platoon of the 120th TC Company to Binh Thuy in IV CTZ. This platoon was formerly in direct support of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade. Support to that command is now provided through the Common User Land Transportation System (CULTS).

(b) Attachment of the 3d Platoon of the 541st TC Company from Pleiku to the 120th TC Company at Binh Thuy. This unit completed its move from II CTZ North to IV CTZ on 18 April 1970.

(2) With the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division, 1st Logistical Command was tasked with assuming the finance operations at Di An. At the same time 1st Logistical Command gained responsibility for operation of the Class B agent finance offices at Bear Cat, Bien Hoa, and Phu Loi. To provide a control element for the Class B disbursing activities and the spaces to staff the Di An facility, the 22nd Finance section was reassigned, less personnel, from USASUPCOM-CAB to USASUPCOM-SGN with station at Di An. The move of the unit was completed on 5 March 1970.

(3) In order to provide increased maintenance capability in USASUPCOM-SGN for support of units inactivating or redeploying under Keystone Bluejay, the 588th TC Co, Maint (DS) Div was relocated from USASUPCOM-DNG. The unit move, with all personnel and specified equipment was completed on 26 February 1970.

(4) The 485th TC Det (FH) was reassigned from USASUPCOM-DNG to USASUPCOM-SGN effective 10 April. This unit was transferred, less equipment, to USASUPCOM-SGN to provide a crew for refrigerator Barge 6230 which was assigned to USASUPCOM-SGN in November 1969. Refrigerator Barge 6234 which the 485th TC Det had operated at Da Nang was turned over to the Marine Maintenance Activity, Vietnam, located at Cam Ranh Bay, for further disposition as it was excess to the needs of the command.

(5) As part of Phase III of the 1st Logistical Command's plan for the takeover of Common Service Support in I CTZ, two units were relocated to USASUPCOM-DNG.

(a) The 525th QM Co Headquarters and two platoons were moved to assume the POL mission from US Naval forces at Da Nang, Chu Lai and Tan My. The moves of these units were completed on 28 February 1970. The units were previously located in USASUPCOM-CAB and USASUPCOM-QNH.

(b) On 26 February 1970 one platoon of the 1098th TC Co (Medium Boat) was relocated from USASUPCOM-QNH to USASUPCOM-DNG. The unit's mission is to operate the port of Tan My.

(6) The 274th TC Det, Crane was reassigned from USASUPCOM-QNH to USASUPCOM-SGN effective 1 May 1970. The operation of the 60 ton crane previously operated by this detachment was assumed by the Han Jin Company. The detachment will be utilized in Saigon to assist in training of the ARVN personnel in crane operations.

## CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

d. (C) MOOSE II: In conjunction with MOOSE II (Move out of Saigon Expeditiously), Headquarters, USANV directed that Camp Davies, located in Saigon, be vacated by US Forces to allow for turn over of the facility to RVNAF on 1 May 1970. Camp Davies, also known as the Saigon LSA, included the 223d S&S Co and the 526th Light Equipment Maintenance Company; these units were relocated to Di An and became operational at that location as of 5 April 1970. Other Camp Davies units included the 4th Transportation Command, a Security Company, the 544th Transportation Company (Medium Boat), the 154th Transportation Company (Terminal Service), and Harborcraft Company had completed movement to Newport and Long Binh by 21 April 1970. All unit moves have been smoothly effected with exception of the Harborcraft, the relocation of this unit was dependent upon removal of a sunken vessel at the relocation site.

e. Closure of Qui Nhon - An Khe POL Pipeline: On 25 March 1970, Headquarters, USANV directed that the Qui Nhon - An Khe POL pipeline be closed as a matter of urgency. The action was taken in view of continuing high petroleum losses from pumping operations and the resulting damage to Vietnamese farm lands. USASUPCOM-QNH closed the line for operations with the termination of pumping operations on 29 March 1970. Effective 30 March 1970 delivery of POL from QNH to An Khe was accomplished by line haul. A review of available transportation assets in USASUPCOM-QNH was made and it was concluded that requirements could be met without transfer of assets from other support commands. On 14 April 1970 instructions were issued by Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command for disposition of the pipeline, ancillary equipment, tubing and other associated facilities. Six each five mile, six inch tubing facilities and three complete 1355 BHP pipeline pump stations will be shipped to C&B Depot for prepositioned storage. This will provide an in-country capability if additional pipeline assets are required or if an emergency situation dictates its use. In addition, pipe sections are to be shipped to the Depots at C&B, LBN and DNG for maintenance of other pipelines.

f. Qui Nhon Phasedown:

(1) To continue the efficient and responsive support to II CTZ, in consonance with past and future redeployment of forces, a reorganization of the support structure was necessary. Based on studies of the logistical support operations of both Cam ranh Bay and Qui Nhon Support Commands, in terms of performance factors facilities and other assets, it was determined that the former ultimately should become the predominant port complex and headquarters for logistical operations in II CTZ.

(2) The problem was defined as a realignment of logistical support and was to be resolved by selectively phasing down the Qui Nhon Support Command and transferring specific support responsibilities for the area to Cam ranh Bay Support Command. The realignment will commence with C&B assuming responsibility for Class III (pkg), V and selected items of Class VII prior to 1 July 1970. To implement the transfer of responsibility for Class V and Class III (pkg), this headquarters published Operations Orders 106-70 (SLAM) and 108-70 (Phasedown of QNH Class III (pkg) Support) on 19 February and 25 March 1970,

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

respectively. Class VII transfer began on 2 January 1970 as Qui Nhon Support Command began reducing its stock of all but 120 selected items which are to remain in prepositional stock at Qui Nhon. Transfer of Class II, IV, VII and IX is to be implemented by a letter of instruction. The Operations Orders 106-70 and 108-70 implement the use of containerized shipment of Class V and Class III (pkg) for resupply operations in II CTZ (N); however, because of a lack of transportation assets it was necessary to obtain 90 USATSA trailers from the 2d Logistical Command for Roll-on/Roll-off operations between Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon Ports.

(3) Additional changes in the realignment include the cessation of most port operations at Vung Ro Bay and subsequent resupply of Tuy Hoa Air Force Base by rail and road with over-the-beach backup. Also, a study was made to determine the feasibility of relocating the Qui Nhon Support Command Headquarters; however, no action was taken as current consolidation and reorganization plans favor the present location.

### g. Letters of Instructions:

(1) A major effort was undertaken to standardize the letters of instruction (LOI) published for the Support Commands. Upon careful review of both the LOI published for Cam Ranh Bay and that for Saigon, it was determined that the LOIs did not follow a standard format. To insure standardization and to avoid confusion on the part of subordinate commands, each staff section provided input for their respective areas of responsibility. Although some listed tasks are peculiar to a given support command, particular attention was given to those requirements which have universal application.

(2) The standardization program resulted in the revision of the Cam Ranh Bay Support Command LOI which incorporated the information provided by all staff sections. The Saigon Support Command LOI is currently in the process of being published and, upon completion, will be parallel to the CRB LOI for those requirements which have universal application.

h. Closure of Duc Pho LSA: Da Nang Support Command requested that all activities at the Duc Pho LSA, except ASP 106, be operated by the DISCOM, Americal Division, effective 1 May 1970. All residual stocks from the Duc Pho LSA were transferred to the DISCOM by the closing date. The closure of the Duc Pho LSA was considered necessary in order to reallocate Da Nang Support Command assets to Chu Lai in an effort to gain an optimum posture in anticipation of the takeover by USASUPCOM-DNG of all combat service support responsibilities in I CTZ.

### 1. Project Duffel Bag:

(1) Project Duffel Bag is a Department of Defense sponsored program involving the use of various electronic and electro-mechanical devices to detect enemy movement.

(2) At Cam Ranh Bay, the 1st Logistical Command operates the in-country facility for receipt, storage, issue, and maintenance of all Duffel Bag

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

equipment used in the Republic of Vietnam. This facility is manned by a TDA augmentation to the 128th Signal Company.

(3) Prior to 16 April 1970, the Logistical Operations Division, SP&O, monitored the Duffel Bag logistical system and maintained a point of contact on Duffel Bag matters at 1st Logistical Command Headquarters. On 16 April 1970, this function was transferred to the Doctrine, Systems, and Training Division of G3, USAF.

(4) Under MACV J3-04 guidance, a program has been initiated to AnVNize the Duffel Bag facility at Cam Ranh Bay. This program envisions an on-the-job training program for the Vietnamese who will eventually assume responsibility for the facility. The first two trainees were to start at the facility near the end of April, 1970.

### J. Airdrop Operations:

(1) Airdrop operations during the reporting period were conducted in support of Special Forces and army aviation elements. In I and III CTZ, Class IV supplies were delivered by Containerized Delivery System (CDS) to elements of the 5th Special Forces Group Alpha in order to improve airfield and helicopter landing zones. In IV CTZ, Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System (LAPES) was utilized to deliver 15,000 gallons of JP-4 in 55 gallon drums. The use of 55 gallon drums rather than 500 gallon collapsible containers for the LAPES is more reliable and more economical.

(2) Elements of the 109th QM Co (AD) at CnB provided support to the 35th Engineer Group by slingging 256 short tons of construction materiel from Nhon Co to the new Bu Prang CIDG site.

(3) All 1st Log Comd parachute rigger elements continued to provide quality control inspections and parachute support to US and FVMAF forces. Of interest is the technical assistance and training provided the 199th LIE in the high velocity delivery of supplies from rotary wing aircraft. This training was conducted by the 383d QM Det (AD) with locally available supplies with a view toward self-sufficiency in rigging at the maneuver battalion level.

### AIR DROP SUMMARY (SHORT TONS)

	<u>February</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>	<u>Total</u>
CDS	26	79.9	0	105.9
LAPES	<u>0</u>	<u>55.0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>55.0</u>
	26	134.9	0	160.9

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

### k. Special Airlift Missions:

During the reporting period, two emergency resupply (Er) and 15 combat essential (CE) airlift missions were conducted. Ten missions delivered Class V supplies and the remainder carried other items such as Class III and repair parts. A total of 197 short tons of supplies were shipped by special mission. The chart below gives a detailed breakdown of amount and type tonnage hauled:

#### SPECIAL MISSIONS

	<u>Total</u> <u>Missions</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Class V</u> <u>Missions</u>	<u>Class V</u> <u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Other</u> <u>Missions</u>	<u>Other</u> <u>Tonnage</u>
Feb	2	63	1	49	1	14
Mar	8	60	3	40	5	20
Apr	7	74	6	73	1	1

ANNEX D (U) ACoFS, Supply (Depot Operations)

1 (U) Project HIT

a. Due to increased interest to further the Vietnamization program for the Republic of Vietnam, emphasis has been placed on ARVN Housing. Of specific interest during the period 1 February through 30 April 1970 have been the Popular Forces Dependent Housing and Force Structure Increase Programs.

(1) Popular Forces Dependent Housing, one element of Project HIT, is a program for construction of family dwellings units to shelter dependents of Popular Forces personnel.

(2) Force Structure Increase, a second element of Project HIT, is a program for construction of garrison facilities, such as mess halls, kitchens, latrines, and repair shops. As withdrawal of US Forces personnel continues and bases are made available for occupation by ARVN Forces, a number of construction sites have been and are being cancelled.

b. United States Army Vietnam is responsible for providing and delivering construction materials for these programs. These requirements have had inherent control problems.

(1) The determination was made to assign project code "HIT" to all supplies which were especially earmarked for ARVN Housing, thereby establishing control procedures and the ability to monitor the supplies in storage.

(2) The determination was made to have transportation personnel coordinate with liaison personnel at the Military Property Construction Offices when shipments were scheduled for delivery to construction sites. Guides were to be furnished to accompany shipments to the point of delivery, thus insuring the arrival of all shipped supplies at the correct location and to the proper personnel.

2. (U) Project Cross Count

a. Discrepancies exist between the data contained in the depots' Availability Balance Files and Master Locator Files. The differences in these files reduce the accuracy and reliability of the supply data base and degrade the logistical support required by the combat units.

(1) Project Count Always, an element of Project Cross Count, requires a continuous cyclic inventory of all depot stocks.

(2) A program entitled "SO6VB", the second element of Project Cross Count, was developed to compare the data as shown on the Availability Balance Files and the Master Locator File.

(3) When the two files are compared, the SO6VB program will generate "exceptions" if differences exist. These exceptions will be generated when any of the following disparities in data are found:

(a) Master Locator File does not contain a location for an FSN and the Availability Balance File indicates assets are on hand. (6NL)

(b) Master Locator File indicates a location for an FSN and the Availability Balance File indicates there are no assets available for the FSN. (6NA)

(c) When a kill card is submitted to eliminate the last location for an FSN on the Master Locator File and Availability Balance File indicates assets are available for the FSN.

b. Subsequent to receipt of the exception cards, a physical inventory would be performed on each FSN for which there were exception(s).

(1) Prior to the physical inventory, a thorough research would be conducted of each exception.

(2) The availability Balance File and the Master Locator File would then be reconciled to conform with the results of the physical inventory.

ANNEX D (U) ACofS, Supply (Log Management)

1. (U) New Item of Supply - SSSC PRE-PACKS

a. Isolated units physically located in an area remote from a Self Service Supply Center (SSSC) cannot routinely visit the Centers and consequently are unable to obtain critically needed items temporarily out of stock. A means was sought to guarantee supply of mission essential office and housekeeping supplies to isolated teams.

b. This headquarters assembled a PUSH PACKAGE containing 16 SSSC items for automatic resupply from the supporting depots to isolated Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) teams. An initial test increment of 340 Push Packages was issued in January, mostly through Class I channels. Each package contained a questionnaire.

c. Acting on the comments and suggestions from MACV teams, the package contents and the distribution plan were changed to better serve the varied needs of MACV teams. A new item, FSN 9999-W40-3688 SSSC PRE-PACK, was added to the Master Stockage List (MSL) of Self Service Supply Centers. Instead of being pushed on a recurring basis from the depots, isolated personnel now request PRE-PACKS in quantities required from the nearest Self Service Supply Center. Twenty dollars is deducted from the unit's quarterly SSSC allocation for each package issued.

d. The revised plan to stock PRE-PACKS in SSSCs was implemented in March 1970. Approximately 150 PRE-PACKS were issued from the 11 SSSCs and all stores have replenished stocks.

2. (U) Phasedown of Qui Nhon Support Command

a. Phasedown planning to reduce the extensive logistical support activities operated by USASUPCOM QNH which began in November 1969 continued through April 1970. The purpose of the phasedown was to realign logistical support in II CTZ North to provide efficient support with available resources.

b. Planning for the transfer of Class VII vehicular resupply was completed during April 1970. USASUPCOM CRB assumed responsibility for vehicular resupply to II CTZ North on 1 May 1970.

c. In March 1970 package POL stocks at QNH were reduced to direct support level stocks with resupply for II CTZ North assumed by CRB.

d. In April 1970 procedures were developed and implemented for the phasedown of Class II, IV and IX supplies at USAD QNH. Stocks at QNH are to be reduced from the present base depot level to only fast moving demand support items and other selected items.



ANNEX D (U) ACofS, Supply (Log Management) cont

3. (U) Nonstandard Repair Parts

a. Background. Prior to 1 July 1969, the Repairs and Utilities (R&U) repair parts mission was performed by a contractor. The remaining Nonstandard Repair Parts (NSRP) mission was located in the 1st Log Comd Depots. After a Defense Contract Audit Agency report disclosed that the contractor was not utilizing his resources effectively, it was decided to place the entire NSRP mission for R&U, air conditioning, refrigeration, communications, construction, materials handling and NCR 500 equipments within 1st Log Comd.

b. Evaluation. Studies were conducted in 1969 - 1970 to identify significant problem areas and to recommend the most effective method to perform the mission. Findings showed that current cost of operations are excessive compared with estimates for a contractor operated mission. It is estimated that a contractor can perform the mission for \$495,000. The 12-month tour has its disadvantages for effective continuity of operations. A contractor's work force would be more stable, thus allowing a greater degree of expertise to develop.

c. Decision. The decision was made to contract the stock management, stock control, receipt, storage and issue of NSRP. This action should provide improved supply support for NSRP to all units and activities in RVN. A PR&C was prepared and forwarded to Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam for approval action on 27 March 1970.

ANNEX D (U) ACoFS, Supply (Directorate of Food)

1. (U) A "Memorandum of Understanding between Commander, Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam (COMROKFV) and Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, (COMUSMACV)" was developed pertaining to subsistence support to ROKFV. It was agreed that the issue of supplemental MCI rations to ROKFV in support of night operations would be discontinued as of 31 March 1970. This supplemental issue was phased out over a three month period which began on 1 January 1970. It was also agreed that ROKFV would increase the quantity of "A" rations consumed with a corresponding decrease in MCI rations, thus effecting a dollar savings. A goal of 60 percent "A" rations and 40 percent MCI rations by 1 April 1970 was set, with an ultimate goal of 75 percent "A" rations and 25 percent MCI rations to be consumed by ROKFV. This headquarters was advised in MACV message 14642, DTG 271244Z Mar 70, subject: ROK Rations, that the DCG, MACV granted a 30 Day extension to ROKFV for the implementation of the 60 percent "A" ration-40 percent MCI ration issue ratio, thus making 1 May 1970 the new effective date.

2. (U) Dairy product support in III and IV CTZ was improved with the transfer of the mission of supplying dairy products to Tay Ninh, Vung Tau and Can Tho from USASUPCOM, CRB to USASUPCOM, SGN. The Foremost Dairy, Saigon with increased production capability now supports these locations and also provides direct delivery of dairy products to Di An, Phu Loi, Cu Chi and Bearcat.

3. (U) A 28 Day Master Menu was developed for the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Forces, Vietnam (RTAVFV). The US Military 28 Day Master Menu contains many items not compatible with the Thai diet, resulting in many deletions and some waste. This new menu, developed in conjunction with the Thai Army food service personnel and the USARV dietician, will result in better customer satisfaction and supply economy.

4. (U) The Director of Food attended the CINCPAC reefer ship service to SE Asia conference in Hawaii on 26-27 February 1970. The purpose of this conference was to discuss the different viewpoints as to the optimum reefer ship schedule in support of perishable subsistence for RVN, and for MSTs to keep reefer ships on published schedule. As a result of this conference:

a. A sealand container ship is scheduled to arrive at Cam Ranh Bay, RVN every 7 days instead of 8;

b. A bulk break reefer ship is scheduled to arrive in RVN every 14 days instead of 12 and

c. The reliability of reefer ship schedules is expected to increase significantly.

5. (U) Test shipments to Qui Nhon and Pleiku of locally procured fresh fruits and vegetables (FF&V) from the Saigon area were conducted. Plans are to purchase produce grown in III and IV CTZ for distribution to Northern II CTZ. In the past, vendors trucked some of these items to Dalat for procurement and the Dalat procurement center then air-shipped to points North. These test shipments out of Tan Son Nhut proved highly successful, and the Saigon Support Command assumed the mission of continuing these shipments on a permanent basis commencing 15 April 1970.

6. (U) The Directorate of Food was notified by the US Army Support Command, Chicago, that 400,000 cases of Meals, Combat, Individual (MCI) would be shipped from Europe to RVN in three equal shipments to arrive in RVN approximately 1 June, 1 July and 1 September. Date of pack for these MCI's is 1968 and their remaining storage life under normal conditions is 21 months with at least 5 months of storage under high temperature high humidity conditions after arrival in SEA. Each of these 3 equal shipments represents approximately three fifths (3/5) of a month's requirement for RVN. A requisition for these MCI rations was submitted on 24 March 1970.

ANNEX D (U) ACoS, Supply (POL)

1. (U) During the quarter, the 1st Logistical Command assumed the POL mission which had previously been performed by the Navy in I CTZ. On 26 February 1970, the ocean terminal at Tan My was taken over by the Army and on 26 March 1970 the Da Nang and Chu Lai ocean terminals were transferred. The 1st Logistical Command is now responsible for all bulk and package POL supply in the entire Republic of Vietnam. Steel storage capacity operated by 1st Logistical Command increased 50 percent to 2,350,000 barrels and ocean terminal thruput increased 30 percent to 3,400,000 barrels per month.
2. (U) The laying of the buried, welded 6 inch pipeline from Qui Nhon to Phu Cat Air Force Base progressed satisfactorily and on 26 April 1970, the line was completed from Phu Cat to the Junction of QL 1 and QL 19. The completed portion of the welded line and the coupled line from Qui Nhon to the junction will become operational on or about 29 April 1970 and will continue in operation until the welded buried line construction is completed between the junction and Qui Nhon.
3. (U) Losses continued to be unacceptably high on the Qui Nhon to An Khe pipeline. For the period February-March losses were 15 percent which was greater than the average of 11 percent for the preceeding three months. Movement of bulk fuels by pipeline is normally more economical than transport by tank truck, but loss of product due to line breaks and other pipeline incidents can make trucking more economical when such losses are high. A major project to upgrade the pipeline was not economically justified when losses increased to over 17 percent in March, the decision to close the pipeline was made and the line was closed down on 29 March 1970. Water was injected into the line to recover the line fill and removal of the line
4. (U) On hand tonnage of package POL (in II, III & IV Corps) was reduced from 12,900 short tons to 9,000 short tons on 1 April. The reduction was the cumulative effort of reevaluation of requisitioning objectives, retrograde action and redistribution of in-country assets.

## ANNEX D (U) ACoS, Supply (Directorate of Retrograde)

### 1. (U) Depot Centralized Outprocessing Facilities

Each depot was directed to establish a central outprocessing facility, which operates on an assembly-line basis to prepare, pack, and ship all excesses that are being shipped to out-of-country destinations. All 1st Logistical Command units will now process unit excesses and station returns through these depot facilities. All materiel will be identified and prepared for long-term storage prior to shipment. Currently, each CONEX, Sea-Land van, or USASTA trailer leaving a 1st Logistical Command centralized processing facility is being inspected by a qualified container inspector appointed on orders. This dramatic change in retrograde processing has produced outstanding results in improving the quality and flow of retrograde cargo from Vietnam.

### 2. (U) Master Disposition List

A Master Disposition List (MDL) for the retrograde of unserviceable reparable materiel to out-of-country destinations has been developed by the Directorate of Retrograde. The MDL is a consolidation of all known and current disposition instructions, and is the sole authority for the support commands to ship unserviceable reparable materiel not included in the Closed Loop support program. It is published on a monthly basis in punched card format and updated by numbered messages as changes occur during the month. The third issue of the MDL provides predisposition instructions for approximately 3400 different pieces of equipment. The centralization of all disposition instructions for unserviceable reparable materiel into one document has produced outstanding results in reducing shipping errors and preventing a backlog of materiel at CC&S activities. Centralizing the authority for retrograde of materiel in one central agency has reduced the confusion in the field.

### 3. (U) Expansion of Inspect and Advise Teams (I&A Teams)

The Directorate of Retrograde has expanded its I&A program. The additional I&A teams include Army Materiel Command (AMC) technical assistance personnel. This has strengthened our I&A program in the number of technical areas we can cover and the amount of technical expertise available to SUPCOMs. The following additional technical assistance areas are now made available to support commands:

- Wheeled Vehicles
- Artillery Items
- Combat Vehicles
- Communications/Electronic Equipment
- Packaging/Preservation
- Documentation
- Construction Equipment
- Power Generating Equipment
- Soft Pack Machines

The value of I&A teams cannot be overemphasized. They provide the informal technical channel required to expedite the daily improvement of retrograde operations and provide working-level feedback required to develop policy.

#### 4. (U) Retrograde Performances vs. Goals

A new method for setting retrograde goals has been implemented for reparableables. This system compares actual shipments with assets available for shipment. The criterion used is the ratio of average tonnage shipped to the average tonnage inventory plus average tonnages received. The goals for reparableables, depot excess/station returns, and ammunition/ammunition components are now being computed on a monthly basis, because it was found that a quarterly basis was too long a period to be responsive to the changing inventory levels in the support commands. The short ton goal for depot excess/station returns was eliminated, as of 1 Apr 70. Retrograde performance for Feb through Apr 70 is compared to the retrograde goals as follows (figures expressed in short tons):

Month	Depot Excess/ Station Returns		Reparables		Ammunition/ Ammo Components	
	Goal	Shipped	Goal	Shipped	Goal	Shipped
Feb 70	12300	6610	17500	17387	1000	712
Mar 70	12300	8853	24500	16722	1000	2007
1-22 Apr 70		6719	18375	12871	750	1000

#### 5. (U) Dollar Values of Retrograde Materiel

The dollar values of depot excess/station returns retrograded during the first three weeks of April 1970 has more than doubled that of the shipments during the month of February. Since the number of short tons have not also increased a proportionate amount, this indicates that the current emphasis is on shipping high-dollar value items. The dollar value of shipments for the period Feb through Apr 70 is as follows:

Month	Short Tons	Lines	Dollar Value of Shipments
Feb 70	6610	6594	\$ 6,399,990
Mar 70	8953	13915	\$ 5,836,800
1-22 Apr 70	6719	18629 44	\$12,961,300

6. (U) Analysis of Normal Retrograde Tonnages Compared to Keystone and to new Depot Receipts

To determine the relative magnitude of Keystone operations and their relationship to normal retrograde shipments, an analysis of the tonnages involved was made. These, in turn, were compared with average depot receipts of similar new materiel. A synopsis of this review is shown below.

MONTHLY AVERAGES  
(Short Tons)

<u>Depot Receipts</u>	<u>CC&amp;S/Depot Retrograde</u>	<u>Type Division</u>
22,140 (CL VII)	18,016 (Reparables)	
<u>21,921</u> (CL II/IX)	<u>11,795</u> (Depot Excess)	
43,061 Total	29,811 Total	24,578 Tons
		<u>+ 6,154</u> Excess
		30,722 Total

Review of the above data indicates that a type division turnin in its equipment on redeployment during a 3-month period would approximately equal the quantity of reparables and depot excesses retrograded during a 1-month period, based on an average of the previous 8 months. Adjunct to this situation, however, is the time required to prepare equipment for retrograde, whether Keystone or conventional retrograde. A 2d Log Comd study conducted during 1969 indicates that effort to prepare retrograde equipment computes to 5 times the effort to receive similar-type new equipment.

7. (U) Computerization of Keystone Reporting

Although it was recognized in Nov 69 that computer support of Keystone reporting would eventually be required, the Keystone Bluejay exercise began with records maintained on keypunch cards in a manual configuration. This was because the size of Keystone Bluejay and units involved were not known early enough to finalize a computer system. During Jan 70, efforts were directed to convert this manual system to a computer-supported effort. On 14 Feb 70, after a ten-day effort to write and test the 1401/1460 computer program, the Keystone Bluejay records were converted to computer. This computerization has resulted in automation of all data, providing detailed reports on 11 PEMA equipment processed under Keystone Bluejay. Although many obstacles were encountered, rapid reaction by all personnel has resulted in resolution of problem areas. The Keystone Bluejay computer programs are now being refined to more effectively and accurately process input data for future Keystone operations and provide additional management data.

## CONFIDENTIAL

### 8. (U) Transfers of Keystone Equipment to RVNAF

With the progressive improvement of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, increased emphasis has been placed on providing additional quantities of equipment to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). Under Keystone Bluejay, the procedures for these transfers have been developed and implemented. A detailed maintenance support plan was developed to repair equipment to ARVN standards, insuring that all equipment can be used without major repairs during the remaining life of the equipment. This program has posed no serious problems and has been an acceptable means of providing this needed equipment.

### 9. (U) Keystone Bluejay Statistics

From the computer history and status files, reports are generated which provide management data on PEMA equipment received and the disposition effected. This data provides a means of reviewing performance for the command and for the support commands. Data is used to determine problem areas requiring resolution and evaluation of techniques. The following charts show the status of Keystone Bluejay equipment for the command and the support commands reporting. The first five columns show by materiel category the total quantity received to date, and, of this total, the quantity for which disposition has been completed, the quantity for which the support commands are waiting disposition instructions, and the quantity for which they have received instructions, but have not yet effected disposition. The right half of the chart shows where the equipment is to be transferred. The figures in the "X" rows break out by destination the support command "pending" quantity. The figures in the "Y" rows break out by destination the quantity for which disposition has been completed.


- a. Overall Keystone Bluejay Equipment Status (Command) (Incl 1)
- b. Overall Keystone Bluejay Equipment Status (Saigon Support Command) (Incl 2)
- c. Overall Keystone Bluejay Equipment Status (Qui Nhon Support Command) (Incl 3)
- d. Overall Keystone Bluejay Equipment Status (Da Nang Support Command) (Incl 4)
- e. Overall Keystone Bluejay Equipment Status (Cam Ranh Bay Support Command) (Incl 5)



# CONFIDENTIAL


## ANNEX E (C) ACoS, Maintenance

1. (U) A high level state of readiness was maintained for combat vehicles, artillery weapons and selected tactical vehicles. This state of readiness was achieved through constant alertness to the trends reflected in the daily deadline reports, close coordination between supply and maintenance and the excellent response of the supply system.




# CONFIDENTIAL

## 155mm HOWITZER, TOWED, M114/123




## 155mm HOWITZER, SP, M109



CONFIDENTIAL


8 INCH HOWITZER, SP, M110



J A S O N D J F M A M J

NOR	3.6	3.6	4.52	5.54	5.31	5.01	5.27	4.23	3.17	4.93		
NORS	0	0	.12	.74	1.23	1.93	2.95	1.50	.19	1.18		
NORM	3.6	3.6	4.40	4.80	4.08	3.08	2.32	2.73	2.98	3.45		

175mm GUN, SP. M107




J A S O N D J F M A M J

NOR	4.44	6.20	4.90	3.77	3.71	5.73	5.19	6.13	6.09	3.56		
NORS	.25	0	0	.57	.49	.51	.95	.12	1.30	1.30		
NORM	4.19	6.20	4.90	3.20	3.22	5.22	4.24	6.01	4.79	2.26		


CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

M551




TRACTOR, WHEELED




CONFIDENTIAL

# TRACTOR, FULL TRACKED




NOR	18	16	15	19	15	11	12	12	13	13		
NORS	7	7	6	3	6	5	4	5	6	6		
NORM	11	9	9	11	9	6	6	7	7	7		

## CRANE, TRUCK MOUNTED AND ROUGH TERRAIN, 20 TON




NOR	21	22	24	25	20	24	23	17	22	21		
NORS	10	11	12	13	14	11	11	9	12	10		
NORM	11	11	12	12	14	13	12	8	10	11		


# ROUGH TERRAIN FORKLIFTS



# COMMERCIAL FORKLIFTS




# TRUCK, 2-1/2 TON




	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J
FOR	8	9	9	10	11	11	10	10	10	10		
WORS	4	4	3	4	4	5	5	4	4	4		
NORM	4	5	6	6	7	6	5	6	6	6		

# TRUCK, 5 TON CARGO AND TRACTOR




	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J
FOR	9	9	9	10	10	10	10	9	10	10		
WORS	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3		
NORM	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	6	7	7		

# TRUCK, 5 TON DUMP



NOR	12	11	15	16	16	11	13	13	11	13		
NORS	5	5	6	8	7	6	5	6	6	6		
NORM	7	6	9	9	9	9	8	7	8	7		


# RADIO SET, AN/VRC-12



NOR	7	9	8	8	8	9	8	8	8	7		
NORS	2	3	2	2	3	3	2	2	2	2		
NORM	5	6	6	6	5	6	6	6	6	5		



# RADIO SET, AN/GRC-106



## 2. (U) Material Handling Equipment (MHE)

In an effort to improve the Operational Readiness (OR) rate of the Rough Terrain Fork Lift (RTFL), increased emphasis has been placed on in-country repair of subassemblies and components. Repair contracts have been established with Applied Technical Services, Philco-Ford Corporation and Vinnell Corporation for overhaul of Detroit Diesel engines used in the RTFL. Direct and General Support Maintenance has been expanded to repair high dollar, high mortality components such as lift cylinders, generators, starters and steering cylinders thus reducing deadline times and repair costs.

## 3. (U) Marine Maintenance

a. FY 70 and FY 71 Dry Dock Overhaul Program - AR 750-20, Maintenance of DA Watercraft and Amphibians, prescribes the periodic drydocking cycles of watercraft in active service. On 11 Mar 70, DA announced a change to the regulation extending the interval from 18 to 24 months for self-propelled watercraft, 24 to 30 months for nonpropelled watercraft with machinery, and 24 to 60 months for nonpropelled craft without machinery. The change resulted in a complete suspension of both the in-country and out-of-country overhaul programs of this command for the last quarter of FY 70. Twenty-seven watercraft scheduled in that period were rescheduled for overhaul in

FY 71. The revised program for FY 71, reflecting the increased time interval between scheduled drydocking, was published and distributed on 17 Apr 70.

b. Maintenance Support of ARVN Watercraft - At the direction of MACV this command assumed the responsibility in March 1970 for management of the program for periodic drydocking and overhaul of ARVN watercraft. With funding provided by USARPAC, 15 ARVN landing craft (LCM-8s) have been scheduled during the remainder of FY 70. Contracts have been negotiated with commercial firms in Saigon for overhaul of seven of the landing craft. The remaining eight craft will be shipped out-of-country for overhaul at shipyards designated and administered by the 2d Log Comd. The US Army Marine Maintenance Activity, Vietnam will receive the craft from the ARVN watercraft units and prepare the craft for movement to the designated shipyard. Forty-five ARVN landing craft will require overhaul in FY 71. Fifteen have been programmed for in-country commercial shipyards; thirty for movement out-of-country. US Army management of the ARVN watercraft overhaul program will continue into FY 72 when the Vietnamese Navy is expected to have the capability to assume the responsibility.

ANNEX F (C) ACoFS, Transportation

1. (U) General. During the first two months of the reporting period tonnages handled at all ports remained at a low ebb. During April, a large increase in tonnages was observed due to increased intercoastal tonnage and large amounts of inbound tonnage. Highlights of the period include the turnover of Can Tho/Binh Thuy to ARVN on 19 March 1970; turnover of Camp Davies and K-12 to ARVN; the successful completion of Project TOCSA; and the initiation of Project SLAM.

2. (U) Port Operations.

a. Summary. During the reporting period attacks on shipping increased. The following ships were fired on in the Long Hau River approach to Saigon: Transglobe - 3 Feb, Venus Victory - 3 Feb, Washington Bear - 27 Feb, Hong Kong Merchant - 27 Feb, Loma Victory - 3 Apr. USNS Petrarca and a barge alongside were severely damaged by a floating mine at Cat Lai on 26 February. Amercloud, on the DeLong Pier at Qui Nhon on 12 March, was damaged by an explosive device and required discharge and offshore repair. A tug and barge tow in the Dong Nai River were fired on without damage on 28 February. Two LCM-8's were damaged by mines at Tuyen on 4 April 1970. During the period the 485th Transportation Detachment (FH) was transferred from Da Nang Support Command to Saigon Support Command. This action was taken to provide a crew for a reefer barge in Saigon which had been transferred from Cam Ranh Bay Support Command less crew. This crew was retained in Cam Ranh to form a nucleus for a Y-Tanker crew. The reefer barge assigned to Da Nang was turned in awaiting disposition instructions. On 21 March 1970, this office sponsored a retrograde and dunnage yard orientation at Newport Army Terminal. Attendees were port retrograde and dunnage yard personnel from the support commands. The purpose was to familiarize personnel with the successful retrograde operation in Newport and the dunnage yard operation, as well as to provide an opportunity for exchange of views, operational procedures and policies among personnel in the working level.

b. Tonnages Handled. Tonnages handled by 1st Logistical Command ports during the period 1 February 1970 - 30 April 1970 totaled 1,855,241 short tons of cargo. This figure includes military and Sea-Land tonnage, and USAID tonnages.

c. Average Turnaround Time. Vessel turnaround time for general cargo vessels increased from an average of 7.9 last quarter to an average of 8.5 this quarter. Ammunition vessel turnaround decreased tremendously from 27.7 last quarter to 14.2 this quarter. The decrease was due to improved weather conditions in I and II CTZ's.

3. (U) Highway Operations

a. Performance.

(1) A total of 1,331,338 STON's of cargo was hauled by 1st Logistical Command military truck units during the reporting period. Contractor vehicles hauled 659, 020 STON's of cargo during this quarter. Port and beach clearance constituted 38.9%, local haul 28.5% and line haul 32.6% of the total amount of dry cargo transported by military units. Of contractor tonnage, 58.5% was in port and beach clearance, 40% in local haul and 1.5% in line haul.


(2) Average monthly highway performance during this period was:

(a) 663,452.7 STON's

(b) 51,522.3 FAX

(c) 32,018,133 gallons POL

(3) Total performance for the past 3 months is as follows:



b. Realignment of assets. During the quarter three POL truck companies of the 649th QM BN (POL) were reorganized into 2 medium truck companies (POL). The two new units were assigned to the 7th Transportation BN, 48th Transportation Group, resulting in better utilization of assets. One platoon of the 541st Light Truck Company (Pleiku) was transferred to the 120th Light Truck Company in support of the Delta Logistics Support Activity at Binh Thuy.

c. Management Actions. An allocation of 246 pieces of Philco-Ford equipment was made to this command to replace similar items scheduled for procurement and tactical equipment which is in critical shortage. These assets will be distributed within the following support commands: SGN - 152; CRB - 10; QNH - 76 and LNG - 8.

#### 4. (U) Railway Equipment.

a. Railway Equipment Status. The Mail Branch has not been able to inspect some pieces of US Army railway equipment operated by the Vietnam National Railway System (VNRS). This problem is inherent in the organizational structure and results from the separation of functions. There are 204 pieces of US Army railway equipment located throughout I, II, and III Corps Tactical Zones. The 1st Logistical Command is tasked with accountability for the equipment and for administering the rail equipment maintenance contract with the VNRS. MACV/TMA has operational control

of the equipment but is unable to pinpoint the location of all assets. A message was sent to MACV/TMA requesting that specified pieces of rolling stock be spotted for inspection. A letter was also sent to the VNRS apprising them of this situation and requesting monthly car location reports. Several inspection trips have been made. An inspection has been made of all but two of the assets in the VNRS Saigon division. On an inspection visit to the Nha Trang division by the NCOIC of the Rail Branch, TMA did not spot cars during a three day period. Continued inspection trips will be made. As long as the functions of operational control and accountability maintenance are fragmented, the problems presently encountered with accountability and maintenance will persist.

b. Semiannual Inventory. As a result of the semiannual inventory, it was discovered that some repair parts were removed from stock by the Vietnamese National Rail System without notifying this office. The problem seemed to be one of communication. A bilingual form has been produced to facilitate parts requisitioning procedures.

#### 5. (U) Movements Management.

##### a. Sea-Land.

(1) The following is a summary of the number of containers and tonnage received in Vietnam during this period along with subsequent distribution to the three support commands. There was an average of 16.4 short tons loaded per in-bound van during the period.

<u>TOTAL CONTAINER INPUT</u>	<u>AVG PER SAILING</u>	<u>TOTAL SHORT TONS</u>	<u>AVG STON PER SAILING</u>
7,607	634	104,223	8,685

##### DISTRIBUTION

<u>PORT</u>	<u>CONTAINERS</u>	<u>AVG PER SAILING</u>
SGN	4,684	390
CRB	1,264	105
QNH	1,659	138

#### (2) Project TOCSA.

(a) In early December 1969, the 1st Logistical Command agreed to participate in a test of containerized ammunition shipments. The role of the 1st Logistical Command in this test was pre-arrival planning, vessel discharge at Cam Ranh Bay, movement of containers to Ammunition Supply Depots (ASD) in Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon, delivery of containers to forward Ammunition Supply Points (ASP), unstuffing of containers and return of containers to carrier control. The US Army Materiel Command (USAMC) arranged for the stuffing of two hundred and twenty six commercial 35'x8½'x 8' containers and movement of the containers to the port of embarkation (POE). At Naval Weapons Station, Concord, Port Chicago, California, on 22-23 December these containers were loaded on the Sea-Land Incorporated owned ship, SS Azalea City. The vessel sailed from Port Chicago on 23 December 1969, and after a

stop for bunkering in Yokohama, Japan arrived at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam at 1720 hours 17 January 1970.

(b) Objectives of this test included: 1 Evaluation of the comparative costs/workload effort to receive a comparative amount of Class V tonnage by the container and conventional deep draft break bulk vessel methods.

2 Determine optimum container unstuffing techniques and equipment requirements.

3 Evaluate the feasibility of thru-putting containers to forward ASP's.

4 Provide data to USAAPSA, Joliet, Illinois for use in completing overall evaluation of Project TOCSA.

(c) The SS Azalea City arrived Cam Ranh Bay and was secure on berth at 1945 hours, 17 January. Discharge operations began at 2050 hours and all 226 containers had been offloaded by 1910 hours, 18 January. Discharge could have been completed in 13-15 hours had there not been some eight hours of non-productive time due to mechanical failures of the vessel cranes. Two hundred and twenty six empty containers were backloaded by 1955 hours, 18 January and the vessel departed at 2126 hours 18 January.

(d) From the discharge site, pier 5, the containers were moved in accord with pre-arrival disposition instructions to one of two staging areas. Those containers consigned to Cam Ranh Bay ASD were moved 1 mile east of pier 5 for staging into storage areas "alpha" and "charlie".

(e) Those 44 containers which were to be transshipped on the BDL LTC John U.D. Page and AB&T barge were staged .1 mile south of pier 5. The barge, with 22 containers, was loaded and departed for Qui Nhon at 0035 hours 18 January. The Page sailed at 1740 hours the same day.

(f) At Cam Ranh Bay, 179 containers were unstuffed in some 44 hours. Problems encountered were time consumed in dunnage removal and the lack of vertical clearance on those commodities which were stacked two pallets high. It was found that there is a significant transfer of effort from the pier area to the ammunition storage areas in the handling of ammunition received by the container mode as compared to the more conventional means. This workload at the ASD can be reduced by the use of a dropside container or installation of roller conveyors in the container.

(g) The principal method of unstuffing at Cam Ranh Bay ASD, as well as at the Qui Nhon ASD, was removal of the pallets with a low mast forklift to an unloading dock (M127A2 3&P trailer). The pallets were then moved directly to a storage pad. Other methods tested were the use of a portable ramp for container entry and egress, pallet jacks to move the pallets to the rear of the container and a snaking technique. The latter method involved dragging the pallets, using a chain and forklift or truck motive power, to the rear of the container. At this point the pallet was extracted by the rough terrain forklift.

(h) Qui Nhon ASD unstuffed 13 containers with essentially the same experience as encountered at Cam Ranh Bay.

(i) Discharge of the barge and Page at Qui Nhon was accomplished using M52

tractors to tow the containers from the lighterage.

(j) Containers were thru-put by convoy to forward ASP's at Ban Me Thout (3), Pleiku (20), An Khe (9) and LZ English (2). The snaking and pallet jack methods were utilized for unstuffing at the forward ASP's.

(k) It should be noted that from CONUS source of supply to forward ASP there was a total intransit time of only 40 days. In addition, handlings were reduced 2 to 8 times from that necessary for ammunition shipped by the conventional mode. All cargo arrived in excellent condition. Comments made by personnel at the ASD and ASP levels were most favorable toward containerization even though it increased their workload in terms of man hours to handle specific tonnages. Again, changes in the type of container and pallet orientation within the container will negate these increased workload requirements.

(l) Cost effectiveness analysis of the containerized method of shipment indicates that considerable cost savings are possible. Given changes in the type of container (i.e. dropside flatbed) and methods and quantity of blocking and bracing, ammunition can be handled efficiently in the ASD's and ASP's. A significant advantage of containerization is the reduction of inroute damage.

(m) Specific conclusions are: 1 Ammunition shipped in containers can be discharged and moved to intermediate and final consignee in the same manner as containerized general cargo so far as operational techniques are concerned. It is recognized that waivers/changes in current regulations would be needed to discharge ammunition laden vans at other than designated ammunition discharge sites.

2 There is a great reduction in cargo handling at the pier for containerized ammunition shipments while at the ammunition depot and supply points there is an increase in workload. The workload is caused by the removal and pickup of blocking and bracing and working in a closed container as opposed to a stake and platform trailer which is normally used. This additional workload (time and manpower) at the ASD's and ASP's could be eliminated through the use of a drop-side container or installation of roller conveyors and changes in types and methods of blocking and bracing.

3 Vessel turnaround time of ammunition loaded container ships is approximately one-third of that for conventional vessels with comparable tonnages. In addition, the container ship can be backloaded with a number of containers equal to that discharged without a significant increase in turnaround time.

4 Containerized shipments of ammunition could reduce in-country OST by at least one day (it is estimated that each day's reduction is worth \$5,000,000).

5 The primary cost savings of shipping via the containerized mode occur when ammunition is delivered to a point within 30 miles of the port. Cost savings are also realized when the container is thru-put from POD direct to forwarded ASP. Cost savings are not realized if the containers are transshipped using costly in-country resources. Refinement of containerization techniques could result in considerable higher cost savings.

6 Cube utilization, using the 35'x 8'x 8½' container is low. Only 24.9% of available cube was used on the Azalea City though many of the containers could

have been loaded with additional weight. Reconfiguration of pallet sized could result in improved cube utilization. Use of dropside containers would also improve cube utilization.

7 The maximum potential of the containerized ammunition concept is only realized when the container is thru-put as far forward as possible. In addition to cost savings in paragraph 2e above, advantages of containerized ammunition shipments include reduction in the Order-Ship Time (OST), considerably less exposure to rough, inroute and depot handling, reduction (from 2-8 times) in number of handling and elimination of costs associated with processing cargo in and out of the depots. While the cost of holding and processing at depot level, in the case of ammunition shipped via conventional modes, is not identified in this study, such cost is significant and worthy of cost reduction efforts.

8 Stuffing of containers must include consideration of the limited equipment available at forward distribution points. The objective should be ease of extraction of the pallet with minimum personnel and equipment.

9 The portable ramp technique of unstuffing is not satisfactory due to poor traction of hard wheeled forklifts and the ramp is not organic to the ammunition unit TO&E.

10 Use of hydraulic pallet jacks is not recommended as the wheels are easily jammed by bits of dunnage and debris.

11 It is possible to snake pallets to the rear of the container with minimum effort. The container is then easily moved by a rough terrain forklift. This method, of those tested, was most adaptable to field use.

12 A minimum of two to three inches clearance must be allowed between the top of the door opening of the container and the top of the pallet to facilitate stuffing. Pallets in the rear of the container should not be placed flush with the side walls. Forklifts with laterally adjustable tines are required for efficient removal when so loaded.

13 Containerized shipment of ammunition requires that documentation be more complete and accurate than for conventional vessels. Inaccurate documentation of a container would probably not be detected until the container is opened at a forward point. This could result in the shipment to a unit of a type of ammunition for which it has no need.

14 Use of an open top, dropside or gondola container would permit removal of projectiles with a crane only and eliminate the need for the rough terrain forklift and associated additional handlings.

15 The danger involved in handling ammunition in containers is significantly reduced at pierside due to rapid evacuation of discharged cargo and reduced hazard exposure time.

16 A most significant finding made during the test, and one which should be given considerable emphasis during the on-going test evaluation in CONUS, is that of cargo condition. There was not a single instance of damaged pallets or cargo. This, to the forward ASP's, was one of the most appealing features of the concept. Much the opposite is experienced with ammunition shipped via the



## CONFIDENTIAL

the conventional mode. Damage occurs on a frequent basis during loading to the vessel, during the voyage at sea, during offload and in-country handling and movement.

### b. Roll On/Roll Off (RO/RO)

(1) On 1 April 1970, Project SLAM, the movement of Class V ammunition from Cam Ranh Bay to Qui Nhon was initiated. This system of ammunition distribution was initiated in order to effect personnel and cost savings at the Qui Nhon Ammunition Supply Depot.

(2) A total of ninety (90) 12-ton stake and platform semi-trailers were obtained from the 2nd Logistical Command for this project. These semi-trailers were hand-receipted by the Qui Nhon Support Command. The word "SLAM" was stencilled prominently on trailer headboards and sides as a means of rapid identification for the trailers.

(3) Thru-put of Class V from Cam Ranh Bay to Ammunition Supply Points (ASP) located at Landing Zone English, An Khe and Pleiku was emphasized. Lessons learned during Project SLAM are expected to be relevant to future movements of Class V via container. In the first four "SLAM" shipments, a total of 81 trailers were loaded with over 800 S/Tons of ammunition at Cam Ranh and moved via MSTS LST to Qui Nhon. Over 85% of the "SLAM" trailers in the first four "SLAM" shipments were thru-put to forward ASP's at Pleiku, An Khe, Tuy Hoa, LZ English and the KOK ASP.

c. CONEX Control Program During the period 15 through 26 February a one time CONEX serial number inventory was conducted. A total of 76855 CONEX were reported in-country compared to the 31 March 1970 CONEX inventory report of 71944 containers in-country. The Army component, as of 31 March 1970, reported a total of 49940 CONEX compared to the one time CONEX serial number inventory of 48380. The purpose of the serial number inventory was to purify the records and remove from the CONEX inventory those CONEX no longer suited for their designed purposes. Since December 1969, the 3 repair facilities have been exceeding their rated repair capability of 750 CONEX. During the period January - March 1970, 3069 CONEX were repaired at the 3 repair facilities. As of 31 March 1970, 5575 CONEX were stockpiled compared to the desired level of 8000.

### d. MILVAN.

(1) Information was received from HQ, USAMC on 11 April 1970 that a lease for 1300 commercial design MILVAN containers had been signed. Initial shipments of MILVAN's are expected to arrive in RVN in mid-May 1970.

(2) Initial shipments of MILVAN's into RVN will be via Seatrain vessel with containers on chassis until a total of 700 MILVAN chassis are in-country (450 chassis at Cam Ranh Bay and 250 chassis at Qui Nhon).

(3) Initial planning calls for the arrival in-country of 140 MILVAN's each eleven (11) days. USAMC requested to route MILVAN vessels to Cam Ranh Bay then Qui Nhon in order to provide for intra-support command MILVAN movements.

e. Air. During the reporting period three (3) requests for Special Assignment Airlift Missions (SAAM's) were received. Two (2) requests were for in-country moves of signal vans (27 STONS) and one (1) request for a SAAM to move an infra-red

## CONFIDENTIAL

van (9 STONS) to Thailand.

f. Troop Movement. During the reporting period, no United States personnel arrived by ship at 1st Logistical Command reports. Eight thousand four hundred ninety-two Republic of Korea (ROK) replacements arrived in RVN via the USNS Barret and USNS Geiger.

g. Project Challenge. This program challenges the priorities and requirements for cargo offered for movement in-country. The following is a summary of all shipments in thousands of STON's that were offered, challenged, downgraded and stopped during the reporting period.

	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>MARCH</u>	<u>APRIL</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
OFFERED	299.1	261.3	272.8	833.2
CHALLENGED	80.8	56.0	37.5	174.3
DOWNGRADED	4.4	45.6	25.4	75.4
STOPPED	2.1	7.9	1.6	11.6

h. Project MILSTAMP Handbook. A revision has been made and supplied to TMA-MACV by the ACoFS, Transportation. The revision corrects errors found in the first printing and supplies additional information in the areas of air shipments and FSN identification. The revised edition is presently being staffed through all concerned agencies prior to printing.

i. Qui Nhon MILSTAMP/Automatic Data Processing Project. Development of a MILSTAMP - ADF capability at Qui Nhon port was initiated in early December 1969. Qui Nhon Depot facilities are being utilized while 5th Trans Comd personnel have been trained to operate the system. The system is now in the final stages of testing in preparation for transferring over to full reliance on transceived manifests in lieu of airmailed manifests. Electronic transmission of manifest data will result in cost savings and in speedier cargo documentation.

### 6. (C) ARVNization of US Ports.

a. ARVNization of US ports continues to be a primary concern of the 1st Logistical Command. Ports that are being ARVNized at the present time are Can Tho/Binh Thuy, Saigon, Nha Trang and Qui Nhon.

b. Can Tho/Binh Thuy was officially turned over for complete operation to ARVN on 19 March 1970. The equipment lent to the ARVN unit was returned upon receipt of TOE bill from CONUS. ARVN is experiencing no difficulties in discharge operations but has problems in port clearance. The rate is determined by the ability of the depot to receive and the ARVN ammunition depot has a restricted capability that cause a backlash in port operations.

c. The draft agreement for Saigon and the M&M pier area was finalized in March and is awaiting formal ratification. US port operators made equipment and supplies available to ARVN on an as required basis. ARVN also received equipment from US depots on a Temporary Loan Authorization. Action has been initiated to provide a dunnage yard for ARVN in the M&M area. Authorizations are

## CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

being developed for securing tie down devices. Saigon union representatives have brought pressure upon US port operators to employ only contractor provided checkers for MASF cargo discharged at the M&M area. The 4th Transportation Command reacted by placing military checkers on the MASF cargo vessels. An agreement was reached with USAID and ARVN whereby ARVN would discharge USAID cargo at the M&M area and the US would reimburse the ARVN contractor out of AIK funds.

d. The ARVN capability at Nha Trang was increased by the assignment of additional personnel and equipment to the US port activity. The ARVN TOE was converted from a Type B to a Type A for its terminal service company. The conversion will authorize a total of 341 military spaces instead of two hundred.

e. At Qui Nhon, 5th Transportation Command and Qui Nhon Transportation Terminal Command have been working together to introduce QNHITC into port operations. ARVN boat operators have been integrated into operations in Qui Nhon harbor. ARVN personnel have worked ammunition ships in the stream and are working deep draft ships at pierside.

## CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

1. (C) Ammunition Activity.

a. During the reporting period, total on hand serviceable stocks averaged 164,000 STONS. This is compared with an average balance on hand of 141,000 STONS during the same period a year ago. The average on hand quantity during the period was slightly higher than anticipated. This was due mainly to the significant build up of ammunition supplies in anticipation of the Tet offensive.

b. It has also been noted that despite the drawdown in troop strength, ammunition issues have remained fairly constant. This substantiates statements in previous ORLL's that as US troops (Infantry units) are withdrawn, this loss manpower is offset by increased employment of artillery.

2. (U) Surveillance Activities: During the reporting period a course of instruction for Ammunition Technical Inspectors was presented to members of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. This was the first such course presented under the "Vietnamization" program. The course was presented by members of the ACoS, Ammunition, 1st Logistical Command, ACoS, Ammunition, Saigon Support command, and the 3d Ordnance Battalion. The instruction was designed to train qualified surveillance inspectors in ammunition handling, identification inspection, and maintenance techniques. Twenty-four ARVN personnel were graduated from the course.

3. (U) Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Activities.

a. Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel are spending many hours at FSB's and LZ's in route to and from incident sites, although they are authorized a 1 B2 Priority for air travel to and from incident sites. Samples of this are incident number 44-461-70: hours necessary to complete incident 2 - 6 man hours, hours actually taken - 26 man hours; and incident number 3-400-70: hours necessary to complete incident - 4 man hours, hours actually taken - 18 man hours. MACV Directive 75-1, which states, "EOD personnel resources are extremely limited and are subject to immediate redeployment at any time, therefore EOD teams require immediate responsiveness to emergency sites and return to home station," was written as a guide for Corps, Division, Brigade, and Battalion when requisitioning EOD help.

b. The vehicles presently authorized for EOD units/sections are not sufficient to adequately perform their mission. Communications (AN/VRC-46 and AN/PRC-25) presently authorized for EOD units/sections do not have sufficient range to provide necessary communications within their units. Most units/sections maintain at least one (1) on site team and telephone contact is not available; therefore they may go days without communications contact. MTOE9-520G was submitted in 20 Apr 70, and if approved will alleviate the above problems.

4. (C) Supply Activities.

a. Total issues for the period of 25 Jan 70 to 24 Apr were 234,848 STONS versus receipts of 220,095 STONS. Total issues, receipts, and serviceable balances on hand were as follows:

**CONFIDENTIAL**

# CONFIDENTIAL

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>RECEIPTS</u>	<u>ISSUES</u>	<u>BOH</u>
FEB	78,361	79,164	168,478
MAR	77,836	72,633	171,471
APR	63,898	83,051	152,710

Receipt and issue figures exclude unit turn-ins and losses and gains due to condition code changes. Therefore, ending balance onhand (BOH) is not the numerical sum of beginning BOH plus receipts minus issues.

b. Enemy action on 4 Apr 70 resulted in the loss of 10.05 STONS of ammunition at the Quan Loi ASP valued \$6700.00. This brings the total theater losses for FY 70 to 31.62 STON valued at \$45,207.58.

c. Retrograde: The Class V Retrograde Program was instituted at HQ, 1st Log Comd, to identify and retrograde all serviceable excess and unserviceable ammunition which is beyond in-country repair capability. The program was divided into phases; progress since the program was initiated as shown below.

<u>TIME PERIOD</u>	<u>GOAL</u>	<u>STON RETROGRADED</u>
Phase I - 1 Sep - 31 Dec 68	14,800	15,967
Phase II - 1 Jan - 28 Feb 69	35,000	33,562
Phase II - 1 Mar - 30 Jun 69	10,000	13,397
Phase IV - 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69	6,655	10,566
Phase V - 1 Jan - 30 Apr 70	4,000	5,657

## 5. (C) Ammunition Operations:

a. Two Class V installations were closed during the period, and one was transferred to the 25th Division.

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>AREA</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Lai Khe	III CTZ	Closed	15 Feb 70
Ban Me Thout	II CTZ	Closed	20 Feb 70
Chu Chi	III CTZ	Trans to 25th Inf	19 Mar 70

b. The Central Munitions System-Vietnam (CMS-V) pilot system was initiated on 25 Mar 70 as scheduled. The system has now replaced the Univac 1005 system which had supported ACofS, Ammunition since 1968. The pilot system presently supplies daily asset listings, tonnage and cost summaries, issue summary of allocated items, plus semi-monthly management input for USARPAC. The requisition segment of the system is now being programmed. This will enable ACofS Ammunition to maintain updated ship manifests, trace requisitions, and produce candidate requisitions for commodity managers. This phase will be operational on 25 Jun 70 when the entire Central Munitions System is fully operational.

c. Ammunition is being transported between Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon by roll on/roll off type vessels. This concept was initiated to support the reduction of Qui Nhon Ammunition Depot to an ASP. The mechanics of the system are quite simple. The Qui Nhon depot determines what their requirements will be for a two week period. These requirements, expressed in 21 trailer load lots, which is the capacity of an LST, are sent by message to 1st Log, ACofS Ammo. This

# CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

office then issues a shipping directive to Cam Ranh Bay and when scheduled by TMA are loaded on LST's and transported to Qui Nhon. There they are offloaded and scheduled for convoys to the ASP's. Priority is given to the forward ASP's at Pleiku, An Khe, and Landing Zone English. Empty trailers are back loaded and returned to Cam Ranh Bay to complete the trip.

d. Qui Nhon Ammunition Depot was phased down to an ASP. The net result of this reduction was to reduce the storage capacity of Qui Nhon depot from 22,500 STONS to approximately an 8,000 STONS storage capacity.

e. Systems design was completed for an automated lot record accounting system for the four support commands. The system is designed so that it gives daily lot status for the ammunition battalion, DODIC asset status for the support command and input data for the Central Munitions System-Vietnam. The system is designed to operate on the Univac 1005 and will require six to eight hours a day of data processing support.

## CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX H (U) ACofS, Services

1. (U) Field Laundry Production.

a. Tonnage produced. During the reporting period 1st Logistical Command field laundry units processed 9.1 million pounds of laundry.

b. Field laundry production capability. The capability of a field laundry unit to process flatwork items, i.e., sheets, pillow cases, was revised 1 Apr 70 from the TM rate of 61,500 lbs per month to 41,600 lbs per month. The change was found to be necessary through experience in Vietnam. The TM rated capacity of the field laundry unit was 60 lbs per cycle. The flatwork that was being processed was not a clean quality product. A washing cycle of 40 lbs per cycle of laundry has been found to produce the clean quality wash load desired.

c. Processing heavily soiled laundry. Instruction has been disseminated that heavily soiled flatwork, requiring repeated wash cycles, be segregated from less heavily soiled laundry and the heavily soiled laundry be turned over to contract laundries for processing. This procedure allows field units to process a greater volume of less soiled flatwork, which in turn reduces the backlog. When conditions exist permitting utilization of this concept, commercial laundry requirements can actually be reduced,

d. Processing backlog laundry. The recommendation has been disseminated to support commands that laundry operations experiencing large quantities of backlog be instructed to process flatwork, such as sheets, pillow cases, blankets, mattress covers, etc., in the field laundry and allow contract laundries to handle mixed laundry. The mixed laundry consists of fatigues, hospital PJ's, uniforms, robes, etc., and other items that require starching and pressing which cannot be accomplished at the field laundry. This recommendation is not to be construed as authority to shift laundry from field units to contract laundries, but as a means to eliminate a backlog without an undue loss of time.

2. (U) Analysis of Self Service Supply Center (SSSC). Analysis of the SSSC concept of operations revealed a need for revised instructions that would clarify areas of misunderstanding and standardize operations. Significant areas/changes are as follows:

a. The Master Stockage List (MSL) was revised and expanded to provide for a better selection of items which included common hand tools. This action will significantly decrease the quantity of requests/requisitions at the DSU and depot level and provide a more responsive customer service. In addition, this MSL will assist the SSSC in meeting customer demands and, in some cases, provide a readily available means of reducing excesses to the DSU. In some cases, the depot will issue substitutable items in lieu of the prime item to reduce theaterwide excesses.

b. Revised procedures require implementation of financial accountability at the SSSC which will eliminate stock record cards at the store. Demand history will be centralized and maintained at the DSU stock control section. This centralization will place skilled personnel under a single supervisor and eliminate duplication of efforts. Under this new concept, DSU's will maintain a 60-day stockage level and the SSSC will maintain a 30-day stockage level with a 15-day reorder point. The 15-day reorder point will trigger a DSU requisition to the depot as the DSU will maintain a 45-day reorder point. These concepts will provide an even and continuous flow of supplies, and decrease the probability of reaching an "out of order stock" position.

c. A system has been devised wherein the ICCV will provide advance management information on lines that are at zero balance in the depots and lines that will be at zero balance within 90 days. This will allow DSU's and SSSC's to ration those items on hand in DSU stockage and in the store. By utilizing this "advance" management data, the DSU and SSSC will be capable of decreasing the impact upon the customer. In addition, reporting of excess stocks allows for redistribution within the SSSC system to optimum utilization of Class II material.

3. (U) SSSC Synopsis. A complete, detailed procedure/synopsis, including the above changes, is in the final staffing stages. Once it has been finalized and distributed, units of this command will be standard in operations and concept, and have available, for the first time, advance and current management information.

#### 4. Property Disposal Sales.

a. During the past quarter, Vietnam property disposal operations increased in efforts to reduce the command inventory. Part of this continuing process was a 65% increase in the number of sales conducted during the quarter. Forty-nine sales were conducted this quarter as opposed to 33 sales during the previous quarter. The effect of this increase in sales will be the reduction of the on-hand inventory during the 1 May to 30 July quarter.

b. Reporting time. The acquisition cost of items sold during the quarter was \$7,046,111. A 6.0% return was realized. In addition, 42,210 short tons of scrap were sold, bringing total proceeds to \$759,324 for the quarter. Emphasis has been placed on reporting usable property for sale in a shorter time frame and increasing the number of sales conducted. This, coupled with better merchandising practices, should result in greater return to the US government. Reducing reporting time on usable property will help reduce the inactive inventory, expedite sales, and ultimately result in reduction of the command inventory.

5. (U) Inventory trends. The beginning inventory for the quarter was 104.9 thousand short tons. The ending inventory was 99.6 thousand short



tons of which 43% was inactive inventory. Of the total 72.9% was scrap and the total dollar value of the usable inventory was \$51,037,546. Total property removed for the quarter was 52.6 thousand short tons of which 3.2 thousand short tons of this total was transferred to the Military Assistance Program (MAP). Total MAP releases from Vietnam activities to date have reached 31.3 short tons. Continuing emphasis will be maintained during the next quarter on the prompt reporting of property for sale and will result in another increase in property sold.

ANNEX I (U) ACOFS, PERSONNEL

1. (U) Noncommissioned Officer Logistics Program (NCOLP). Continuing emphasis is being placed on designation of NCOLP positions and on encouraging eligible noncommissioned officers to apply for entrance into the NCOLP. All commanders and staff officers have been directed to review key positions within their commands or staff sections to insure that all noncommissioned officer positions which meet the basic Department of the Army requirements are recommended for designation as NCOLP positions. This command has 252 NCOLP positions approved by the Department of the Army. The Adjutant General will continue to requisition personnel for the approved NCOLP positions.

2. (U) Project Skills Training. The increasing role of local nationals in the work force of 1st Logistical Command created a special need for formal classroom training and On-the-job training. Under the Project Skills Programs, surveys were conducted in each command to identify training needs. On-the-job training programs were developed for those skills not formally taught. Schools for interpreters were established to augment other training requirements. Through on-the-job training, training conducted by the Area Civilian Personnel Offices, and training conducted by the Central Training Institute, the skill level of the local national employees has been improved. In conjunction with the Central Training Institute, selected local national employees of this command with demonstrated managerial or supervisory potential participate in courses in personnel management, advanced English, and other advance job-related courses.

3. (U) Army Education Program. a. The command's General Education Development (GED) program was authorized in FY-67. During the first two years, it grew to nine Army Education Centers staffed by eleven DAC Education Services Officers. In the third quarter of FY-69, the physical facilities were enlarged with the erection of two to five portable classrooms at each center. These were purchased through nonappropriated funds. Classroom furniture, language laboratory equipment, and educational supplies were also purchased and distributed to each location.

b. FY-69 and FY-70 have seen cut-backs in the number of Education Centers and DAC positions. The center at Tuy Hoa was closed during FY-69 due to a reduction in the number of troops served. The education facilities and DAC positions at Phu Bai and Quang Tri were transferred to USARV during the first quarter FY-70. Despite these reductions, the scope of the GED Program has shown substantial increases. During the first quarter of FY-70, the remaining six centers had a 23% growth over the fourth quarter of FY-69. The second quarter of FY-70 saw an additional expansion of 5%. (See charts, para d and e below)

c. At the beginning of the quarter, the Vung Tau Army Education Center was discontinued due to the deployment of troops and reduction in personnel at that location. The DAC Education Services Officer was transferred to Cu Chi to take over the educational program for the 25th Infantry Division. The relocatable classrooms were transferred to other Army Education Centers: one to Can Tho and two to Da Nang.

d. Also, all DAC Educational Services Officer positions were transferred to Headquarters, USARV and vouchered to its TDA. Nine positions were involved. The incumbents remained in their assigned locations at Cam Ranh Bay, Nha Trang, Pleiku, Qui Nhon, Da Nang, Phu Bai, Quang Tri, and Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command.

e. As of 1 April 1970, staff responsibility for the General Educational Development Program (GED) in the 1st Logistical Command was officially assumed by Headquarters, USARV.

f. The following statistics give a comparison of activities between the second and third quarters of FY 70 by support commands and education centers:

EDUCATION CENTERS	CORRESPONDENCE COURSE 1 ENROLLMENTS		GROUP STUDY ENROLLMENTS		USAFI TESTS ADMINISTERED		UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND ENROLLMENTS	
	2nd <u>Qtr</u>	3rd <u>Qtr</u>	2nd <u>Qtr</u>	3rd <u>Qtr</u>	2nd <u>Qtr</u>	3rd <u>Qtr</u>	2nd <u>Qtr</u>	3rd <u>Qtr</u>
SGN SUPCOM <sup>2</sup>								
Vung Tau	952	0	118	0	735	0	0	0
CRB SUPCOM								
Cam Ranh Bay	710	822	313	282	1457	1521	80	83
Nha Trang	1250	1329	199	342	1079	1129	195	114
QNH SUPCOM								
Qui Nhon	1221	1380	263	279	1817	2135	40	33
Pleiku	186	249	31	83	900	1093	0	0
DNG SUPCOM								
Da Nang	<u>801</u>	<u>935</u>	<u>158</u>	<u>235</u>	<u>1497</u>	<u>782</u>	<u>284</u>	<u>134</u>
TOTAL	5120	4715	1082	1221	6485	6660	599	364

1 Correspondence enrollments are for one year unless sooner completed by a USAFI test. Therefore, figures shown represent cumulative enrollments for four quarters less completions.

2. Vung Tau Army Education was discontinued 6 Jan 70.

g. The following figures show the number of individuals who successfully achieved a higher education level:

	<u>Individuals</u>	
	<u>FY-70</u> <u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>FY-70</u> <u>3rd Qtr</u>
Completion of 8th Grade	91	117
Completion of High School	451	523
Completion of One Year of College	30	23
Completion of Two Years of College	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>
TOTAL	572	665

4. (U) Safety: The accident rates for the 3d quarter of FY-70 were below the rates for the 1st and 2d quarters. Comparisons of the Army motor vehicle accident and military disabling injury rates for the 3d quarter are as follows:

a. The Army motor vehicle (AMV) accident rate for the 3d quarter was 6 accidents per million miles driven compared to 7.3 and 7.9 for the 1st and 2d quarters respectively. The 3d quarter AMV accident rate was also below the expectancy rate of 7.9 assigned by Headquarters, US Army Vietnam. The primary causes of AMV accidents during the 3d quarter were unsafe acts of local national motorists and pedestrians, excessive speed, mechanical failure, and following too closely.

b. The military disabling injury (MDI) rate for the 3d quarter was 33.4 injuries per million mandays. The rates for the 1st and 2d quarters were 34.5 and 37.3 respectively. The 3d quarter MDI rate was also below the expectancy rate of 35.3 assigned by Headquarters, US Army Vietnam. The primary causes of injuries during the 3d quarter were AMV accidents, falls, mishandling of individual weapons, and burns.

5. (U) Civil Military Operations: a. The civil-military operations activities of 1st Logistical Command are designed to provide technical and material support to the Government of South Vietnam in its effort to rebuild the nation. Civil-military operations activities are conducted to support the GVN pacification campaign, to support RVNAF unit capabilities, to conduct civic action, to improve relations between US units and adjacent civilian communities, and to facilitate tactical operations. The 1st Logistical Command's civil-military operations activities cover all of these areas, however several special civic action and community relation type programs have been initiated.

b. The two major civil affairs activities in which this command is engaged are civic action and community relations. They are defined as:

(1) **Civic action:** The use of Military personnel and resources to support projects which are useful to the local population, and which contribute to the economic and social development of the country and in addition serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population.

(a) The objectives of civic action are:

- (1) Develop popular support for the GVN.
- (2) Develop spirit of cooperation among the Vietnamese.
- (3) Improve the living conditions of the people.

(b) During the reporting period, 25 civic action projects were started within the command, 26 were completed, and 42 projects continued.

(2) **Community Relations:** To develop activities which serve to enhance mutual understanding and encourage cooperation between US Army personnel, the people of the Republic of Vietnam and other members of the FMAF.

(a) The objectives of Community Relations are to:

- (1) Lessen the impact of US presence.
- (2) Correct or prevent situations which alienate the people.
- (3) Develop a spirit of good will towards the US military forces.

(b) During the reporting period, 27 community relations projects were started within the command, 24 were completed, and 35 projects continued.

c. The Animal Husbandry Program is being supported by donating condemned foodstuffs and edible garbage to the Vietnamese for use in animal raising. The foodstuffs, which have been declared unfit for human consumption, but fit for animal consumption are donated to the ARVN military farms, small scale farmers, farm cooperatives and private institutions for their use in raising animals. The objectives of this program are to assist the Vietnamese in the raising of animals that will supplement their diets, help them achieve additional income and allow them to become self-sufficient. The donation of foodstuffs also provides a useful outlet for foodstuffs condemned at the ports and generated in mess halls, thus reducing the disposal costs. Monthly, an average of 800,000 lbs of edible garbage is donated by 1st Logistical Command mess halls.

d. The MEDCAPS Program (Medical Civic Action) is one of the most useful and effective programs conducted by military forces in Vietnam. MEDCAP has two related goals:

(1) To establish a spirit of mutual respect and cooperation among and between the civilian population, Government of Vietnam (GVN), civilian officials, and the RVNAF.

(2) To support Revolutionary Development by improving the health environment of RVN civilians through the commitment of military medical resources to the extent permitted by operational requirements. This commitment may be an adjunct of, or in addition to, military operations. 1st Logistical Command units provide transportation, equipment, etc. and coordinate with local GVN officials, dispensaries, and hospitals, who provide medical personnel and medical supplies, and the military police who provide security. The MEDCAP teams then move into an area and treat the people. During the reporting period a total of 11,000 patients were treated throughout the command.

e. Following the lines of Vietnamization, the Government of Vietnam has initiated the Village Self-development Program, whereby the GVN gives financial support to each village to conduct self help programs. 1st Logistical Command units must coordinate with and receive approval from MACV and GVN officials before initiating projects. US units will assist with equipment, supplies and funds but the people will do the work. In conjunction with the redeployment of US units, the level of civil affairs activities is also being scaled down. The US/FWMAF Civic Action PSYWAR Fund for 1st Logistical Command, which was 900,000 \$VN per month, has been cut by 70% for the first quarter CY-70. The fund will be further cut by 80% for the second quarter CY-70 and by 90% for the third and fourth quarters CY-70. This will drastically reduce expenditures and minimize projects to the short term high impact category.

f. The Command civil-military statistics for the period 1 Feb - 31 Mar are shown below. April's statistics are not included due to the transfer of 1st Log Comd Civil Affairs functions to HQ, USARV on 16 April.

(1) The total number of man-days (10 hour days) personnel of units engaged in civic action activities: 1965.

(2) Cost of civic action project:

(a) Cost of supplies contributed from military resources for civic action projects: 7,819,540 \$VN.

(b) Expenditures from US/FWMAF Civic Action PSYWAR Fund: 417,772 \$VN.

(3) Voluntary contributions:

(a) Collections: 979,816.

(b) Expenditures in support of civic action: 874,735.

(4) Percent of US military civic action activities conducted jointly with:

	<u>SGN</u>	<u>CRB</u>	<u>QNH</u>	<u>DNG</u>
(a) Other FWMAF:	50%	3%	10%	5%
(b) RVNAF:	50%	18%	75%	13%

	<u>SGN</u>	<u>CRB</u>	<u>QNH</u>	<u>DNG</u>
(c) US Civilian Voluntary Agencies:	20%	0%	13%	48%

(5) average percent of self help contributed by the people:

(a) Self-help labor:	88%	55%	100%	100%
(b) Material furnished:	15%	40%	15%	0%

(6) Major civic action programs reflecting the number of man-days (10 Hr days) and the cost of supplies provided from military resources.

	<u>MAN-DAYS</u>	<u>\$VN</u>
(a) Economic Development:	155	778,080
(b) Education:	290	1,132,758
(c) Social Welfare:	987	2,896,830
(d) Transportation:	256	112,920
(e) Refugees Assistance Support	184	1,250,707

(7) Number of separate institutions assisted during the reporting period:

- (a) Schools 47.
- (b) Hospitals/Dispensaries 30.
- (c) Orphanages 45.
- (d) Scouting Organizations 2.
- (e) Refugee Centers 13.
- (f) Others 10.
- (8) Educational efforts:

<u>CLASS</u>	<u>STUDENTS</u>
English	733
Mechanics	19
Typing	25
Nurses Aids	3
	77

(9) Commodities distributed:

- (a) Cement (lbs) 139,500.
- (b) Tin sheets (no) 590.
- (c) Lumber (bd ft) 1,090,282.
- (d) Paint (gal) 205.
- (e) Bricks (ea) 29,100.
- (f) Sand (mtr) 130.
- (g) Nails (lbs) 150.
- (h) Firewood (lbs) 35,300.
- (i) Kits 350.
- (j) Health items (lbs) 205.
- (k) Food (lbs) 4,110.
- (l) Clothing (lbs) 1,615.
- (m) Agricultural tools (ea) 8.
- (n) Scrap lumber (truck loads) 21.

(10) Construction projects completed during the reporting period:  
(Joint projects are marked with a J next to the number).

	<u>BUILT</u>	<u>REPAIRED</u>
(1) Dwelling	31	59J, 8
(2) Roads (Km)	1	8
(3) Churches	1	4J, 10
(4) Hospitals	0	4J, 6
(5) Dispensaries	1J	3
(6) Market Places	0	0
(7) Schools	0	12J, 17
(8) Bridges	3	7



## ANNEX J (U) ACOFS PROCUREMENT

1. (U) Purchase Request and Commitments (PR&C's) Received. PR&C's for Fiscal Year (FY) 1970 received during the current reporting period, ending on 25 April 1970, numbered 282 and were valued at \$5.0 million. PR&C's for FY 70 received through 25 April 1970 total 1,456 and were valued at \$253.6 million. The following charts show PR&C's received for FY 1968, 1969 and 1970 (Chart #1) and dollar value of PR&C's received for FY 1968, 1969 and 1970 (Chart #2). The significant accomplishments which these charts and statistics illustrate are that USAPAV has been able to identify major requirements earlier in the FY by improved coordination with requesting activities and improved procurement planning, thus allowing for an orderly progression through the procurement cycle. In previous years, major PR&C's were not received until late in the fiscal year. The smoothing of the traditional hump in the procurement workload will result in better procurement packages and improved contracts. The high dollar value of PR&C's received also reflects the increase in workload caused by the assumption of procurement responsibilities in the I CTZ from the Navy. This change in responsibility has been assumed with minimal disruption of previous workload. Actions now underway will insure that the smooth flow of logistical services and supplies will continue notwithstanding the shift of procurement responsibility from the Navy to USAPAV.

2. (U) Decommitments. The decommitment of funds continues to be a major project in USAPAV. As of 25 April 1970, \$33.3 million had been decommitted and returned to the requiring activities. A concentrated review of on-hand PR&C's was conducted in late April, and decommitment action taken resulted in an additional \$1.6 million with potential decommitments identified totaling \$4.0 million. This continuous review action is taken to insure that maximum utilization of funds is obtained. The early identification of excess funds and the return of these funds to requiring activities allows for numerous requirements to be funded which would otherwise receive no action.

3. (U) Subsistence Management Improvements. USAPAV has maintained a continuing review of the decentralized field offices which are tasked with the responsibility of procuring subsistence. During the period covered, four field offices were closed. This management action was taken to insure the maximum utilization of available resources and still maintain support to the customers. The need to maintain flexibility in the methods utilized to accomplish the procurement mission cannot be overemphasized. The utilization of the personnel spaces allocated to the field offices in other activities with USAPAV to insure accomplishment of the procurement mission clearly illustrates this flexibility.

4. (U) Property Administration Management Improvements. Resolution of the difficulties and problems encountered in administering the property provisions of contracts in Vietnam requires quick response, adequate planning, and tight but realistic controls. Improvements implemented to date have increased the ability of the Property Administrators to meet this requirements. Actions taken include (1) quarterly reports by Property Administrators

showing status of the contractor's property control system, status of the Property Administrator's surveillance efforts, financial management data, summary of improvements realized/recommended, and summary of contractor and contract data; and (2) development of CY 1970 surveillance schedules. Actions planned for FY 1970 include but are not limited to (1) complete revision of the surveillance check list to conform to ASPR; (2) closer coordination with Contracting Officers; (3) assignment of Property Administrators to procurement actions from inception to contract award and subsequent administration and completion; (4) periodic meetings to discuss actions, objectives, and results; and (5) surveillance from contractor management to the field rather than from the field to management so that the "cause" rather than the "result" will be corrected.

5. (U) Directorate of Quality and Facilities Management Improvements. Revised Quality Assurance (QA) Surveillance Program put into effect at the beginning of FY 1970 has resulted in significant improvements in the overall quality of supplies and services procured by USAPAV, elimination of many problem areas, and a better understanding of contract requirements by the contractors. As of 20 April 1970, 595 surveillance inspections and 228 pre-award facilities surveys have been performed by Directorate personnel. In addition to improved quality, these inspections have also resulted in a number of contract terminations. Additional Quality Assurance Surveillance Check Lists have been developed, reproduced, and disseminated for use. Progress continues to be made in the purification of the source list files. Inactive files are being eliminated, and recently established procedures preclude the placement of unqualified offerors on the source lists.

6. (U) Methods Improvements. USAPAV is continually exploring the possibilities of improving the methods employed and the types of contracts utilized to acquire supplies and services. As a result of this continued review, methods of contracting have been developed which increase customers' satisfaction and improve contractor performance. Award fee contracts which were initiated by this Agency have been particularly effective in this areal. This relating of contractor performance to amount of award has proven very satisfactory in increasing overall performance. Currently, contracts are being negotiated which add further incentive for better contractor performance. The use of a fixed price contract with a subjective performance fee is thought to be a further step in accomplishing the desired results of highest performance at the lowest cost to the Government.

Annex K Adjutant General

1. (U) Reenlistment goals established by Department of the Army were exceeded during February, March and April 1970. A statistical resume of reenlistment achievement is at Inclosure 1.
2. (U) During the quarter, 21,789 electrical messages were processed; 474 general orders, 1,721 special orders, and 809 letter orders were published. Two thousand, eleven reproduction jobs were run, aggregating 4,764,236 impressions.
3. (U) During the period Feb - Apr 70 the command published two postal bulletins (No 2 & 3) containing information of interest to the postal elements of the command. The bulletins were of a technical nature and provided a quick means of disseminating current requirements of various postal directives, regulations, etc.
4. (U) Major Jerome Martin, O12 24 1828, was assigned as the Staff Postal Officer on 3 March 1970. Through 30 April 1970, he conducted six triannual postal inspections and audits of the 1st, 41st, 45th, 508th, 58th, and 566th Army Postal Units. These inspections were of a technical nature relating to the efficiency of operations in the Army Postal Units. All units with the exception of the 41st Army Postal Unit received satisfactory ratings.
5. (U) A total of 12,257 enlisted promotion allocations were received by the command, of which 9,307 were used. Statistical data are at inclosure 2.
6. (U) Command strength decreased during the reporting period. A loss of 2,444 authorized spaces occurred and personnel losses exceeded gains during the period by 3,576. Inclosure 3 reflects the command strength posture during the period. A summary of gains and losses during the period is at inclosure 4.
7. (U) A total of 5,086 awards were approved during the period (see Inclosure 5).
8. (U) During this period, no members of the command were killed by hostile action, but 24 died not as a result of hostile action. There were 33 injuries due to hostile action and 97 injuries due to other causes during the reporting period. A summary of casualty data is at inclosure 6.
9. (U) Out-of-country R&R allocation totaled 4,746, 4,730 of which were used. A summary of R&R data is at inclosure 7.

ANNEX L (U) Inspector General

1. (U) Operations: Significant Activities.

Inspector General assistance was extended to 576 members of the command. Approximately 53% of the complaints and requests for assistance received concerned assignment, reassignment and transfer; unit administration; and promotions/demotions. Of the 149 complaints processed, 44 were justified. There were 79 Annual General Inspection conducted. Two units were rated Unsatisfactory. Security, Administration, Maintenance and Training continue to be major areas of interest.

a. (U) Annual General Inspections

Annual General Inspections of the following units were conducted on the dates indicated:

IG, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND

533d Ordnance Detachment (EDOC)	Feb 70
3d Ordnance Battalion, HQ & HQ Company	11-12 Feb 70
29th General Supply Group, HQ & HQ Company	24-28 Feb 70
266th Supply & Services Battalion, HQ & HQ Company	24-28 Feb 70
624th Supply & Services Battalion, HQ & HQ Company	24-28 Feb 70
124th Transportation Command, HQ & HQ Company	8-9 Apr 70
United States Army Depot, Qui Nhon	21-25 Apr 70
Troop Command, USAD, Qui Nhon, HQ & HQ Company	21-25 Apr 70

IG, USASUPCOM, CRB

524th Quartermaster Company	2 Feb 70
Ban Me Thout LSA	12 Feb 70
442d Transportation Company	23 Feb 70
54th General Support Group, HQ & HQ Detachment	3-4 Mar 70
Nha Trang LSA	19-20 Mar 70
Phan Thiet LSA	26 Mar 70
Phan Rang LSA	3 Apr 70
Dalat LSA	7 Apr 70
670th Transportation Company	21 Apr 70

IG, USASUPCOM, DNG

178th Maintenance Company	5 Mar 70
490th General Support Company	9 Mar 70
269th Ordnance Detachment (EOD)	10 Mar 70
2d Maintenance Battalion, HQ & Main Support Company	16 Mar 70
633d CC&S Company	23 Mar 70
57th Transportation Company	6 Apr 70
528th Quartermaster Company (POL)	13 Apr 70
64th Finance Section	15 Apr 70
528th Quartermaster Battalion, HQ & HQ Company	20 Apr 70
661st Ordnance Company (Ammo)	27 Apr 70

IG, USASUPCOM, QNH

27th Transportation Battalion, HQ & HQ Detachment	5 Feb 70
62d Maintenance Battalion, HQ & Main Support Company	13 Feb 70
514th Quartermaster Company	10 Mar 70
854th Transportation Company	13 Mar 70
647th Quartermaster Company	18 Mar 70
560th Maintenance Company	19 Mar 70
Office of Logistical Coordinator An Khe	20 Mar 70
240th Quartermaster Battalion, HQ & HQ Detachment	24 Mar 70
86th Maintenance Battalion, HQ & Main Company	27 Mar 70
669th Transportation Company	30 Mar 70
Company A, USAB, Qui Nhon, Troop Command	1 Apr 70
264th Transportation Company	3 Apr 70
523d Transportation Company	15 Apr 70
512th Transportation Company	17 Apr 70

IC, USASUPCOM, SGN

19th Light Equipment Maintenance Company	2-3 Feb 70
185th Maintenance Battalion, HQ & Main Support Company	5-6 Feb 70
563d Transportation Company	19-20 Feb 70
Personnel Services Center (537th & 520th PSCs)	23-24 Feb 70
590th Maintenance Company	2-3 Mar 70
368th Transportation Company	5 Mar 70
372d Transportation Company	6 Mar 70
Bearcat LSA	5-6 Mar 70
48th Army Postal Unit	5-6 Mar 70
551st Transportation Company	9-10 Mar 70
71st Transportation Battalion, HQ, & HQ Detachment	11-12 Mar 70
US Army Terminal, Newport	13 Mar 70
US Army Mortuary, Saigon	16-17 Mar 70
60th Ordnance Company (Ammo)	23-24 Mar 70
135th Light Maintenance Company	26-27 Mar 70
71st Ordnance Company (Ammo)	2-3 Apr 70
51st Maintenance Company (Re-inspection)	7 Apr 70
574th Supply & Services Company (Re-inspection)	8-9 Apr 70
483d Field Service Company	13-14 Apr 70
47th Transportation Company	16-17 Apr 70
538th Transportation Company	20-21 Apr 70
Company 1, USAD Long Binh Troop Command	27-28 Apr 70

b. (U) Complaints and Requests for Assistance

The following is a summary of complaints and requests for assistance received by Inspectors General, 1st Logistical Command, during the period 1 February 1970, to 30 April 1970, computed on the basis of the rate per 1,000 troops.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>COMPLAINTS</u>		<u>REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE</u>
	<u>JUSTIFIABLE</u>	<u>UNJUSTIFIABLE</u>	
HQ, 1st Logistical Command	0.0	0.0	3.7
USASUPCOM, CRB	0.2	0.5	4.0
USASUPCOM, DNG	0.1	0.2	1.8
USASUPCOM, QNH	0.6	1.4	5.3
USASUPCOM, SGN	0.3	0.1	1.9
Command Wide	0.3	0.8	3.2

# ANNEX M STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE

1. (U) There were 234 personal property claims of U.S. military and civilian personnel, totaling \$48,706.04, processed and paid through the Judge Advocate offices of this command during the past quarter. This was a decrease of 7 claims and \$9265.13 from the preceding quarter. In addition Judge Advocates throughout the command handled 6433 legal assistance cases, including the preparation of correspondence and legat instruments. This was an increase of 299 cases over those reported for the preceding quarter.

2. (U) a. Court-martial rates per thousand changed as follows from the previous quarter: Summary courts-martial rate remained constant at .21; special courts-martial rate increased slightly to 1.65 from 1.43; and general courts-martial rate decreased from .11 to .08. Article 15 rate increased from 30.14 to 30.90.

b. The number of 1st Logistical Command (1st Log Comd) personnel in confinement increased slightly from the end of last quarter to the end of the previous quarter, from 39 in confinement on 31 January 1970 to 46 in confinement on 30 April 1970.

3. (U) Nonjudicial punishment: The following figures represent the number of Article 15 actions imposed by 1st Logistical Command commanders during the period 1 February 1970 - 30 April 1970.

	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
HQ, 1ST LOG COMD	15	30	12	57
USASUPCOM - SAIGON	518	523	623	1664
USASUPCOM - CAM RANH BAY	222	210	126	558
USASUPCOM - QUI NHON	411	373	558	1342
USASUPCOM - DA NANG	<u>185</u>	<u>174</u>	<u>158</u>	<u>517</u>
Totals	1351	1310	1477	4138

4. (U) Courts-Martial: The following is a breakdown for the past quarter of cases tried by courts-martial based upon the organizations to which the accused were assigned:



a. <u>General Courts-Martial</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
HQ, 1ST LOG COMD	0	0	0	0
USASUPCOM - SAIGON	1	1	4	6
USASUPCOM - CAM RANH BAY	0	0	0	0
USASUPCOM - QUI NHON	2	0	2	4
USASUPCOM - DA NANG	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
Totals	4	1	6	11

b. <u>Special Courts-Martial</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
HQ, 1ST LOG COMD	0	0	0	0
USASUPCOM - SAIGON	25	41	39	105
USASUPCOM - CAM RANH BAY	5	11	20	36
USASUPCOM - QUI NHON	9	10	2	21
USASUPCOM - DA NANG	<u>17</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>56</u>
Totals	56	77	85	218

c. <u>Summary Courts-Martial</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
HQ, 1ST LOG COMD	0	1	0	1
USASUPCOM - SAIGON	2	2	2	6
USASUPCOM - CAM RANH BAY	1	3	2	6
USASUPCOM - QUI NHON	2	7	6	15
USASUPCOM - DA NANG	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Totals	5	13	10	28

9. (U) Courts-Martial and Article 15 rates per 1000 military personnel are furnished for comparative purposes as follows:

	<u>1st Log Comd</u> (Present qtr)	<u>USARV</u> (3rd qtr. FY 70)	<u>Army Wide</u> (2nd qtr. FY 70)
General Court-Martial	.08	.08	.16
Special Courts-Martial	1.65	1.3	2.38
Summary Courts-Martial	.21	.16	.78
Article 15 Punishment	30.90	15.9	.72

6. (U) The following figures represent claims paid to members of the command for property, lost, destroyed or damaged incident to service under the provision of AR 27-20:

	<u>Number Paid</u>	<u>Amount Paid</u>
HQ, 1ST LOG COMD	16	\$ 4,266.
USASUPCOM - SAIGON	20	3,536.81
USASUPCOM - CAM RANH BAY	69	15,813.61
USASUPCOM - QUI NHON	25	18,200.8
USASUPCOM - DA NANG	<u>54</u>	<u>6,969.40</u>
Totals	234	\$48,706.04

7. (U) Legal Assistance: The following is a breakdown of legal assistance problems handled by Judge Advocates within this command during the period 1 February 1970 through 30 April 1970:

	<u>Interviews</u>	<u>Instruments Prepared</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Adoption and Change of Name	34	25	59
Citizenship, Immigration & Passport	182	64	246
Civil Rights	71	2	73
Domestic Relations and Paternity	594	193	787

## CONFIDENTIAL

### ANNEX N (C) PROVOST MARSHAL

1. (U) 2 February 1970, the US Coast Guard Port Security and Waterways Detail held a conference with ACofS, Ammo, USASUPCOM, SCN to design requirements and criteria for disposing of unserviceable ammunition at sea.
2. (C) 4 February 1970, the Chief of Physical Security, formulated a fact sheet for the CG which depicted sentry dog kennel construction, for support of 1st Logistical Command units, at the following locations: Da Nang (30) kennels; Phu Bai (13) kennels; Quang Tri (43) kennels; and Qui Nhon (70) kennels.
3. (U) 6 February 1970, the Chief of Physical Security performed a Physical Security Inspection of the Property Disposal Office to insure that security precautions have been implemented to secure funds.
4. (U) 18 February 1970, the US Coast Guard Port Security and Waterways Detail advised the Commanding Officer, 89th MP Group and the Commanding Officer, 720th MP Bn on the methods for strengthening fiberglass hulls on operational Boston Whalers and recommended a new type of craft for purposes of future planning.
5. (U) 3 March 1970, the Provost Marshal implemented Change 2. to LC Reg 190-25, to stress security precautions on commercial type vehicles and to inform personnel that security of vehicles is a personal responsibility of the operator and the individual to whom the vehicle is dispatched.
6. (U) 6 March 1970, the Chief of Physical Security revised/published change 1 to LC Reg 190-13 (C) to update the list of installations/activities that are classified as either "key" or "critical" installations within the 1st Logistical Command.
7. (U) 17 March 1970, the Provost Marshal dispatched a message to the support commands, Subject: Security of Funds and Fund Instrumentalities, to remind commanders to continue to place emphasis on an effective program that will insure safeguarding and control of all activities related to the handling, security storage and transfer of funds.
8. (U) 5 April 1970, the Chief of Physical Security coordinated and distributed LC Reg 190-32 "Physical Security of Funds and Fund-Handling Activities." This regulation prescribes policies, procedures and responsibilities for security and safeguarding of clubs, messes, finance and postal funds and fund-handling activities within this command.
9. (C) The US Coast Guard Port Security and Waterways Detail represented 1st Logistical Command in a joint conference with USARV, NAVFORV and MACV to determine port and waterway security responsibilities within ICTZ upon Army takeover. Pursuant to the US Coast Guard's recommendation, USN/VN retained responsibility for water security within ICTZ.

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

10. (C) The US Coast Guard Port and Security and Waterways Detail conducted surveys, and submitted recommendations for the deployment of Army patrol craft and reducing operating areas within the Republic of Vietnam. The major point made was to cease patrol of open stretches of river (most of which are duplicated by GVN agencies) and concentrate attention on only those water areas adjacent to US controlled shipping facilities.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

ANNEX O (U) Staff Chaplain

1. (U) Operations: Significant Activities

a. Religious Services: Total attendance for the period of 1 February to 30 April was 139,166. This represents participation in the religious services each week for this quarter as 26.0%. Included in this reporting period are the Christian Lenten and Easter Holy Days and the Jewish Passover and Purim Holy Days. The number of opportunities offered for religious worship is an indication of the continued and untiring dedication of the chaplains. Chaplains conducted 10.9 services per chaplain per week.

b. Staff Personnel: Chaplain (LTC) Joseph Degi, Jr., was assigned to the 1st Logistical Command as the Assistant Staff Chaplain 9 March 1970. Chaplain (MAJ) James R. Linderman was reassigned to 5th Special Forces 1 April 1970, and Chaplain (LTC) Charlie S. Mills was reassigned to Staff Chaplain Section, USARV, 20 April 1970.

c. Offerings: The following donations were made by the 1st Logistical Command personnel through the Chaplain Funds to further community relations projects:

		Churches	Schools and Orphanages	Miscellaneous	Total
Feb	VN\$	91,944	77,913	201,228	371,085
Mar	VN\$	167,450	121,327	290,254	579,031
Apr	VN\$	139,741	221,353	139,704	500,798

ANNEX P (U) Information Office

1. (U) Public Information.

a. Hometown News Releases. The 1st Logistical Command continues to be among the leaders of all United States Army, Vietnam (USARV) units in hometown new releases. A total of 5,260 were sent to the Army Hometown News Center or were released directly to hometown newspapers in the United States. In an effort to lower the command's technical "kill" rate, a more thorough monitoring and feedback system of Hometown News Release Forms (DA 1526) was initiated to provide subordinate information offices with factual data enabling them to determine what action should be taken to lower the "kill" ratio in their respective commands.

b. News Releases. A total of 251 news stories and 203 photo captions were released to more than 419 news media. Significant general distribution techniques insure that news finds its way to appropriate media. This headquarters monitors releases from subordinate commands insuring the quality and comprehensiveness of news and photo coverage. Continued emphasis is placed on the information offices of the subordinate commands to seek out, write and photograph news in depth throughout their area of responsibility.

c. Press Queries. The public information section answered numerous press queries which resulted in face to face meeting with members of press. Interviews were granted with Associated Press on the effect of the mail strike on APO mail and with the New York Times concerning property disposal.

2. (U) Audio/Visual Section.

a. Photography. The audio-visual section covered approximately 200 photo assignments relating to awards and requirements for the staff sections of the headquarters in the Long Binh Post area. Also, the information office photographer made 25 trips throughout the Republic of Vietnam to all of the Support Commands. There were over 600 photo releases made of 1st Log personnel (awards, promotions, ceremonies, etc.).

b. Radio. The radio section produced twelve 20 minute radio features for AFVN which were aired each Sunday at 1130 hours. Also, 5 audio support requirements were provided for 1st Log HQ personnel. The Audio personnel made 10 trips throug the Republic of Vietnam to gather stories for radio.

3. (U) Command Information Section.

a. Vietnam Newsletter. The command information section continues to publish a monthly newsletter for 1st Logistical Command Vietnamese employees. The newsletter, Ban Tin, has a 1:5 distribution ratio of 3,000 copies.

b. Newspaper. The command newspaper, Vietnam Review is being published bi-weekly at MACV on photo offset equipment. We print 17,000 copies permitting a distribution ratio of approximately one copy for every three military personnel with the command. Nearly 200 additional copies are mailed to other organizations and VIFs including media executives.

c. Magazines. One issue of the command magazine DYNAMO is published each quarter with the winter edition coming out on 28 February, and the spring on 30 April. The 20,000 copies of each issue allow a 1.2 distribution ratio to military personnel assigned.

d. Command Newsletter. The newsletter TROOP TOPICS is published approximately once a month, but this quarter four issues have been printed. They are used for the "Commanders Call" in the subordinate units.

e. Travel. Trips by command information personnel to gather for stories for the newspaper, magazine and newsletters, keeps at least one man and sometimes two, on the road at all times. Trips have covered the area from Quang Tri on the DMZ to Chau Doc in the Delta and on the Cambodian border. Each support command is regularly visited and their releases are utilized whenever possible.

#### 4. (U) Special Project Section.

The special projects section produced a command speech for the speaker's bureau, and produced a welcome brochure for newly assigned personnel.

**ANNEX Q (U) Special Assistant for Data Systems**

**1. (U) ADP Equipment Systems.**

a. Exercised staff supervision over the Automatic Data Processing Equipment and Management Program of the Command. The scope of the management effort is indicated below:

- (1) One IBM 360/50 System at the RVN Logistics Data Service Center.
- (2) Four IBM 7010/1460 Systems, one at the RVN Logistics Data Service Center, and one each at U.S. Army Depot Long Binh, Qui Nhon, and Cam Ranh Bay.
- (3) Eleven UNIVAC 1005 Card Systems, one at the RVN Logistics Data Service Center, one at the U.S. Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay, one each at five Personnel Service Companies, and two each at the U.S. Army Depot Qui Nhon and Da Nang.

b. By letter, AVCA CG, 20 March 1970, subject: Data Automation Requirement and Interim ADPE for USAFD Da Nang, this headquarters initiated action to obtain an interim IBM 1401 magnetic tape system for the USAFD da Nang. This same action also requested approval for USAFD Da Nang to install and operate the USAKPAC Standard Supply System (3S) once the equipment is selected for the system. Information available indicates that Headquarters, USAKPAC has approved the requirement and has submitted it to DA for approval.

c. Initiated a study which resulted in discontinuing a UNIVAC 1005 computer and other items of IBM punched card machines from rental. This action resulted in a savings of some \$48,000 per-year in rental and maintenance charges.

**2. (U) Command Automatic Data Processing Policies.**

a. Letter, this headquarters, AVCA DS, 5 February 1970, subject: Data Project Directive for U.S. Army Field Depot, Da Nang IBM 1401 ADP System.

b. Letter, this headquarters, AVCA CS, 11 April 1970, Subject: Realignment of Automatic Data Processing Functions with inclosure 1 LDSC Organization and Function Manual, 13 April 1970.

c. UNCLAS Message, AVCA CG DTG 131038Z March 1970 subject: Command Data Processing Standards and Priorities.

d. UNCLAS Message AVCA LDSC CO, DTG 150652Z April 1970.

**3. (U) ADP Systems Analysis.**

a. Staff Study, this headquarters, 20 March 1970, to determine whether operations of the U.S. Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay, Personnel Service Company, 92nd Finance Section, and U.S. Army Depot justify retention of the currently authorized UNIVAC 1005's and various IBM punched card equipment.

b. Staff Study, this headquarters, 12 February 1970, to determine whether operations of the two U.S. Army Support Command, Saigon. Personnel Service Companies co-located at Bien Hoa, justify retention of currently authorized ADP equipment.



ANNEX (R) (U) SPECIAL ASSISTANT COMBAT SECURITY

1. (U) Throughout the period the 1st Logistical Command has continued to improve security posture and awareness. Two Support Commands, Qui Nhon and Da Nang, have completely revised their security procedures and have published new implementing plans. To disseminate security information USASUPCOM, Da Nang, has initiated periodic security newsletters. These documents are individually valuable as a guide for installation commanders to develop a viable defensive program and collectively they will be a reliable reference for security data. USASUPCOM Qui Nhon has initiated a monthly security seminar with the same goal. USASUPCOM Cam Ranh Bay has established a combined office for coordination of convoy movement in II CTZ South. The purpose of this office is primarily to minimize traffic problems, however, it has proven useful for coordination of security as well.
2. (U) The first bi-monthly 1st Logistical Command Security Conference was held at Qui Nhon on 26 March 1970. This conference was highly successful as a means of exchanging security information, resolving problems, and presenting new techniques.
3. (U) To avoid the need for a concentrated effort to prepare defenses for expected enemy high points of activity, such as TET, each command has been enjoined to develop a phased program for upgrading and maintaining defenses. This should minimize the large scale diversion of assets from logistics tasks. Extensive coordination is being conducted to insure a smooth transition of security matters subsequent to consolidation of USARV and 1st Logistical Command.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

SECTION II, LESSONS LEARNED.

OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS

96

**CONFIDENTIAL**

## CONFIDENTIAL

### A. (U) PERSONNEL

#### 1. (U) Provisional Units (ACoFS, SP&O)

a. OBSERVATION: The 1st Logistical Command has recently been required, by changing mission requirements, to submit authorization documentation action for organization of four major units. These and their proposed military manpower space authorizations are: Terminal Unit Qui Nhon - 316; Da Nang Depot - 802; Property Disposal Agency - 646; Security Companies - 960. Rapidly changing tactical situations, and their consequent effect upon combat service support missions, preclude anticipating changes in personnel and equipment requirements far enough in advance to obtain the required DA authorization prior to the change in mission. Therefore, new units must be formed (and operate) provisionally until DA approval is obtained. To accomplish modified responsibilities during the 6 to 9 months required to obtain DA approval of a proposed document, personnel and equipment must be drawn from existing TOE and TDA assets. Presently, in only the units mentioned above, 1st Logistical Command has 2,724 manpower spaces for which there exists no approved documentation. This results in the necessity to use personnel in positions other than those for which they are authorized and trained.

b. EVALUATION: The expedient of forming provisional organizations while awaiting DA approval for proposed documents generates unnecessary problems in personnel and equipment management. Morning reports, promotions, morale, availability of critical MOS, availability of badly needed equipment and manpower management are all affected adversely.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That HQ, USARV be granted authority for interim approval of MTOE/TDA/MTDA for requisitioning purposes for both personnel and equipment, subject to appropriate adjustments upon receipt of final DA approval.

#### 2. (U) Shortage of Enlisted Computer Operators (Sp Asst for Data Systems)

a. OBSERVATION: An acute shortage of enlisted computer operators has developed within the Command. The shortage is traceable to two main actions - the pending approval of a revised TDA for the LDSC (formerly a part of USAICCV) and the fact that there is no approved authorization for the US Army Field Depot Da Nang Data Processing Directorate.

b. EVALUATION: An interim solution and a long-range solution to the problem are needed. An authorized overstrength in the appropriate MOS's is the best short-range solution. Once the TDA actions described are approval, the longer range problem will work itself out.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That a temporary overstrength in the appropriate MOS's be authorized pending approval of the TDA's in question and during the period while requisitions are being processed. Specific requirements will be provided as required.

## CONFIDENTIAL

### B. (C) INTELLIGENCE

#### 1. (C) U.S. Military Informant Program (ACofS, SP&O)

a. **OBSERVATION:** During the past 90 days, the 524th MI Detachment has continued to evaluate the enemy intelligence threat to the 1st Logistical Command and planned its operational efforts toward the major problem areas. The major threats in all areas has been determined to be sabotage and subversion. These two primary threats are somewhat interrelated in that subversion of either the local national labor force or military personnel would most logically lead to disruptive dissidence within the command and possibly sabotage. To provide the most effective counter against such activity, this unit has devoted the majority of its manpower to the professional conduct of local national and military informant programs. The threat of espionage has been determined to be less serious than the previously mentioned threats; therefore, the number of counterintelligence inspections, checks and surveys has been reduced to a minimum. The reduction of effort in the counterespionage area has provided the time and manpower to enlarge the informant operations to unprecedented levels.

b. **EVALUATION:** The Military Informant Program has grown steadily since its establishment in November 1969 and currently has in excess of 50 informants reporting on a regular basis. The Local National Informant Program has continued to grow at a consistent rate and now provides inside coverage of the large majority of command installations and activities to include the civilian contractor firms which are vital to the logistical effort in Vietnam. Since informant programs serve primarily to develop leads which must be exploited through detailed investigative activity, this unit has concentrated considerable effort toward accurate and timely investigative work. This has led to a requirement for close and continuous coordination with supported units, other U.S. investigatory agencies, and particularly, Vietnamese intelligence and security services.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** None; action directed is considered satisfactory.

#### 2. (C) Alert Sentries (ACofS, SP&O)

a. **OBSERVATION:** Despite past successes achieved by enemy sappers, there is only one true defense against the sapper and that being an alert sentry.

b. **EVALUATION:** Enemy sappers are continuously applying the technique of striking installations and facilities when security personnel

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

are relaxed and not alert. The sapper must have time. He will sacrifice speed to achieve surprise.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That regardless of alert status and recent enemy engagements, all security personnel must be constantly alert to detect enemy sappers before they are able to capitalize on the element of surprise.

### 3. (C) Wire barriers (ACofS, SP&O)

a. OBSERVATION: In many areas, perimeter wire is improperly placed or construction is inadequate. The most common deficiency is that, in most cases, concertina rolls are stretched so extensively that large gaps are created between the vertical wire.

b. EVALUATION: Enemy sappers will take full advantage of entering installations through weak and ineffective barriers. Concertina wire stretched excessively creates wide gaps which presents little or no challenge to the intruder. The sapper is capable of penetrating a wire barrier successfully if he can get his head through the wire.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Concertina rolls should not be stretched in excess of 15 meters in length. A minimum of three rolls should be used as the base of the barrier with two or three rolls stacked on top. All concertina should be staked and interlaced with barbed wire to prevent the enemy from defeating the barrier. Inspections of the barrier should be made from the enemy's side to insure that gaps do not exist.

### 4. (C) Perimeter Lighting (ACofS, SP&O)

a. OBSERVATION: Several units do not have an adequate lighting system. In those areas that do use perimeter lights, the most common deficiency is that the arcs of the lights do not overlap each other and dark or gray areas are created.

b. EVALUATION: The sapper is trained to operate in the dark. Once he penetrates the perimeter barrier, he relies on confusion among the defenders and their inability to differentiate between defender and the attacker.

c. RECOMMENDATION: An effective lighting system (full illumination of the perimeter) is essential to detection and elimination of the enemy before he can penetrate the perimeter barrier.

### 5. (C) Port Security (ACofS, SP&O)

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

a. **OBSERVATION:** A nearly successful mining attempt in the port of Cat Lai illustrated the need for security personnel to pay extremely close attention to any unusual or out of the ordinary fiber ropes, lines, or cables hanging off of vessels which could be used by swimmer sappers to secure a floating charge.

b. **EVALUATION:** Extensive reconnaissance by enemy forces determined that little or no attention was being paid to unnecessary or unattended ropes, lines or wire cables attached to vessels and buoys. These lines provide an ideal means by which the enemy (swimmer sapper) could attach a floating charge along side of a vessel, barge or buoy for the ultimate purpose of destroying its target.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** All waterborne patrols and ships guards must closely inspect all unattended lines and take immediate action to remove them.

CONFIDENTIAL

C. (C) OPERATIONS

**CONFIDENTIAL**

1. (C) Use of Forecasted Weapons Densities for Computation of Ammunition Requisitions (ACofS, Ammo).

a. OBSERVATION: Ammunition stockage objectives are computed based on weapons densities published by the US Army Major Item Management Agency (MIDA), in accordance with USARPAC Reg 710-15. However, changes to the MIDA weapons density are normally published after changes have occurred. Since ammunition must be requisitioned 90 days in advance, this results in overstockage during a period of troop withdrawals.

b. EVALUATION: The ammunition stockage objective is computed according to the following formula:  $SO = \text{Weapons Density} \times \text{Intense Combat Rate} \times 30 \text{ days} + \text{Weapons Density} \times \text{Theater Sustaining Rate} \times 30 \text{ days}$ . The weapons densities are published by MIDA, and the rates are published in USARPAC Reg 710-15. Changes to the MIDA weapons density are normally published after they occur. As a result, since ammunition must be requisitioned 90 days in advance, an overstock will occur if troop reductions take place during February and March 1970. For instance, during this period 105mm howitzer density decreased from 708 to 564, a reduction of 20%. If ammunition had been requisitioned based on this weapons density, a considerable overstockage of ammunition country wide would have resulted. Using known projected weapons densities, requisitioned quantities met the actual need.

c. RECOMMENDATION: For future requisitioning purposes, projected weapons density based upon the troop units being withdrawn be used.

2. (C) Sea-Land Movement of Ammunition (SLAM) (ACofS, Ammo).

a. PROBLEM: The normal discharge rate of an ammunition ship is 1,000 STONS per day which extends the time required for port and beach clearance. Ammunition depots are likewise taxed in that ammunition must be received from the port, stored, then outloaded for shipment to forward ASP's.

b. EVALUATION: Project Test of Containerized Shipment of Ammunition, (TOCSA) proved the flexibility of containerized shipment of ammunition from CONUS ammunition plants to Vietnam and the throughput of these vans to forward ASP's. The obvious benefit gained was in reduced ship discharge and port clearance, 13 hours as compared to 3 plus days for slightly more than 3,000 STONS of munitions. The ammunition as received at the depots and forward ASP's was in factory like condition since it had not been subjected to the many "lifts" with resultant damage experienced in normal ammunition shipments.

c. RECOMMENDATION: More shipments of ammunition from CONUS by Sea-Land container be instituted so as to further test and evaluate containerization as a mode for ammunition shipments.

3. (C) Ammunition Resupply of II CTZ North (ACofS, Ammo).

a. PROBLEM: In mid February the decision was made to phase the Qui Nhon Ammunition Depot down to an 8,000 STON ASP. This action decreased the stockage capacity by 14,500 STON. This loss in capacity meant that Qui Nhon would not have sufficient storage capability to support ammunition activity

**CONFIDENTIAL**

## CONFIDENTIAL

in II CTZ North. The advantages of maximum throughput of ammunition to forward ASP's was demonstrated in the Test of Containerized Shipment of Ammunition conducted in January. With additional containerized shipments from CONUS not expected until much later in the year, an interim measure was needed to preserve the advantages of maximum throughput to forward support units.

b. EVALUATION: A roll on/roll off operation originating at Cam Ranh Bay was initiated at the beginning of April to support Qui Nhon. The mechanics of the system are as follows: The Qui Nhon depot determines what their requirements will be for a two week period. These requirements, expressed in 21 trailer load lots, which is the capacity of an LST, and sent by message to 1st Log ACofS, Ammo. This office then issues a shipping directive to Cam Ranh Bay. The trailers are loaded at Cam Ranh Bay, and when scheduled by TMA, are loaded on LST's and transported to Qui Nhon. There they are off-loaded and pulled to the ASP's with the first available convoy. Empty trailers are back loaded and returned to Cam Ranh Bay to complete the loop.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Due to the initial success of this concept, it is recommended that the system be expanded to a monthly movement of approximately 6,000 STONS (half of the present Qui Nhon ammunition requirement) thus taking full advantage of direct throughput to the ASP's.

#### 4. (U) Keystone Bluejay General Officer Furniture (ACofS, Supply).

a. OBSERVATION: Requests were received from numerous commands for general officer furniture during Keystone Bluejay.

b. EVALUATION: Uncoordinated requirements for general officer furniture were made to Keystone processing locations, resulting in a duplication of effort and conflicting shipping instructions.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That all serviceable general officer furniture be turned into depot, with disposition requests and instructions handled through ICCV.

#### 5. (U) Keystone Bluejay Weekly Statistical Reports (ACofS, Supply).

a. OBSERVATION: Weekly statistical reports of Keystone Bluejay activity from computer sources only cover a one-week period.

b. EVALUATION: To arrive at cumulative statistics as management data, it was necessary to manually add quantities from all previous printouts to arrive at desired information.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That all weekly statistical reports be cumulative in nature to produce meaningful management data to command levels.

#### 6. (U) Erroneous Assumption of Predisposition by Subordinate Commands (ACofS, Supply).

a. OBSERVATION: Keystone Bluejay predisposition was erroneously assumed by subordinate commands for PEPA items, which required decision by higher headquarters.

102  
CONFIDENTIAL



b. **EVALUATION:** As a result of inadequate holding facilities for PEMA equipment, subordinate commands assumed disposition authority and shipped numerous items to depot stock and maintenance facilities without required authority from higher headquarters. This necessitated a reversal of transaction documentation, and new requests for disposition to be initiated through proper channels.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That closer checks by Inspect and Advise (I&A) teams be made at the processing locations to preclude subordinate commands from deviating from approved procedures.

7. (U) Lack of Initial Keystone Bluejay Guidance to Subordinate Commands and Processing Locations (ACofS, Supply).

a. **OBSERVATION:** There was a lack of guidance on the outset of Keystone Bluejay to subordinate commands and processing locations.

b. **EVALUATION:** Late guidance received from higher headquarters caused processing locations to take actions on their own initiative to process items received. This has resulted in erroneous data in improper format being submitted on items being processed.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That knowledgeable staff officers make early visits to all subordinate commands and processing locations to explain procedures and pass on the latest guidance. These initial visits should be followed up by frequent I&A visits to the processing locations to monitor the project and identify problem areas.

8. (U) Keystone Bluejay Courier Service (ACofS, Supply)

a. **OBSERVATION:** There was a lack of a consistent Keystone Bluejay courier service to all processing locations (ACofS, Supply).

b. **EVALUATION:** Difficulty was encountered in delivering and picking up Keystone Bluejay requests and dispositions from all processing locations up-country. Problems in booking the courier on Air Force flights and erratic flight schedules plagued the service throughout. This has resulted in disposition instructions being delayed as much as 5 days after the support command has failed to meet the courier as the flight was far off schedule.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That close coordination be maintained with MACV Transportation Management Agency to insure the best possible flight service and that support commands make every possible effort to meet courier flights.

9. (U) Keystone Bluejay Shipments to USAREUR (ACofS, Supply).

a. **OBSERVATION:** Certain Keystone Bluejay equipment was designated for shipment to USAREUR.

b. **EVALUATION:** Higher headquarters designated items for USAREUR without shipment instructions or reporting requirements, which were eventually disseminated after-the-fact. This resulted in a larger manpower effort in giving these items special treatment.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That primary consideration be given to in-country requirements and that off-shore requirements be completely worked out before dissemination to the field by higher headquarters.

10. (U) Subsistence Support to Free World Military Assistance Forces (ACofS, Supply)

a. OBSERVATION: When Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) arrived in Vietnam, they were supported with subsistence supplies by the US Army. Each FWMAF was authorized the same ration as was being served to the US Army. The US Military 28 Day Master Menu that was developed for use in Vietnam contains numerous items that are not compatible with the dietary requirements and ethnic tastes of the FWMAF serving in Vietnam. Therefore, the issue of the US ration resulted in many deletions of requirements, some waste and possible sale of subsistence on the black market.

b. EVALUATION: After two or more years of service in Vietnam, special 28 Day Master Menus were developed for the Republic of Korea Forces, the Royal Australian Forces and the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Forces. Since the implementation of these special 28 Day Master Menus, they have been modified several times causing numerous time consuming changes to requisitions, stockage objectives and local procurement specifications. The new menus, once developed and implemented, did result in better customer satisfaction and supply economy.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That prior to attaching any FWMAF to a US military Class I facility for logistical support, a menu be developed that meets the dietary requirements and ethnic tastes of the FWMAF to be attached, developed and published.

11. (U) Late receipt of Kosher Foods. (ACofS, Supply)

a. OBSERVATION: Requisitions were placed for Kosher Foods, for the Jewish Passover Holiday (20-27 April 1970), on 5 November 1969 with a required delivery date (RDD) of 1 April 1970.

b. EVALUATION: On 14 March 1970, the Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC) was queried as to lift data for Kosher items as the available manifests provided incomplete lift information. Several exchanges of messages were required before complete lift data was provided indicating that all items would arrive by 13 April 1970. As of 19 April 1970, three line items still could not be located as manifested.

c. RECOMMENDATION: All specialty subsistence supplies, such as Kosher Foods, should be shipped via containerized transportation from CONUS in one consolidated shipment for each depot, with special lift data being provided via message.

12. (U) 3SVN Supply Cycle Processing (Special Assistant for Data Systems)

a. OBSERVATION: Prior to September 1969 limited emphasis was placed on the importance of timely production of 3SVN supply cycles. As a result, there was generally a backlog of transactions and a lack of responsiveness throughout the supply system. To solve the problem the CG directed that data processing standards be established.

b. EVALUATION: The first standards were set up in October 1969 on a monthly basis with a status report presented to the Commanding General each week. By February 1970 the goals were being exceeded by all ADP sites. During March a standard of six basic supply cycles per week was established for each depot.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That continued emphasis and priority be given to the processing of basic supply cycles. That additional attention be given to spacing of cycles and increased production of supply cycles by the LDSC in the months ahead.

13. (U) Lack of Documentation of the Standard Supply System, 3S Version 31 (Special Assistant for Data Systems)

a. OBSERVATION: Recently a team made up of personnel from the U.S. Army Computer Systems Command, Support Group (PAC) and the Data Service Center, Headquarters USARPAC came to Vietnam to train personnel and supervise the installation of the 3S Version 31. After their arrival it was determined that only 24 copies of the 3S SOP had been received by mail. This is far short of what is needed within the Command. Also the program documentation was incomplete and only one copy was on hand.

b. EVALUATION: Complete documentation of systems and programs is essential to the success of ADP operations. Careful documentation of the programs and wide distribution is essential. To provide the required documentation is was necessary for this command to have the necessary copies made.

c. Recommendation: That future systems and program changes be more thoroughly documented before they are implemented in Vietnam.

14. (U) Reprogramming to Autocoder from COBOL reduces run time. (Special Assistant for Data Systems)

a. OBSERVATION: On 27 March 1970, the programmers of the Systems and Programming Division, Directorate of Plans and Management, U.S. Army Inventory Control Center, Vietnam completed the reprogramming of S301KV - Update DMDOSTMSTR from Input Cards into Autocoder from COBOL. The program performs the transfer on deletion of demands by Activity Address Code (AAC). This program has been used to delete Keystone units demands as the withdrawal of troops occurs. It was also used to transfer the demands from Qui Nhon to Da Nang when the requirement for replenishing Da Nang was placed on the USAICCV.

b. **EVALUATION:** During the past runs, approximately 45 - 50 hours of computer time was consumed per run. It was determined that an Autocoder version of the program could perform the same logic with a dramatic reduction in the time consumed.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** On a subsequent run after reprogramming, the run consumed 1.25 hours of computer time. Further investigation is being conducted in an effort to find other programs on which similar savings can be made.

15. (U) ARVN Ammunition Discharge, Qui Nhon (ACoFS Transportation)

a. **OBSERVATION:** Lack of training and skill of ARVN terminal service personnel caused hazardous operating conditions aboard ammunition ships and forced U.S. Coast Guard surveillance personnel to halt discharge operations.

b. **EVALUATION:** Both RAPPAHANNOCK (3-4 April) and OVERSEAS EVA (1-3 March) were shut down on the advice of US Coast Guard (USCG) Explosive Loading Detachment (ELD) personnel. The ELD's have advisory responsibility for safe ammunition handling aboard US flag shipping. In both instances unsafe and inexperienced whinch operators and stevedores forced the shut-down. The normal Army contractor took over in both cases to complete discharge operations.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That the training of ARVN stevedores for ammunition handling stress safety operations to USCG standards; that such training be monitored by USCG personnel to insure compliance, and that ARVN assume responsibility of insuring proper safety standards be met.

16. (U) Vung Tau Rock Staging Site (ACoFS Transportation)

a. **OBSERVATION:** A proposal was made in March to move the rock quarry staging area at Vung Tau onto the general cargo staging area in the vicinity of the DeLong Pier.

b. **EVALUATION:** The concept of moving the rock for staging to the general cargo area would have reduced the flexibility of port operations at a time of increased cargo staging activity, required because of transshipment cargo being discharged. An intransit storage area is required. The advantages to the rock movement program in locating the surge pile in the intransit cargo area were outweighed by the requirement for general cargo staging.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That sufficient general cargo and ammunition intransit storage will be retained in each port.

17. (U) Line Haul Ocean Going Tugs to Cat Lai (ACoFS, Transportation)

a. **OBSERVATION:** 2nd Logistical Command has been experiencing difficulty in obtaining clearance for Okinawa crew members of line haul tugs to transit Long Tau River to Cat Lai.

b. **EVALUATION:** Until relocation of the Marine Maintenance Activity, Vietnam Detachment #2 (MMAV Det #2) from Vung Tau to Cat Lai, there was no problem as watercraft under tow returning from out of country maintenance could be turned over to MMAV personnel on site at Vung Tau. Since the mission of the ocean going tugs calls for delivery of the tows to the MMAV, the tows must first stop at Cam Ranh Bay to exchange for military crewmen.

## CONFIDENTIAL

c. RECOMMENDATION: That 2nd Logistical Command continue to retain the responsibility for delivery of incoming watercraft assets to the PMAV at Cat Lai; that arrangements be pursued to allow Okinawa crew members to transit the Long Tau River to Cat Lai.

### 18. (C) Property Disposal (PDO) cargo customs clearance (ACofS, Transportation)

a. OBSERVATION: During the reporting period it became necessary to define more closely the role of Vietnamese customs officials towards PDO cargo being removed from Vietnam by contractor.

b. EVALUATION: It was determined that Vietnamese government customs officials have no authority over PDO cargo being loaded at a US military facility by US contracted reimbursable stevedore effort. To clarify this position it was arranged to have title pass to the civilian owner only after the ship had departed Vietnamese territorial waters. Access to the port is gained customs free by moving the cargo on a military Transportation Control and Movement Document. The cargo is staged and handled separately from standard military sponsored retrograde and import cargo.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the procedures to avoid customs interference with PDO cargo be made a part of applicable regulations.

### 19. (U) Retrograde Cargo Cleanliness and Entomological Standards (ACofS, Transportation)

a. OBSERVATION: During the period it became necessary to examine the applicability of US Department of Agriculture (USDA) and US Public Health Service (USPHS) standards to all retrograde cargo.

b. EVALUATION: There was some indication that perhaps strict CONUS retrograde standards would need not be applied to retrograde destined for other than CONUS ports. This viewpoint was discussed with USARV, MACV, USDA, and USPHS officials. Agreement was reached that the same standards of cleanliness should apply to all retrograde regardless of destination. It was noted that frequent enroute diversions occur, and cargo not originally intended for CONUS discharge may be required there. The establishment of a dual set of standards for CONUS and non-CONUS ports creates an undesirable training and operational situation.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That a single set of standards for retrograde cargo cleanliness and entomological clearance be maintained.

### 20. (U) Ammunition Ship Rerouting (ACofS, Transportation)

a. OBSERVATION: Considerable difficulty was encountered in requesting rerouting of ammunition ships to locations outside Vietnam for discharge.

b. EVALUATION: This problem represents responsibility for both ammunition and transportation elements. The requirement in terms of ammunition storage must be addressed and coordinated through ammunition channels. The question of aboard ship storage and feasibility of handling must be addressed by transportation elements. A certain coordinated procedure had to be developed to first determine the ammunition requirements and then to coordinate transportation in support. The procedures worked out during the period are viable and

## CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

represent a valid method, providing the necessary transportation lift data and ammunition intelligence are available, to enable a sound decision to be made. The channels of action and authority must be clearly defined to expedite the rerouting.

c. **Recommendations:** That the changes to applicable CINCUSARPAC and MACV regulations be promulgated stating in detail the steps in coordination and requesting required to divert ammunition and general cargo ships between entries.

### 21. (U) Ship Congestion (ACofS, Transportation)

a. **OBSERVATION:** Continued loading of ships for Saigon/Newport with less than full loads resulted in ship congestion in the Saigon/Newport area.

b. **EVALUATION:** The number of military berths in the Saigon/Newport area is decreasing as a result of ARVNIZATION. However the number of incoming ships remains constant, apparently a result of less than maximum loads being made. This problem was addressed in separate correspondence to the loading ports in an attempt to obtain better use of ships destined for Saigon/Newport.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That continued emphasis be placed on maximum ship use, loading full for military ports, and spacing the ships to avoid congestion.

### 22. (U) Retrograde Cargo Destination (ACofS, Transportation)

a. **OBSERVATION:** During the period several instances occurred of retrograde cargo being shipped to incorrect destinations.

b. **EVALUATION:** This problem stems from two sources. Initial selection of an incorrect port of discharge POD and notation on the offering Transportation Control and Movement Document (TCMD) or a change in desired POD which occurs after the initial offering has been made, but is not posted to the offering. In either case, the result is a shipment made to the wrong port, thus delaying scheduled maintenance programs and requiring additional costly transportation and handling to correct. The preparation of a Master Distribution List printout of the correct consignee codes and POD codes for each type of retrograde equipment has been a big factor in reducing incidents of misshipment.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That continued use be made of a master distribution list to properly match items with both consignees and POD's, that a final check for correctness of consignee code and POD be made within 24 hours of loading, that water clearance authorities take a more active role in checking correctness of POD's as related to consignees when offerings are accepted.

### 23. (U) ARVN Ammunition Barge Site Clearance (ACofS, Transportation)

a. **OBSERVATION:** During the reporting period, ARVN accepted the responsibility of truck clearance of ARVN ammunition discharged at Corido barge site on a routine basis by US military cranes.

b. **EVALUATION:** This process speeds and facilitates clearance of ARVN cargo and spreads the remaining logistical burden more evenly among the available assets. Coordination will be effected to insure that the trucks would operate day and night shifts and that they had access to installations.

The overall concept is valid, and represents a good use of transportation.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That continued use be made of ARVN capability to clear their cargo of any type from port and beach area, and that new areas for expansion of this service be employed.

24. (U) Cam Ranh Bay Stevedore Strike (ACofS, Transportation)

a. OBSERVATION: On 17-18 April, a labor dispute at Cam Ranh Bay caused a slowdown.

b. EVALUATION: Impact on the overall operation was considerably lessened by the rapid transfer of military and LN stevedore assets within the port. This showed the value of cross-training and contingency planning conducted by the support command. No serious impact was felt in terms of cargo handled.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That review and necessary update of contingency port plans and training be conducted to insure rapid, effective response.

25. (U) Equipment (ACofS, Transportation)

a. OBSERVATION: Cargo-type (PC) barges continue to be employed in a static pier role in IV CTZ.

b. EVALUATION: Despite continued efforts to return these barges to the general cargo system, three barges are still employed as static rock discharge piers. According to initial plans at the time of equipment loan in November, 1968 from Cam Ranh Bay, the engineer units operating the Delta Rock Sites were to obtain suitable substitute or replacements for these barges, in order to return them to the general cargo system at Cam Ranh Bay. This action has not yet taken place, despite continued requests from this headquarters.

c. RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the using engineer units obtain MTOE or TDA authorization for those additional assets required for their operations.

(2) Using this authorization, that the engineer units requisition the required assets.

(3) That transportation assets currently authorized to Cam Ranh Bay Support Command be returned to their control.

26. (U) Maintenance of Highways (ACofS, Services)

a. OBSERVATION: Maintenance of MSR roads used for resupply operations is not adequate.

b. EVALUATION: Roads and streets are allowed to deteriorate to the point that they are dangerous to convoy operations, increase vehicle maintenance problems, and slow operations. The Ministry of Public Works (MPW) is responsible for maintenance of roads after they have been accepted from the US engineer unit or contractor responsible for construction or upgrading. MPW does not have the capability of conducting adequate maintenance; this has been stated in letters written by provincial officials to elements of this command. US Engineer units are only responsible for making repairs to battle damage so that the roads can be kept open. PA&F does not make repairs off US installations. The LOC program will improve some roads, but it does not solve the problem of maintaining them after they are upgraded.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the road maintenance capability of the Ministry of Public Works be increased through aid from appropriate US agencies.

27. (U) Construction Priorities (ACofS, Services)

a. OBSERVATION: The priorities of engineer construction effort in Vietnam do not include a category for emergency repairs or replacement of critical logistical facilities.

b. EVALUATION: The only category of engineer support listed in USARV Reg 415-1 under which repair or replacement of logistical facilities clearly falls is base construction. This category has last priority on engineer effort. Therefore, critically needed projects often cannot obtain the priority necessary for immediate construction, thus hampering vital logistical operations. On occasions, some projects of this type have been obtained as operational support, which carries a higher priority. However, classification of a project into this category depends upon interpretation of the definition of operational support given in the USARV regulation and varies widely between individuals with approval authority.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the definition of operational support in USARV Reg 415-1 be changed to include repair or replacement of facilities critical to logistical operations in Vietnam.

28. (U) Upgrading PDO Yards (ACofS, Services)

a. OBSERVATION: The Property Disposal Operation (PDO) yards in Vietnam require upgrading of their facilities in order that they can operate with desired efficiency. However, there is no criteria available on which to plan these facilities.

b. EVALUATION: The PDO program in Vietnam has increased in size each year, but only limited facilities have been constructed to provide efficient operations. MACV Construction Bulletin 415-2-10, Facility Planning Factors, does not include criteria for PDO facilities nor do standard designs exist.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That criteria for PDO facilities be developed for inclusion in published planning documents.



29 (U) Pipeline Stress Crossings (ACofS, Services)

a. OBSERVATION: POL Pipeline stream crossings constructed of coupled pipe sometimes develop leaks either through deterioration of gaskets or as a result of pilferage. The leaking POL spills into the streams with the resulting danger of fire to nearby bridges and inhabited areas.

b. EVALUATION: POL pipeline stream crossings are normally made with coupled pipe laid along side or on a bridge. Leakage from pipeline joints can result from a variety of sources including enemy action and acts of pilferage. POL product then spills onto or under the bridge and floats downstream. If the product catches fire, the bridge and other facilities and personnel in the area are endangered. In II CTZ during this quarter two bridges were damaged in this manner, a number of Vietnamese dwellings destroyed, and civilians killed and injured.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Stream crossings for pipelines be designed and installed in such a manner that they are less vulnerable to leaks, and if leaks do occur, the product does not endanger nearby bridge sites. A request has been submitted to USAECV(P) for a study of this problem. Possible solutions include use of welded pipe at these critical sites with perhaps an additional metal sleeve for increased physical protection, together with resiting to reduce potential damage from fire.

30 (U) Fire Safety (ACofS, Services)

a. OBSERVATION: During the reporting period, several field laundry fires occurred, which were a serious danger to human life and caused considerable damage to laundry and laundry equipment. The rubber hoses used as fuel lines on the dryers were weather-rotted and leaked fuel on the burner assembly causing the leaking fuel to ignite.

b. EVALUATION: Adequate fire safety precautions were not taken in the maintenance of laundry processing equipment. Personnel operating laundry were forgetful of the ever present danger of fire inherent in operating field laundry units.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Constant attention must be devoted to fire prevention at field laundries. Classes on fire prevention and control should be given to personnel working with field laundry units. Insure that working areas are separated to the maximum extent feasible to minimize the possibility of fires spreading from one area to another. Rubber fuel lines must be checked and periodically replaced as deterioration develops. The possibility of replacing these lines with metal tubing when the machines are at a fixed position should also be examined.

31. (U) Production Loss (ACofS, Services)

a. OBSERVATION: During the reporting period, numerous instances of deadline laundry units occurred as a result of generator failure when commercial power was not available.

b. EVALUATION: The failure of generators to function was due mainly to a lack of adequate maintenance being performed during periods when the laundry was operating on commercial power.

c. RECOMMENDATION: To reduce the frequency of downtime due to generator failure, a vigorous program of continued emphasis on generator maintenance must be followed.

32. (U) Procedures (ACofS Services)

a. OBSERVATION: During the reporting period the finished laundered items were of poor quality.

b. EVALUATION: TM 10-3510-208-12 requires a 60lb wash load per machine. By changing the rated capacity from 60 to 40lbs per load of laundry the quality of the finished laundry has greatly improved, as well as customer satisfaction.

c. RECOMMENDATION: The rated capacity of the field laundry as stated in the TM be changed to 40lbs per wash load for Southeast Asia and other hot, humid climates to give the desired quality wash.

33. (U) Fuel Cell Leaks, M107/110 Artillery Weapons (ACofS, Maintenance)

a. OBSERVATION: A frequent cause of deadline of the M107/110 artillery Weapons is a cracked fuel cell.

b. EVALUATION: Information has been provided to direct support units on the proper techniques of preparation and welding the fuel cells. This process usually requires extensive downtime for the weapon and the fuel cell can only be repaired a limited number of times. Eventually the crack becomes too large for in-country repair capabilities.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That a flexible fuel cell bladder, such as that used in the M113A1 APC family, be developed for the M107/110 series vehicles. This would reduce the frequency of deadline for leaking fuel cells for this weapon system.

34. (U) Voltage Regulator for the M551 General Sheridan (ACofS Maintenance)

a. OBSERVATION: Units employing the M551 Sheridan have reported the voltage regulator has been shorting out due to water and fuel getting into the regulator through the adjustment access hole plug which is located on the top of the regulator.

b. EVALUATION: This fault has had an adverse effect on the operational rate for the M551 Sheridan. The voltage regulator controls the electrical current flow for the turret electrical system and without this current the majority of the turret sub-assemblies will not function.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the possibilities be investigated of relocating the voltage regulator to such a position that water and fuel drippings could not possibly get into the regulator. As an interim measure it is recommended that the adjustment access hole plug threads be coated with sealing compound (FSN 8030-226-6436) each time the plug is removed to perform an adjustment. In addition, whenever the cover is removed the pre-formed packing groove in the base section must be coated with silicone compound (FSN 5970-224-5277) prior to reinstalling the pre-formed packing and cover.

35. (J) Intercom System on M48A3 Tank (ACofS Maintenance)

a. OBSERVATION: M48A3 tanks classified as not repairable in Vietnam and those that have met overhaul milire criteria are retrograded to Sagami, Japan less Basic Issue Items (BII). Tanks with combat damage are retrograded to USAD Anniston with BII. Sagami is not funded or authorized to replace the BII and consequently tanks overhauled at that location are returned to RVN less these items. The intercom system, without which a tank commander is unable to effectively coordinate the actions of his crew, is considered a Basic Issue Item.

b. EVALUATION: Prior to issue from USARV depots the intercom system is requisitioned and installed in tanks that have been overhauled in Japan. This procedure requires that maintenance time be expended on vehicles received directly from an overhaul facility.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That a standard policy be adopted to allow both facilities overhauling M48A3 tanks to install or repair the intercom system.

36. (U) 10-Ton Tractor Engine Trouble Shooting (ACofS Maintenance)

a. OBSERVATION: Units equipped with the truck, tractor, 10-Ton, M108A1C have deadlined a high per centage of these vehicles for defective engines. The Red Ball division of the USAICV indicated that as of 26 April 1970 there was a total of 71 active Red Ball Express and 7 Red Ball Extended requisitions for the 10-Ton engine assemblies (FSN 2815-10-0013).

b. EVALUATION: A USATACV Field Maintenance Technician (FTM) was dispatched for several days to a local maintenance battalion, which had on maintenance request seven vehicles that were accepted because of faulty engine operation. The FTM found, through proper diagnostic techniques, that six out of the seven engines had fuel system malfunctions. These were corrected by cleaning and adjusting nozzles and one fuel pump. During the course of his visit the FTM found little or no diagnostic skill available to the unit and conducted on-site trouble shooting classes using the seven deadlined vehicles as training aids. This lack of troubleshooting capability would have caused extensive and unnecessary engine replacements to have been made. It is very probable that this lack of diagnostic skill exists in other support units throughout the command.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That Field Maintenance Technicians visit the three major users of the 10-Ton tractor to conduct on-site inspections of vehicles deadlined for inoperative engines and to conduct classes for support maintenance personnel on proper diagnostic testing procedures.

37. (U) M113A1 Air Filter Assembly (ACofS Maintenance)

a. OBSERVATION: Reports from using units to this headquarters indicated that a new type of air filter element and container is being used on recently produced and rebuilt M113A1 carriers.

b. EVALUATION: Investigation revealed that an engineering change had been made with this element but that field units had not been notified by the commodity command. Also there were no advance actions taken for supply of the new air filter assembly or the element. After study by technicians it was found that the new air filter assembly is interchangeable with the old assembly if the entire assembly is switched. Using units were notified to make this change until such time as the new filter element becomes available. When adequate supplies of the new filter element are on-hand in the command the assemblies can again be switched.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That commodity managers insure that the field units are notified of any modification of equipment and that necessary stocks of repair/replacement parts be made available before the modified equipment is deployed.

38. (U) Direct Exchange of Modules (ACofS Maintenance)

a. OBSERVATION: Communications-Electronics equipment is becoming more modular in construction. These repairable modules are expensive and control must be maintained over unserviceable assets.

b. EVALUATION: Prior to the introduction of modular construction, electronic equipment was repaired by piece part replacement; i.e. tubes, resistors, capacitors, etc. With the introduction of the AN/VRC-12 series radio, repair by module replacement was initiated. Many modules were replaced at the organizational level and the modules were comparatively inexpensive -- \$15.00 to \$30.00. Return of these repairables was uncontrolled. With advancement in the state of the art, modules became more complex with attendant rise in cost -- \$100.00 to \$2,000.00. However, modules are still being supplied to the user level with the same looseness in control. This allows units to requisition modules without turning-in unserviceables and creates large expenditures of stock fund monies. A new concept of direct exchange and retrograde is required in communications electronics maintenance.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That these modules be placed on a direct exchange program and that strict accountability be initiated. Action should be taken to block requisitioning by other than DX points. This action must be coordinated through HQ USARV and the US Army Electronics Command.

39. (U) Use of Stated Minimum Guarantees in Fixed Price Indefinite Quantity Contracts (FPIQ) (ACofS Procurement)

a. OBSERVATION: The US Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam has been able to effect a material cost saving through the use of stated minimum guarantees in selected FPIQ contracts.

b. EVALUATION: When preparing a RFP for indefinite requirements there must be a decision made as to the use of a requirements type contract or a fixed price indefinite quantity type contract. The major difference and most pertinent aspect of this choice is that minimums are not required in a requirements contract, whereas minimums are required in a FPIQ contract. When preparing a bid on a RFP, that has no realistic minimum, the contractor may plan his operation to satisfy maximum foreseeable requirements including contingencies which may be costly to him. Consequently, proposed prices are inflated. The RFP where the careful use of statistical and/or historical data will permit the use of guaranteed minimums, normally causes the offerer to assume some risks. The degree of reliability and refinement of the statistical and historical data will dictate the degree of risk sharing the Government may reasonably assume. Basic data may permit the Government to share only a minimal risk whereas, sophisticated data could permit maximum risk sharing. With a guaranteed workload, the contractor's operation is planned with fewer variables in costs, thereby, reducing the unit or contract cost.

c. RECOMMENDATION: The savings made possible through the use of stated minimum deliveries or quantities in the area of stevedoring strongly indicates like savings are possible in other indefinite quantity contracts. When statistical and historical data will support this concept, recommend guaranteed minimum quantities or deliveries be incorporated in the RFP thus providing for corresponding cost reduction to the Government.

D. (U) ORGANIZATION (none)

E. (U) TRAINING (none)

F. (U) LOGISTICS

1. (U) Sale of Aluminum Beer Cans (ACofS. Services)

a. OBSERVATION: Recent sales of garbage and trash have proven so successful in increased proceeds to the government that segregation of aluminum beer cans generated by the Officer and NCO Open Mess System is being considered as another probable source of revenue for the US Government.

b. EVALUATION: At the present time the Long Binh Post Officer and NCO Systems alone, generate approximately half a million beer cans per month. In CONUS the price per can is approximately  $\frac{1}{2}$  cent. It is foreseen that a comparable price can be obtained in this area with the approximate net return in the neighborhood of \$2250 per month to be put back into the club system.

c. RECOMMENDATIONS: The capability to segregate, remove, and sell aluminum cans is already established in Vietnam. Property Disposal Agency is presently in

coordination with the Long Binh Post Commander to implement procedures to collect and sell aluminum cans. Should the venture prove successful, the Agency proposes to institute the plan at other installations throughout Vietnam. In addition the prospect of shipment to a central location for the utilization of one of the five aluminum smelters presently in-country is being studied. Property Disposal yards presently have the capability to crush light metal and should the cost of transporting the high density, low volume packet to a central location not be excessive, an even higher price per pound could be realized for the aluminum in ingot form.

2. (U) Dual Retrograde Policy for M4A3 Tanks and M113A1 APCs. ACoS, Supply (Log Management)

(a) OBSERVATION: A critical shortage of Basic Issue List Items (BILI) now exists within RVN.

(b) EVALUATION: This problem evolved from the present dual retrograde policy which states that battle damaged tanks are retrograde with all available BILI; tanks that are retrograded because they have been classified as not repairable in-country or meet the mileage criteria established in USARV Regulation 750-22 will be turned in without BILI. Tanks which are rebuilt in CONUS are received in RVN with BILI; tanks which come from Sagami, Japan, arrive without BILI. However, depending on progress of the two rebuild programs, IECV (Closed Loop Division) directs shipments of tanks on an individual basis. Rebuild averages 8 months in Sagami and 10 months in CONUS and units have no way of knowing if they will receive a vehicle with or without BILI.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a single retrograde policy be established and that all tanks be retrograded with BILI and returned to RVN with complete BILI.

3. (U) Exclusion of the 5-Ton Truck from the USARV Inventory

(a) OBSERVATION: To introduce a new vehicle into the approved field environment, during a time of reduction of logistical capability, resulted in adverse impact on the command.

(b) EVALUATION: (1) Proposed supply of 5-ton trucks to USARV indicated replacement vehicles would be the new Cummins model truck. The supply and maintenance requirements for these vehicles would require increased ASM-FILs and additional mechanic and operator training.

(2) A study was conducted to project requirements and assets over the period 1 Jan 70 through 30 Jun 71. Authorizations over the period were factored downward in proportion to expected troop reductions and projected assets were obtained from Closed Loop data. Assuming assets of redeploying units could be retained for in-country redistribution, projected CF requirements could be satisfied without introducing the new motor vehicles.

(3) The study results were passed to USARV. A message was prepared and forwarded from USARV to USARPAC recommending adjustments be made to resupply programs and that only non-Cummins vehicles be provided to USARV.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That new items introduced into the Army inventory be distributed on an as-required basis to selected units to preclude a mix of makes and models.

4. (U) Project HIT Construction Materials ACoIS, Supply (Depot Operations)

(a) OBSERVATION: Reports of quantities of materials shipped by the depots and reports of quantities received by MACV advisors at project sites have often been in conflict in the past.

(b) EVALUATION: The discrepancies revealed by these reports have been attributed to pilferage and loss in numerous handlings during shipment, and to the fact that US transportation personnel are unfamiliar with areas and personnel to whom deliveries must be made. Usually, their only contacts in these areas have been Vietnamese and they could not be certain the right persons were receiving the materials.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That depot personnel contact addressees on scheduled shipments and coordinate with transportation personnel to insure that US personnel or, as appropriate, ARVN personnel are made available as guides to accompany the shipments to their destination. This action should preclude pilferage and insure timely delivery to the addressee.

5. (U) Disposition Instructions on Post, Camp, and Station (PC&S) Property and Secondary Items

(a) OBSERVATION: Disposition instructions on PC&S property and secondary items were not received in a timely manner for Keystone Bluejay operations.

(b) EVALUATION: Disposition instructions to the processing locations on PC&S and secondary items were held up until 20 Feb 70 due to lack of guidance from higher headquarters. This caused large backlogs of stocks at processing locations, where storage space was critical.

(b) RECOMMENDATION: That guidance be provided prior to the outset of each phase of troop reductions so that the SUPCOMs are able to establish disposition procedures in advance.

6. (U) Keystone Bluejay "Shopping Lists" for PC&S Items

(a) OBSERVATION: Keystone Bluejay "Shopping Lists" for PC&S items from six sources were passed to the support commands for fill.

(b) EVALUATION: Higher headquarters passed shopping lists from MACV, ARVN, USARHAW, and USAEIGHT of PC&S items to the 1st Logistical Command for fill from Keystone Bluejay assets. This caused the processing locations to screen six different shopping lists for each item of PC&S property received. Additionally, storage space was required to accumulate sufficient items to make a shipment worthwhile.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a consolidated printout be made with requirements for all commands, to include US requirements, by Federal Stock Number (FSN), with shipping activity address codes (AACs) for each SUPCOM to fill.

7. (U) Keystone Bluejay Predisposition Instructions for PEMA Items

(a) OBSERVATION: Keystone Bluejay predisposition instructions were not available on PEMA items.

(b) EVALUATION: Disposition instructions for SCRAM 1, 2, and 3 items were maintained at two, three, and four command levels higher than the processing location holding the equipment, which involved an average of 7 days from the time disposition was requested until the time it was received. This necessitated large equipment holding areas where items were susceptible to the elements and pilferage.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all predisposition be delegated to the organization which is only one command level higher than the support command.

8. (U) Pipeline Stream Crossings ACoIS, Supply (POL)

(a) OBSERVATION: Numerous fires have occurred on bridges over which POL pipelines are laid. A revision of the procedures for reduction of fire risk is required.

(b) EVALUATION: Several factors must be considered when designing stream crossings for POL pipelines. Cost considerations and proximity to roads make bridges ideal crossings for pipelines. However, several fires which have severely damaged bridges have occurred when POL pipelines were ruptured by enemy action and or mechanical failure. No unique solution to this problem exists although several have been tried. These included suspension of pipelines on the downstream side of the bridge and on pilings downstream from the bridge. An additional technique is to cross all bridges with welded pipe which has been placed in a sleeve and filled with asphalt to prevent damage to the pipeline and thus to the bridge.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Further study, research and development be initiated to determine the best method of constructing pipeline stream crossings.

G. (U) COMMUNICATIONS (none)

H. (U) MATERIAL (none)

I. (U) OTHER (none)



## CONFIDENTIAL

AVHCC-DST (15 May 70) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
30 April 1970 (RCS CSFOR-65)(R-2)(U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 17 JUL 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Railway Equipment," page 58, Annex F, paragraph 4: concur. Currently this Headquarters is taking action to place US Rail car assets under the direct control of three Support Commands: Da Nang, Cam Rahn Bay, and Saigon, which match up with the three Vietnam National Railway System (VNRS) rail divisions - Da Nang, Cam Rahn Bay, and Saigon. With an accountable Officer in each SUPCOM to closely coordinate maintenance as well as rail car movement with TMA and the VNRS, overall control should improve. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

b. Reference item concerning "Project TOSCA," page 59, Annex F, paragraph 5a(2): concur. The test indicated that there were significant advantages in terminal operations in CONUS and RVN and in the condition of ammunition received. Excessive costs were generated in the CONUS line haul and sealift aspects of the test, however. This Headquarters is in favor of use of containerized Class V shipments from the standpoint of reduced hazards to handling personnel and the reduction in time from vessel to using unit. Cited reduction in cost is also desirable in our continued cost reduction efforts. Action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

c. Reference item concerning "Provisional Units," page 97, paragraph A(1): concur. This Headquarters has already requested authority for interim approval of MTOE/TOA/MTDA. Action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

d. Reference item concerning "Shortage of Enlisted Computer Operators," page 97, paragraph A(2). A letter from subject headquarters identified the specific critical command shortages in data processing personnel and requested authorization for overstrength. The shortages were determined to be 15 personnel in MOS 74E. The 1st Indorsement by HQ, USARV to the 1st Logistical Command, dated 30 May 1970 approved the requested temporary overstrength. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

## CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (15 May 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
30 April 1970 (RCS CSFOR-65)(R-2)(U)

e. Reference item concerning "Wire Barrier," page 99, paragraph B(3): concur. A topic in the May 1970, USARV Tips for Commanders entitled "Increase the effectiveness of Concertina as an Anti-Sapper Barrier" is a good reference. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

f. Reference item concerning "Use of Forecasted Weapons Densities for Computation of Ammunition Requisitions," page 101, paragraph c(1): concur. The use of projected density figures based upon troop withdrawal strength would offer a more realistic and flexible requisitioning practice. Present data is obtained from AMC Major Items Data Agency (MIDA). Action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

g. Reference item concerning "Sea Land Movement of Ammunition (SLAM)," page 101, paragraph c(2): concur. Comments covered under Project TOSCA. Additional shipments of containerized ammunition from CONUS have been requested as a result of the Project TOSCA test. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

h. Reference item concerning "Ammunition Resupply of II CTZ North," page 101, paragraph c(3): concur. Increased direct throughput is highly desirable with the recent loss in QNH storage capacity. Use of this method appears to offer the solution to the problems of adequate support for II CTZ. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

i. Reference item concerning "Keystone Bluejay General Officer Furniture," page 102, paragraph c(4): concur. Action is now being taken by this command to correct the situation. Appendix III to Annex F OPLAN 183-70 is presently being revised. Specific instructions will be forthcoming as to the disposition of assets refused by ARVN prior to implementation of Keystone Robin. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

j. Reference item concerning "Keystone Bluejay Weekly Statistical Reports," page 102, paragraph c(5): nonconcur. The system in question is a unique type three system as defined in paragraph 1-2b and c, AR 18-2. Changes to such computer programs are not centralized and minor output changes can be made without reference to this Headquarters. The Directorate of Data Processing, US Army Depot, Long Binh has changed the computer program to produce the reports in the desired form for the next Keystone operation (Robin). No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

k. Reference item concerning "Erroneous Assumption of Predisposition by Subordinate Commands," page 103, paragraph c(6): concur. Due to the lack of coordination and communication between the processing locations and this Headquarters, numerous PEMA Items were given disposition without authority from higher headquarters. Recommendations that closer check by I&A Teams is concurred with. Courier service improvement would increase communications between processing locations and HQ USARV. This action is under consideration in the plans being developed for Keystone Robin. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended. 120

## CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVHGC-DST (15 May 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
30 April 1970 (RCS CSFOR-65 (R-2)(U)

1. Reference item concerning "Lack of Initial Keystone Bluejay Guidance," page 103, paragraph c(7): concur. Every possible effort was made in Keystone Bluejay to provide definitive early guidance. Annex F (Logistics) to USARV OPLAN 183-69 (U) was revised and advance copies were distributed to HQ, 1st Log Comd and each SUPCOM at a Keystone Bluejay Logistics Conference. This conference was called for 3 January 1970 which was as early as possible after release of the troop list and revisions of the logistics annex. Keystone Bluejay procedures were explained to participating and supporting units' representatives and a question and answer period followed which allowed attendees to clarify points. Liaison was also established between SUPCOMs and redeploying units to permit advanced planning at the operating level. Asset accounting, reporting and processing procedures were then somewhat rudimentary and many details had not been firmly established. Only limited predisposition instructions could be provided. As a result of Keystone Bluejay experience, USARV has extensively revised and published Annex F to USARV OPLAN 183-70 to provide step by step detailed guidance. This document has already been distributed to SUPCOMs for advanced planning and preparation of implementing instructions in anticipation of the next redeployment increment. Disposition and Predisposition instructions are being analysed to determine if additional predisposition instructions can be delegated to SUPCOMs for their advanced preparation. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

m. Reference item concerning "Keystone Bluejay Courier Service," page 103, paragraph c(8): concur. This Headquarters is cognizant of the problems that untimely courier service created during Bluejay. Currently, plans are being made to correct this situation through coordination with MACV. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

n. Reference item concerning "Keystone Bluejay Shipments to USAREUR," page 103, paragraph c(9): concur. Action has been initiated to insure that special shipment requirements are completely firm before instructions are disseminated to the field by HQ USARV. Exact procedures on how this will be accomplished are forthcoming. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

o. Reference item concerning "Lack of Documentation of the Standard Supply System, 3S version 31," page 105, paragraph c(13): concur. Recommend that Computer Systems Command, Support Group (PAC) and Headquarters, USARPAC insure that all future changes, except emergency type changes, be thoroughly documented prior to installation in USARV. Documentation will become even more critical as this command shifts to the Standard Supply System (3S) with the system being maintained at USARPAC. Action by USARPAC is recommended.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVHGC-DST (15 May 70) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
30 April 1970 (RCS CSFOR-65 (R-2)(U)

p. Reference item concerning "Reprogramming to Autocoder from COBOL reduces run time," page 105, paragraph c(14): concur. Action by USARPAC is recommended to grant an exception to the requirement to use COBOL in the instance as provided in paragraphs 6-5d and 6-6, Army Regulation 18-7.

q. Reference item concerning "Line Haul Ocean Going Tugs to Cat Lai," page 106, paragraph c(17): concur. Action has been taken to inform 2d Log Comd that watercraft being returned to RVN must be properly crewed to transit the Long Tan River to Cat Lai. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

r. Reference item concerning "Property Disposal (PDO) Cargo Customs Clearance," page 107, paragraph c(18): nonconcur. Vietnamese Customs Officials do not operate under US Army Regulations. The US Embassy in Saigon is aware of the customs problems and is taking steps to enforce the country to country agreement between the US and the Republic of Vietnam. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

s. Reference item concerning "Retrograde Cargo Cleanliness and Entomological Standards," page 107, paragraph c(19): concur. TAB A to Annex F, USARV OPLAN 183-70, outlines specific procedures to be used in preparing retrograde cargo to pass entomological standards for shipment from Vietnam. These standard procedures will be used in preparation of equipment regardless of the shipment's destination. Coordination will be maintained with the Processing Locations to insure that action is accomplished. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

t. Reference item concerning "Retrograde Cargo Destination;" page 108, paragraph c(22): concur. Continual emphasis is being placed upon insuring that documentation reflects the current POD. The use of the master disposition list is being continued along with a final check of consignee code and POD by the loading port within 24 hours of loading. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

u. Reference item concerning "Equipment," page 109, paragraph c(25): nonconcur. Static rock discharge piers in IV CTZ are an urgent but non-continuing requirement. MTOE or TDA authorization for these barges are not considered feasible. The three barges are critical to the high priority Delta Rock Program and are used in lieu of permanent piers which would cost in excess of \$100,000 each to construct. Since each barge will be used at two or three sites during FY 71, savings of up to \$900,000 construction cost will be realized. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

## CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (15 May 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
30 April 1970 (RCS CSFOR-65 (R-2)(U)

v. Reference item concerning "Construction Priorities," page 110, paragraph c(27): nonconcur. USARV Regulation 415-1 was written as it is now to insure that our limited engineer effort would be expended in such a way that the level of effort devoted to a particular category of construction would be in proportion to its relative urgency. If the lack of repair of a critical logistical facility would hinder "current or impending tactical operation," then this repair can qualify as operational support under the current provisions of this regulation. If the lack of repair is not a threat to tactical operations, then it does not warrant operational support priority. If R&U work is properly requested, and accomplished, these facilities should not require operational support type repairs. Normal R&U work includes both normal maintenance and the repair of minimum battle damage. If major repairs or replacements are required then a priority of these constructions must be assigned unless the tactical situation warrants otherwise. It is not felt that variance of interpretation by approval authorities is sufficient justification for rewriting this regulation as it would automatically authorize an operational support priority for the repair of critical logistical facilities regardless of tactical considerations. Unit has been so advised.

w. Reference item concerning "Pipeline Stream Crossing," page 111, paragraph c(29): concur. A study was conducted on 26 May 70 by USAECV on the "Prevention of Bridge Damage from POL Fires." The recommendations are listed below:

- (1) That all POL pipeline stream crossings be valved with gate valves located inside bunkers on each side of the stream, and a check valve located on the side of the stream opposite the pump.
- (2) That POL pipelines not be attached directly to a bridge structure under any circumstances.
- (3) That unburied subaqueous POL pipeline crossings not be used in locations where high explosives are used as a deterrent to enemy swimmers.
- (4) That aerial POL pipelines crossings be used in the majority of cases and be placed 20 to 100 feet downstream from bridges.
- (5) That buried subaqueous POL pipeline crossings be used in locations where an aerial crossing is not feasible.

## CONFIDENTIAL

AVHCC-DST (15 May 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
30 April 1970 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R-2)(U)

x. Reference item concerning "Procedures," page 112, paragraph c(32): concur. The 2d Indorsement, dated 19 February 1970, to 1st Log Comd letter, subj: Field Laundry Productivity, dated 15 January 1970, authorized the use of 40 pounds per washer load. Unit has been so advised.

y. Reference item concerning "Fuel Cell Leaks M107/110 Artillery Weapons," page 112, paragraph c(33): concur. The chasis of the M107/110 artillery weapon absorbs an enormous shock each time the weapon is fired. Continuous firing of the weapon results in fatigue cracks in the metal fuel cell. To minimize the flexing of the fuel cell wall in the hydraulic pump shaft area, a kit containing a doubler and stiffener is being applied as MWO 9-2300-216-40/5 (Installation of Cooling System Fuel System Engine Mount and Forward Hull Improvements). In addition, a bladder type fuel cell is being developed by USATACOM and is presently undergoing tests. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

z. Reference item concerning "Voltage Regulator for the M551," page 113, paragraph c(34): concur. This Headquarters has already recommended that the Sheridan voltage regulator be moved to avoid fuel drippings. Advanced information from USATACOM reveals plans for moving the regulator and providing more durability. The procedure for sealing the regulator is already in use. Unit has been so advised.

aa. Reference item concerning "Intercom System on M48A3 Tank," page 113, paragraph c(35): concur. The installation of the intercom system by Sagami would be a wise step and could save valuable maintenance manhours in USARV. Request USARPAC review the possibility of Sagami installing the intercom system on M48A3 tanks.

ab. Reference item concerning "10-Ton Tractor Engine Trouble Shooting," page 113, paragraph c(36): nonconcur. The recommendation stated that field maintenance technicians should visit the major users of the 10-ton tractor, and that they conduct on-site inspections and also conduct classes on proper diagnostic testing procedures. At the present time each of the four support commands have diagnostic schools specifically for this purpose. All maintenance activities have been made aware of these schools and there has been good attendance to date. The field maintenance technician (FMT) is to identify problem areas and to make his findings known to the appropriate maintenance activity and to the support command. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

## CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST ( 15 May 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
30 April 1970 (RCS CSFOR-65)(R-2)(U)

ac. Reference item concerning "Direct Exchange of Modules," page 11', paragraph c(38): nonconcur. There is a critical shortage of many modules throughout the command, not due chiefly to losses, but rather to the slow repair time in CONUS Depots. Recently a tracer action was initiated to find out how many A-5200 modules were returned to CONUS during 1969 since we had demands for approximately 5,168. Lexington Army Depot, the offshore repair point for the A-5200 modules, indicated USARV units returned a total of 5,511 modules. The direct return program by using the "Jiffy Bag" concept is recouping unserviceable/repairable assets. Also, USARV established a control on the direct return program in January of this year, by utilizing the 1348-1 to control the issue of new modules. Additional copies (250) of USAECOM Supply Information Letter (SIL) 3-70 (which provides a new revised listing of modules required for direct return) has been requested through USAECOM channels and will be disseminated throughout appropriately. Unit has been so advised.

ad. Reference item concerning "Direct Exchange of Modules," page 114, paragraph c(38): concur. USAECOM has presented a wholesale exchange program to the Army Materiel Command for consideration. Under this program certain modules/components will be designated as "T" Code (depot repair only) by ECOM. Designated evacuation points will evacuate "T" Code items to CONUS depots which will report the item to the NICP and submit a requisition for replacement to the evacuation point. Units will be unable to requisition "T" Coded modules except for initial issue or combat loss. Unit has been so advised.

ae. Reference item concerning "Dual Retrograde Policies," page 116, paragraph f(2): nonconcur. The Command is cognizant of this problem and previous actions have been taken to resolve the dual standard policy. Proposals submitted to USARPAC for elimination of this dual standard in the retrograde of vehicles with and without BILI have been disapproved by USARPAC. Denials are based on two major factors: A world-wide shortage of BILI items exists for the subject vehicles. This shortage is not peculiar to USARV alone. There is a limited availability of BILI items available to CONUS rebuild facilities. Consequently, those items shipped to CONUS rebuild facilities will be shipped with BILI and upon repair and return of items from CONUS, missing and/or unserviceable BILI is replaced and returned to USARV with the vehicle. Upon establishment of the USARJ (Sagami) rebuild program, funding provisions were not made for replacing missing and/or unserviceable BILI on vehicles repaired and returned to USARV. In essence, USARJ does not possess BILI stocks to equip vehicles repaired in Sagami. Consequently, BILI for vehicles shipped to USARJ for rebuild must be retained in USARV. The problem experienced by USARV in this area has been directed to the personal attention of CINCUSARPAC. It is USARPAC's position that the dual standard will continue for the remainder of FY 70; hopefully to be resolved with new funding programs for FY 71. Unit has been so advised.

## CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVHGC-DST (15 May 70) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
30 April 1970 (RCS CSFOR-65)(R-2)(U)

af. Reference item concerning "Exclusion of the 5-ton Truck from USARV Inventory," page 116, paragraph f(3): concur. Recommendation is in concurrence with USARV position as indicated in USARV msg 160438Z March 1970 (S). Recommend action by USARPAC and DA.

ag. Reference item concerning "Disposition Instructions on PC&S Property," page 117, paragraph f(5): concur. Action has been initiated to correct this situation. USARV msg DTG 101155Z Jun 70, Subj: PC&S and Secondary Items of Equipment, required all addressees to submit a want list in card deck form to this Headquarters NLT 10 July 1970 on PC&S and secondary items. These card decks will enable HQ USARV to make disposition on these items prior to the start of troop reductions. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

ah. Reference item concerning "Keystone Bluejay Shopping Lists for PC&S Items," page 117, paragraph f(6): concur. Action has been initiated to correct this situation. USARV msg 101155Z Jun 70 requests information which will be used to produce a consolidated printout with requirements for PC&S items from all commands. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

ai. Reference item concerning "Predisposition Instructions for FEMA Item," page 118, paragraph f(7): nonconcur. Due to the nature of some FEMA items it is not feasible to delegate predisposition instructions to the lowest level of command below the SUPCOM. Plans are being developed in an effort to disseminate predisposition instructions to the SUPCOM's as expeditiously as possible. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
Clark W. Simmons Jr.

LTJG  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
HQ, USARV ATTN: ACoFS, G4

**CONFIDENTIAL**



GPOP-DT (15 May 70) 2d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Logistical Command for Period  
Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 1 OCT 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed subject report as indorsed and provides  
the following comments:

a. Paragraph 2c (paragraph 1, page 97 ). Nonconcur. Headquarters  
USARV requested interim approval authority in April 1970 which was not  
favorably considered. Following submission of this report headquarters,  
1st Logistical Command TDA was discontinued, the TOE reduced to zero  
strength, and its mission absorbed by Headquarters USARV.

b. Paragraph 2o (paragraph 13, page 105). Complete program documen-  
tation was subsequently forwarded and will continue to be furnished for  
systems and programs.

c. Paragraph 2p (paragraph 14, page 105). Nonconcur. The situation  
discussed is unique and in all probability the reduction cited was due  
in large part to a revision in the programs processing logic and would  
have been attained in either COBOL or Autocoder.

d. Paragraph 2aa (paragraph 35, page 113). Effective 1 Sep 70 all  
APC and M48A3 tanks retrograded from USARV will be shipped with all  
required BII. Beginning 1 Mar 71 APC and tanks will be shipped from  
Sagami with required BII. This procedure was announced in USARPAC  
message 180445Z Jul 70.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



D.D. CLINE  
2LT, AGO  
Asst AG

Cy furn:  
CG USARV

ENLISTMENT STATISTICS 1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70

LA LOGISTICAL COMMAND REINFORCEMENT STATISTICS													
COMMAND	1ST LOG COMD OBJECTIVE		1ST TERM RA A OBJECTIVE 33.3%		CAREER RA RA OBJECTIVE 80.0%		AUS (INDUCTEES) LA OBJECTIVE 6.7%		USAR/NG'S DA OBJECTIVE 25.				
	OBJ	ENL	%ENL	ELIG	ENL	%ENL	ELIG	ENL	%ENL	ELIG	ENL	%ENL	
Cam Ranh Bay Support Command	120	110	91.7	144	94	65.3	62	60	96.8	144	16	11.1	NA
Saigon Support Command	230	146	63.5	272	127	46.7	103	103	100.0	124	19	15.3	NA
Qui Nhon Support Command	154	99	64.3	162	77	47.5	53	53	100.0	134	22	16.4	NA
Da Nang Support Command	102	47	46.1	67	39	58.2	41	40	97.6	42	8	19.0	NA
HHD	19	5	26.3	16	5	31.2	15	15	100.0	8	0	0.0	NA
TOTAL	625	407	65.1	661	342	51.7	274	271	98.9	452	65	14.4	NA

\* Objective is .86 of total assigned enlisted strength. ■ ■  
AVCA Form 77 (28 Sep 68)

# MORALE AND WELFARE PROGRAMS

## In-Country R&R Utilization

	<u>Allocation</u>			<u>Filled</u>			<u>Utilization %</u>		
	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>
Enlisted	108	120	*	72	147		66.6	122.5	
Officer	9	11		4	9		44.4	81.8	
Total EM	228			219					
Total Off	20			13					

## Out-Of-Country R&R Utilization

	<u>Allocations</u>			<u>Filled</u>			<u>Utilization %</u>		
	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>
CRB	436	435		434	431		99.5	99	
SGN	684	703		681	702		99.6	99.8	
QN	558	518		554	518		99.2	100	
DNG	442	443		442	443		100	100	
HQ&ATTCH UNITS	213	314		211	314		99.0	100	
COMD	2333	2413		2322	2408		99.5	99.8	

\*April statistics are not available until the 2nd week of May 70.

~~Inlosure 3 to Incl 1~~

COMD	FEBRUARY 1970			MARCH 1970			APRIL 1970		
	ALLOC	APT	UNUSED	ALLOC	APT	UNUSED	ALLOC	APT	UNUSED
HHD, 1st Log									
E7	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
E6	15	12	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
E5	17	0	17	0	0	0	33	33	0
E4	38	12	26	0	0	0	42	42	0
TOTAL	72	26	46	0	0	0	75	75	0
USASUPCOM, SCN									
E7	5	5	0	12	12	0	7	7	0
E6	97	97	0	46	46	0	9	9	0
E5	703	531	172	1192	825	367	338	315	23
E4	1434	987	647	964	804	160	860	762	98
TOTAL	2239	1420	819	2214	1687	527	1214	1093	121
USASUPCOM, QNH									
E7	8	8	0	6	6	0	3	3	0
E6	11	11	0	5	5	0	15	15	0
E5	83	83	0	297	297	0	181	181	0
E4	349	277	72	397	352	45	310	310	0
TOTAL	451	379	72	705	660	45	509	509	0
USASUPCOM, CRB									
E7	18	18	0	11	11	0	6	6	0
E6	13	13	0	8	8	0	11	11	0
E5	104	104	0	203	203	0	121	121	0
E4	1119	390	729	448	392	56	493	402	91
TOTAL	1254	525	729	670	614	56	631	540	91
USASUPCOM, DNG									
E7	9	9	0	11	11	0	5	5	0
E6	21	18	3	22	22	0	13	13	0
E5	196	196	0	260	260	0	130	130	0
E4	526	288	238	553	350	203	477	477	0
TOTAL	752	511	241	846	643	203	625	625	0

# CONFIDENTIAL

## (C) 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND QUARTERLY STRENGTH REPORT

	FEB 1970				MAR 1970				APR 1970			
	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>OPER</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>OPER</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>OPER</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>OPER</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
HQ, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND	543	582	107.2	543	529	97.4	500	502	500	502	100.0	
ASSIGNED UNITS	1044	1037	99.3	1044	1013	97.0	1029	948	1029	948	92.1	
USASUPCOM, CAM BANH BAY	8526	8637	101.3	8313	8240	99.1	8216	7710	8216	7710	93.8	
USASUPCOM, DA NANG	7618	7416	97.5	7471	7116	95.2	7471	6872	7471	6872	92.0	
USASUPCOM, QUI NHON	11772	11168	94.9	11739	10810	92.1	11243	10423	11243	10423	92.	
USASUPCOM, SAIGON	18103	16927	93.5	18144	16445	91.2	16562	16335	16562	16335	98.6	
COMMAND TOTALS AND OVERALL PERCENTAGES	47278	45407	96.0	47254	44153	93.4	45021	42790	45021	42790	95.0	

CONFIDENTIAL

Inlosure 5 to Inel 1

QUARTERLY REPORT OF GAINS AND LOSSES

	FEB 70		MAR 70		APR 70		TOTAL	
	GAINS	LOSSES	GAINS	LOSSES	GAINS	LOSSES	GAINS	LOSSES
HQ & Asg Units	43	93	97	179	79	134	219	406
USASUPCOM, CRB	492	645	317	961	347	878	1156	2484
USASUPCOM, DMG	499	484	415	624	487	420	1401	1528
USASUPCOM, QNH	934	764	645	788	417	901	1996	2453
USASUPCOM, SGN	546	973	703	1077	541	1217	1790	3267
TOTAL	2514	2959	2177	3629	1871	3550	6562	10138

(U) AWARDS APPROVED BY 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND  
DURING THE PERIOD 1 FEB 70 - 30 APR 70

AWARD	HQ 1ST LOG COMD	USASC SAIGON	USASC CAM RAH N BAY	USASC QUI NHON	USASC DA NANG	TOTAL
SILVER STAR	2	0	0	0	0	2
SOLDIER'S MEDAL	10	0	0	0	0	10
BRONZE STAR W/"V" DEVICE	5	4	1	21	3	34
BRONZE STAR MEDAL	253	413	369	421	235	1601
AIR MEDAL W/"V" DEVICE	0	0	0	0	0	0
AIR MEDAL	2	2	1	12	4	21
ARCOM W/"V" DEVICE	6	14	0	17	2	39
ARCOM	195	1164	713	882	345	3299
TOTAL	473	1597	1084	1353	589	5096

The following is a complete report of casualties by area and type rendered during the months of February 70, March 70, and 1-15 April 70.

FEBRUARY

Death/Injuries by area	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>DEATH N-H</u>	<u>INJURIES N-H</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Cam Ranh Bay	0	3	0	13	16
Da Nang	0	1	0	11	12
Qui Nhon	0	4	5	21	30
Saigon	0	0	1	4	5
HHD & Atch Units	0	0	1	0	1
Total	0	8	7	49	64

MARCH

Death/Injuries by area	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>DEATH N-H</u>	<u>INJURIES N-H</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Cam Ranh Bay	0	0	1	5	6
Da Nang	0	1	1	6	8
Qui Nhon	0	2	3	8	13
Saigon	0	0	3	12	15
HHD & Atch Units	0	0	0	2	2
Total	0	3	8	33	44

1-15 APRIL

Death/Injuries by area	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>DEATH N-H</u>	<u>INJURIES N-H</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Cam Ranh Bay	0	4	1	1	6
Da Nang	0	2	0	1	3
Qui Nhon	0	10	3	10	23
Saigon	0	6	5	3	14
HHD & Atch Units	0	0	0	0	0
Total	0	22	9	15	46



CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED  
Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310		CONFIDENTIAL	
		2b. GROUP	
		4	
3. REPORT TITLE			
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 1st Logistical Command			
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)			
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb to 30 Apr 70.			
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)			
CG, 1st Logistical Command			
6. REPORT DATE		7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES	7b. NO. OF REFS
15 May 1970		142	
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.		8b. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
A. PROJECT NO. N/A		702185	
		9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT			
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		12. NUMBERING MILITARY ACTIVITY	
N/A		DA, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	
13. ABSTRACT			

135

DD FORM 1 NOV 64 1473

UNCLASSIFIED  
Security Classification